

The Futures of Power⁽¹⁾

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INTRODUCTION

Some may recall, or have read about, those heady days when history allegedly ended, as the Berlin Wall collapsed⁽³⁾. When the wall came down it seemed to many observers as if, with the end of communism – at least in Europe – the only threat to existing democratic political power was vanquished. Liberal, plural democracy, the open society and open organizations seemed to stretch as a vista into a future full of promise offering peace in our time, with all its assumed dividends, and the triumph neither of the will nor the state but of decent, ordinary democracy. Surely the chance to build a better world of organizations was imminent?

To imagine the end of history is to imagine a world without surprise, contingency and drama, a world wholly of apparent order. Any social order is an emergent drama, enacted through the clash of imaginations, encoded through circuits of power, experienced as different orders of domination. It involves prosaic as well as implausible projects, dreams as well as nightmares, ambitions as well as anxieties. Ordering uses whatever devices, actors and technologies come to hand for it's constructing. And it always occurs in contested spaces. There is never a single social imaginary, despite what conservatives, radicals, or functionalist theorists might think. Always there will be imaginings, striving to come into being and seeking to deny the strivings of other projects. Such is life.

Not surprisingly, in the 1970s many key debates overwhelmingly concerned power and the state, in part because in a number of European countries during this era, notably France, Spain and Italy, it looked as if the communist parties might gain electoral office⁽⁴⁾. Hence, the debates about power at that time were conceived in terms of the extent to which the state was an organizational

instrument capable of being run by alternate elites in different ways (Miliband, 1969; Poulantzas, 1973). By the 1980s it was clear that the chance that these communist parties might have to gain office was past. The neo-liberal agenda was resurgent, with the pace being set in the UK and the US and other Anglo-dominions such as Australia and New Zealand. On the left the debates had shifted to consider how it was possible to construct coalitions and alliances between disparate and fragmented interests from green parties, feminism, and from social democrat parties in opposition to these neo-liberal projects. As rates of unionization declined and the old heartlands of the male blue-collar working class, such as mining and steel-making, were decimated by the switch to a post-industrial services economy in most Western countries, the notion of class position securing clear-cut identities weakened greatly, in both theory and practice. The debates shifted to encompass the insecurity, multiplicity and indeterminacy of conceptions of identity in a post modern world (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985)⁽⁶⁾. The proliferation of a plurality of identities introduces many more points of rupture into contemporary politics. The fundamental role previously assumed by relations of production in defining identity as either that of ruling or working class cannot be sustained in the face of new, shifting, unstable identities. These new identities are articulated not so much through traditional forms of political representation (parties and unions), but colonized and channelled through consumption, lifestyles and branding (consumer generations such as Gen X and Y, Boomers, as well as the new tribalisms of identity, such as dance, trance, Goths etc).

Increasingly, against the hybridity of identity, the business organizations that market and brand those identities with which people badge their bodies, possessions and lives, were becoming increasingly global. Capital became ever more organized on a transnational basis. Branch offices, dispersed yet coordinated production and marketing capacities, and spread all over the world, exploiting global migratory patterns, profiting from globalized labour markets and consumption (Hardt & Negri, 2000).

The world's space seemed to be shrinking, not only because of globalization, in at least three ways. First, time is **eclipsed** through virtual media. Second, whereas once there was a limited and secure set of identities planted in firm hierarchies in the social space, these are now **expanding**, proliferating, and complicating the nature of the social space such that it becomes simultaneously shrunk by over-crowding and much more difficult to navigate because of increasingly confusing signs. Third, social spaces that once were only colonized on the colonizers terms are now **counter-colonized** in ways that threaten the security of these spaces. The buffering spaces of the social have shrunk.

SHRINKING SPACE: ECLIPSING TIME

Extending Business Globally

What made contemporary globalization possible, in part, was the virtual capillaries of instantaneous communication and trade embedded in the Internet. By the 1990s much of organization theories' focus had shifted to the emancipatory possibilities of new virtual technologies potentially rendering hierarchy and bureaucracy redundant (see Clarke & Clegg, 1998). Optimistically, there is good reason to think that, however slowly, imperative coordination may be giving way to responsible autonomy and heterarchy. There are now technologies available that can handle more distributed authority relations, through the use of digital and virtual communication. The Internet allows for far less centralized modes of organization – and, indeed, in the present state of anxiety in society about terrorist attacks, we are likely to see many organizations adopting more distributed and network structures, with responsible autonomy in each of their nodal points – if only to be sure that the organization can survive a cataclysmic event such as 9/11. It is evident that organizations that have distributed systems and networked leadership will better survive catastrophe. After all, that is precisely what the Internet was designed to do⁽⁶⁾.

While the optimistic scenarios envisage a world in which small and local business, offering unique products, will be globally connected by the Internet, there are more pessimistic aspects of globalization to contend with that are likely to have an impact on organizational power relations. Pessimistically, the times in which we live have grown more troubled in many respects and the necessity of imperative coordination seemingly ever more pressing. As a result of digital capabilities Western post modern society not only surrounds those who live within its borders; its global media project images of it to the rest of the world, intensifying the powers of the market enormously.

Resisting Globally?

In the past the major challenge to market power was the state (Clegg, Boreham, & Dow, 1983) or the organized labour movement. After the failure of Eurocommunism in the 1970s, and the rapprochement of social democracy with the neo-liberal agenda from the 1980s, challenge from the state declined. The decline in left politics was paralleled in the industrial sphere as well.

The **international** organization of capital confronts *national* labour movements.

Organized labour has had to match the learning trajectory of that capital in whose employ it is globally arraigned. Significant global campaigns have emerged from within the trade union movement and from the critics of globalization to confront the new global realities (Hogan & Greene, 2002). However, trade unions remain, for the present, largely nationally institutionalized, and they do not afford much of a threat to existing organization of the relations of production, especially as their recruitment and penetration of the post-industrial services economy is far lower than was the case in the era of industrial labour and society. Also, they are increasingly irrelevant because their leadership is largely male and the domain of their traditional membership female. Thus, the biggest issues that unions face today on the membership front are low female and ethnic minority participation rates such that the people doing the representing rarely share either gender or ethnicity.

Inter-union coordination in response to the globalization of value chains was taken forward by the UK Liverpool dock dispute, which took place between 1995 and 1998. Extensive mobilization of support from within and beyond the labour movement was achieved through the use of the web in concert with more traditional forms of mobilization (Carter, Clegg, Hogan, & Kornberger, 2003). Following the defeat of the union, the skills developed in the struggle have been carried forward to archive the dispute and to develop a sustainable skill-base within the community⁽⁷⁾. Within 48 hours of the settlement of the UK dispute an identical dispute broke out in Australia, a locus of support for the Liverpool workers and, at that time, a regulated labour environment (Clegg, 1999)⁽⁸⁾. Of critical significance was the role of the Federal Australian government in planning the dispute, involving overseas training of serving members of the Australian armed services⁽⁹⁾.

Anticipating Resistance? Simulation and Identity in the Electronic Panopticon

Increasingly, the work force, whether unionized or not, encounters organizations within which sophisticated surveillance is the norm. Organizations, not just in government, are increasingly making use of available surveillance technologies to seek enhanced supervision and control. The electronic panopticon is going global in an increasingly insecure world, offering opportunities not only for hypersurveillance but also a new kind of organizational simulation, that is hyperreal, a world where we can ‘*simulate a*

space of control, project an indefinite number of courses of action, train for each possibility, and react immediately with preprogrammed responses to the “actual” course of events (which is already over and through a simulacrum)’ (Bogard, 1996, p. 76). Organizations increasingly neither need a political economy of bodies to **handle** power nor to embed it in a moral economy of the soul through extensive **surveillance**. Instead, they project information in a mode that has been described as ‘the purest form of anticipation’ (Bogard, 1996, p. 76).

Almost all large scale organizations of any sophistication are increasingly premised on work whose doing is simultaneously subject to hypersurveillance of its being done, characteristic of both managerial work and work more generally. The traces of data that all information-laden actions leave automatically as they are enacted become the objects for analysis, for the speeding up of processes, of eradicating porosity through which some effort, time or work might seep, eradicating the gap between the action and its accounts, the work and its record, the deed and the sign. The loop between being, doing and becoming tightens irrevocably on the terms of those elites that can channel and funnel information, closing down the unaccountable moments in the programmed loop between employees and technologies reporting data that managers have to act on.

Hundreds of thousands of workers in both government and private industry are subjected to drug tests, have their prior work records scanned, are diagnosed for general health, intelligence, loyalty, family values, economic and psychological stability (through matches generated in searches of other databases), fitted to job profiles, placed on career tracks – or unemployment tracks – all in addition to routine, rigorous monitoring on the job ... The virtual scene of work is one where the end of work – who the worker **will have been**, what the worker **will have produced**, what path his or her career **will have taken** – governs the entire process before it begins (Bogard, 1996, p. 117).

It is not only the security apparatuses and the legislative assemblies that multiply dreams within which identities that are constructs of the profiler, the psychological tester, and the human resources manager, become crucial. All large organizations, equipped with the foresight of simulation, can screen out potential deviance from the organization as easily as the society at large. It is the reality of how, increasingly, organizations use informatics’ virtual worlds’ as they construct identities within which our lives will be lived. Our identity, more than ever, will be a social construction, but not necessarily one made

under conditions of our own choosing. Organizations will increasingly adopt bio-surveillance technologies, such as retina, fingerprint, and face scanning, and use this to monitor, restrict and govern access, with all the ethical issues that entails. Such data, together with those identities that are coded from market-based information, credit records, credit cards, and other forms of transactions, will ensure that some elements of identity become less negotiable. Given the likely direction and speed of development of genetics, organizational capabilities will increasingly be pre-figurative rather than retrospective; as Bogard (1996, p. 9) puts it, ‘genetic technology offers the fantastic possibilities of pre-identification, i.e., identities assigned in advance, profiles that we have seen can be used to target bodies for all kinds of future interventions and diversions.’ Potential pathologies for organizations – such as prediction of earlier than required executive demise due to genetic codes or lifestyle triggers – can be problems eliminated in advance. Normalization will no longer be remedial or therapeutic, no longer require the counselling interview as its major device, but will be anticipatory⁽¹⁰⁾.

Expanding Identities Filling Space

If the previous section has presented a pessimistic view of identity politics, the technological dystopian view, there is a more optimistic scenario. Much of the politics that surrounded debates about power in the recent past has centred on issues of interests and identity. These politics focused on the indetermination of both interests and identities. However, these debates were only possible in both a theory and a practice informed by postmodernism (Castells, 1997) in which a switch occurred from a society that articulated around relations of productive and domestic labour to one whose centre of gravity was increasingly relations of consumption. Identities founded in the spheres of work and the traditional family and household became unsettled, rendering the idea of objective interests problematic.

In theory, it was postmodernism that deconstructed the stable identities provided by the great cleavages inherent to the master nineteenth century narrative of class, which articulated around the relations of production, and the late twentieth century narrative of feminism, which centred on the relations of gender. Laclau and Mouffe (1985) made a considerable difference to the saliency of these debates with their theoretical intervention, analytically sidestepping all the orthodoxies that wanted to ascribe real interests to others on the basis of big T theory, whether Marxism, feminism, or whatever.

The theoretical moves were in part a result of reflection on changing realities

as well as changing priorities. In the political theory sphere, Laclau and Mouffe could proclaim, as they did, in a Lacanian move, that there was no such thing as society because there is no transcendent signified subject, what we take to be reality is a discursive construct. In the sphere of political practice Prime Minister Thatcher could and did say the same thing, albeit that she meant it in a different way. For her, as with her close colleague in arms, President Reagan, there should be only real individuals exercising their freedoms as sovereign consumers. They were remarkably successful in constructing this as a model of society that was widely emulated in the West.

One theoretical response to these changing politics was that an excessively egotistical and narcissistic subjectivity became celebrated as post modern, as a possibility tied into consumption rather than production. In many respects it was the material environment that of Reaganomics and Thatcherism that framed these late eighties debates (Gamble, 1988), as much as debates in post-structuralism and feminism, although it is evident that they were in fact interdependent, as left intellectuals struggled to come to terms with the new neo-liberal conditions of existence.

The debates had effects that trickled into the analysis of organizations, in terms of a critique of the notion that there are unambiguous identities that possess real, if unknown, unarticulated, or repressed interests (Clegg, 1989). While the main thrust of critique was in terms of a stress on the fragmentation, plurality and ambiguity of identities, the frame of reference was very much that of the sophisticated employee in organizations in the advanced sectors of the advanced economies: Immaterial labour producing immaterial goods such as a service, a cultural or symbolic product (Hardt & Negri, 2000).

Integral to this immateriality is the production of new identities –creative knowledge workers and symbolic analysts – for whom their work is essentially tied up with their identity and successful positioning of their identity as a presence in the competitive market of enterprising subjects. Like workers of old they sell themselves, their time, but the point of sale occurs through the successful presentation of their identity as a presence that makes a difference.

Often, these notions of identity are glossed as post-modern, to signify the fluidity and lack of structural determination by relations of production which is taken to be a hallmark of modern identities. The modern was seen to be passing away and the post modern coming to be. Thus, when **Frameworks of Power** was written, much as nearly everyone else, Clegg (1989) did not dwell on the possibility that conceptions of identity, based neither on modern relations of

production nor post modern relations of consumption, but based instead on fundamental assumptions about the nature of men, women and their relation to a transcendent God, would sprout in the midst of modernity⁽¹¹⁾. We now know that this was a peculiar blindness⁽¹²⁾.

AFTER 9/11: FROM A RISK SOCIETY TO A STATE OF INSECURITY

The Empire Struck Back

For a while, until at least the attack of February 26, 1993 on the World Trade Centre, it might have seemed as if the old matters of identity were hardly of any concern. After the second more successful attack of 9/11 few could think that was still the case⁽¹³⁾. Islamic claims to identity were serving as circuit-breakers to existing power relations.

What emerged from the Middle East was not so much a reassertion of pre-modern identities but a positioning of a contemporary identity. It is one that expresses a version of Islam as politically grounded within modern frameworks. Religious thoughts are used as political weapons, alongside modern instruments such as the Internet and video, and with a sophisticated grasp of mass media spectacle. What was evident about what the terrorists who commandeered the planes did, was their intersection with, and irruption into, the global circuits of power that are centered practically, symbolically, and emotionally on New York and Washington. Practically, New York is the media HQ of the world; the Twin Towers were the emblem of global capitalism, and the Pentagon the symbol of American imperial might. If you want the whole world to watch a spectacle what other venues would be better to stage it in than New York? The choice of the Pentagon as a target (and the White House, the presumed target of the fourth plane that was crash-landed in the countryside) made the meaning of the attack quite transparent. The prime time crews were right on hand at the centre of global distribution networks. The whole world really could be watching what was achieved, very quickly. What was innovative about what the terrorists did was to bring the damage of war to the US mainland in a way that no other adversary ever had achieved, while simultaneously bringing it to the attention of the whole world.

9/11 was a carefully choreographed spectacle. Emotionally, the deaths of thousands of people in a single spectacular were caught in the gaze of the whole television-viewing world in a re-playable series of instances. As such,

the spectacular weighed far heavier in the balance than the infinitesimally numerically weightier accumulation of deaths that have resulted from US Foreign Policy over the years. Mostly, these were unseen; often they were unreported, and they were not, on the whole, spectacular. Nor, to put a fine point on it, did they engage with the emotions of most people in that most self-centred of nations in which the other identity to that of being American is defined as that of being an ‘alien’, as US immigration control so nicely puts it.

Of course, that the US has in the past invariably been both politically discriminate and ethically indiscriminate in its choice of friends and enemies is no excuse for the awfulness of what happened on 9/11 but it does put it into some kind of context. Choices involve responsibilities, in foreign relations just as much as any other. And sometimes others will configure and constitute these choices in ways that their progenitors could never have imagined in the past, by disturbing the architecture of politics, meaning, and war utterly. And this seems to be what has happened. The whole world watched the events of 9/11 in New York and Washington over and over again in replay; we can conclude that its designers had a sophisticated grasp of the **realpolitik** of power and its circuitry. They knew how to use fear and terror to try and reconfigure the circuitry of international relations, as well as to destroy lives. With absolutely no resource dependencies to speak of, with hardly any resources in fact, they were able to symbolically overwhelm, circuit-break, and reposition the entire architecture of power that has made the US so comfortable at home, so secure in its projections of power abroad and so despised by those who regard their causes and peoples as its victims.

Diaspora, Identity and the Democracy of the Market

The explanation of 9/11 that developed from the bin Laden videos makes it evident that fundamentalisms were flourishing through which **pre-modern** claims to identity were paramount, even as they were promoted in terms of contemporary politics and media. The claims of and for a religiously fundamental identity have found realization and ruthless repression alike in different parts of the Middle East and Muslim Asia⁽¹⁴⁾. Nor did their impact start and stop there. They also produced resonances amongst the broader Muslim diaspora, of whom there are over twenty million in Europe alone. For any diasporic community the central issue is always one of cultural integration, a ‘two-sided process of immigrants’ adjustment to a new society without loss of what they consider essential to their identity (or self definition, particularly in the sense of their religion or ethnicity) and, simultaneously, of the adoptive society’s accommodation

of them (McGown, 1999, p. 43). The notion of difference that is indexed by the notion of ethnicity is usually thought of in terms of a continuum that stretches from a primordial, internal concept to one that is external and structural. Primordially, it is the attachments and relations that one carries with one that define identity; structurally, it is the boundaries determined by the larger society rather than the life-world that the communities construct that defines them. Externally, Isajiw (1979, p. 21-22) defines an ethnic group as an ‘involuntary group of people who share the same culture or to descendants of such people who identify themselves and/or are identified by others as belonging to the same involuntary social group.’ In many developed societies, especially where the Muslim population is concerned, external and internal definitions coincide. In the diaspora of British cities, as McGown (1999, p. 228) argues, for specific ethnic communities, there is developing

a strong consciousness of identity through religion, in order to place themselves in a new society that is predominantly non-Muslim, and indeed to assert themselves within it ... [a context in which] ... the Islamists have acquired a moral leadership beyond the circle of those willing to identify themselves as such⁽¹⁵⁾.

For some in diasporic Muslim communities generally, the hostility is such that their identities in question see nothing that resonates positively in the offerings that the market produces in abundance in the host society. Instead, they see an overly sexualized, narcissistic and alienating environment. Revolted by what is on offer in the post modern market – and we in the West are all embraced by this institution now – for some a retreat to the certainties offered by fundamentalism seemed desirable. Here, as Durkheim would have expected, an excess of social integration can lead to a surplus of altruistic suicide as some people, in some communities, are prepared to kill and die for their beliefs in the appropriateness of identity⁽¹⁶⁾. A state of insecurity is generating new risks in and for society.

The State of Insecurity

Beck defined the risk society as one in which the processes of modernization have introduced systemic risks and insecurities previously unknown in nature (Beck, 2002, p. 21). The risk society is characterized by decisions that are industrially produced and potentially ‘politically reflexive’ (Beck, 2002, p. 183). Beck’s (2002) concern is with industrial production and ecological risk, typified by phenomena such as Acid Rain, Global Warming, and Chernobyl and with the loss of identity and heightened insecurity associated with more flexible work patterns (Beck, 1999).

Today, Europeans, Americans and Australians live not only in a risk society but also in a state of insecurity, a condition that previously characterized societies quite marginal to Western civilization (such as Sri Lanka [George & Clegg, 1997]). If the generalized risk is amplified by floating signifiers that attract fear and deliver terror in these countries then elsewhere, in countries such as Brazil and South Africa, that most fundamental element of liberal political philosophy – the security of the body of the individual subjects and the security of the body of the polity as a whole – is more at risk from a marginal population, surplus to employment relations, whose entrepreneurial outlets are largely deployed in a criminal economy of drug-dealing, kidnapping, murder, and corruption⁽¹⁷⁾. The basis of institutionalized and legitimate power relations always rests on a claim to be able to produce social and moral order – a hypothesis as true of intra-organizational relations as it is of those that are societal.

‘Society’ and Identity

Throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s the refrain of economic neo-liberalism was that there was no such thing as society. Society could be conceived of simply in terms of individuals making economic choices, using price signals as allocative mechanisms. In the terms of the ‘no society’ project it was postulated that only individuals should be conceptualized as existentially real. As free subjects they were able to exercise choices in markets, such that consumption became the key to identity. An unanticipated side effect of the project is to whittle down the grounds for identity formation. If you are what you shop to become then identity formation becomes highly contingent on participation in the rituals of a market society. Thus, for those who refused the market and its choices and were estranged politically, economically and ideologically, there was little or no identity available that could relate to the central projects of the type of society in which they found themselves⁽¹⁸⁾. For those Muslims with utopian religious worldviews estranged from the dominant orthodoxies, if what is on offer is a reality constructed on narcissism, consumerism, and individualism, then it is not surprising that it should be seen as constituting a hegemon that affronts their existence, faith, and identity. Where utopian ideals turn present-day life into a dystopia, it is hardly surprising if some responses are dysfunctional for the social reality that normalcy constructs. For the poor, it is perhaps more probable that political utopias, premised on the kind of populism exemplified by Chavez, will attract attention and support, against the neo-liberal agendas of the elites and the open economy favored by globalization.

Where utopian ideology exists in communities that barely interact outside the confines of chosen urban patterns of residence, which, for all the usual reasons

are highly concentrated, then dystopian beliefs about identity, the world, and one's place in it as a member of the broader community, can more easily flourish, especially where everything that is needed is found there – food, religion, spouses, culture, and appropriate garb – so there is little need to go outside⁽¹⁹⁾. Within the embrace of utopianism all faiths develop dystopian groups little involved in the everyday life of a broader society in which they cannot find themselves, where disaffected young people are drawn to radical cliques largely devoid of pluralism, discursively and religiously, because the central role is played by a literalist interpretation of the key text. In such a situation all interpretive politics become condensed into one game of hermeneutics in which those interpretations that seem 'purest' will always attract alienated and anomic individuals.

Media and Identity

Finally, as a result of digitalization, individuals have the choice not to be involved in the cultural life of the place where they live, in the larger sense, but are able to participate more vividly in the cultural life of the diasporic community through Al Jazeera and other media, and thus live a reality that, while it is real, is hardly shared at all with the broader context of everyday life. When this reality is treated on the BBC, CNN or France2, let alone FoxNews, it is rarely a personalized but mostly a dehumanized reality – 26 people were blown up in three suicide attacks in Baghdad on the day that we wrote these words – as opposed to the continuing focus on the people who were destroyed in the bombings on one day in London (7/7/2005) or another day in New York (2/11/2001) or Bali (12/10/02). These others are constituted as **our** brothers and sisters. We feel their pain, we know their faces, we read about their families, and we share their distress and devastation on the nightly news and in the pages of the newspapers in a way that we do not that when we hear of statistics. These people are also brothers and sisters, sons and daughters, mothers and fathers, but their humanity is denied us, because, of these others we know nothing. They are just a statistic. If we knew better these other people, in places, places such as Sharm el-Sheikh (07/23/05), if we knew these people who are not like us, and if, in other places, such as Baghdad (25/07/05) we less routinely expected the statistics⁽²⁰⁾, there might be more understanding and a few more heartfelt tears shed for the losses incurred.

Some young people will be drawn to a dystopian view of reality through a utopian view of religion. In counties in which their very presence is reflected to the selves they see in the looking glass of the others through the frame of difference – different colour, different ethnicity, different language, different food, different clothes, different lives, and different suburbs – all centred on

different religion – this will be especially the case. If, in such circumstances, they might feel their difference existentially should hardly be surprising. Especially, that is when the difference that **you** represent seems to be one on which the other has declared war, via an abstraction of a terror whose sense signifies attack on ‘people like us’. If, at the same time, the opportunities for human growth afforded one are rarely posed in terms other than those that are heavily circumscribed for the deeply devout and orthodox, we should not be surprised if a few people take seriously both their future perfect utopia and their present imperfect dystopia⁽²¹⁾.

ELITES IN A SHRINKING SPACE AND AN EXPANDING STATE OF INSECURITY

In the circumstances we have sketched, we don’t expect to see elites disappearing too quickly. Their circulation might speed up as they fail to deal with the new threats that the risk society and the heightened state of insecurity offer, but circulatory elites have always been essential to power⁽²²⁾. Existing power holders have a bright future in a world where an ideology of threat and uncertainty pervades the whole social and organizational world as a space of heightened risk, together with powers of simulation with which to anticipate, pre-identify and impression manage these risks. The need to organize risk provides unexpected resources with which to perpetuate social relations of domination, increasingly legitimated by the new rhetoric of insecurity. Among these rhetorical resources, the paradoxical power of political powerlessness plays a crucial role. It shapes a curious social world where leading elites are both more and more remote from the grassroots and deliver a compelling discourse about common overwhelming constraints weighing unobtrusively from the top to the basement of the social strata. Consequently, there is a widening gap of social hierarchies, an increasingly oligarchic character to political societies, all oriented to managing overarching threats and constraints upon the whole social body. And in the midst of that landscape, there is, in parallel, the growing political apathy of the masses, which tends to privilege individual fates over any sort of collective good, captured and amplified by popular entertainments such as **Survivor** and **The Apprentice** (Clegg, 2005). Parallel to this is the growing alienation and estrangement of those people who find fundamental meaning in literal interpretations of ancient texts, whether Koran, Torah, or Bible. The Durkheimian ‘nightmare’ of a vanishing solidarity seems to have taken material form to roam around our lives and worlds.

The futures of power are indisputably related to the respective influence of the public and private spheres of action over a large array of political circuits, including discourses, organizational forms, political regimes, forms of elite fragmentation and cohesion, as well as the nature of political performance future leaders will strive for. All are now oriented to a legitimate need to increase control, tighten power, and restrict access because of the general, non-specific but existentially real risks posed to organizations by the free-floating signifier of Terror

Contemporary economic conditions largely shape the futures of power, but not its understanding. Increasingly concentrated in firms oligarchically, power as a concept is 'exploding' in numerous social meanings, power as a resource is disseminated and concentrated, while political agendas are dividing into innocuous local decisions and cardinal centres of power. Agency and sovereignty are progressively modelled in a rejuvenated combination. Political life is both founded on claims to establish sovereign centres of power and decision and on scattered and agonistic agencies, whose mediation demands organization.

That soft power now coexists with enhanced harder power arose in response to heightened security threats as the influence of remote and unknown people and collectives increasingly threatened. The most decisive ingredients of political decisions now come from nowhere, or from globally disseminated bodies, from hardly delineated competitors, hardly defined networks, hardly graspable claims arousing in distant places ... even from places few have ever heard of previously. To get the gist of power futures, we must accept the growing dispersion, first, of systems of meanings and second, of systems of production of meanings among germane actors. Consequently, one of the most fascinating facets of contemporary and future systems of power is how these dispersions are organized.

FRAMEWORKS WITH WHICH TO THINK THE FUTURES OF POWER

The importance of the macro-political developments and their likely effect on the futures of power in organizations is that the futures of power will be largely dependent on the magnitude of the changes that are affecting and will affect the organizational world over the next few decades. Whether the agenda for change will be minimalist, redistributive, developmental or even structuralist, to take March and Olsen's four conceptions of the political agenda at the level of societies (March & Olsen, 1995), the nature and culture of power will be durably affected.

Table1: A Framework with which to Think About the Institutional Futures of Power

	Minimalist agenda	Redistributive agenda	Developmental agenda	Structuralist agenda
Types of change	Individualistic forms of 'intrapreneurship'	Morally-oriented conception and design of organizations	Shaping a true political community Organizations as polities	Creating organizations as powerful political subjects
Outcomes of political actions	Individual consent Voluntary contracts	Human and public welfare	Influencing the values, beliefs and identities of individuals	Institutional and constitutional engineering
Nature of Power	Private interactions Power as game	Regulating power resources Establishing a 'balance of power'	Educational Power as virtue	Power as structure
Culture of Power	Markets and possessive individualism	Consumer sovereignty	Letting better informed buyers beware	Increasing institutionalization of regulation by standards rather than the state
Political performance	Organizing bargaining and exchange Managing coalitions	Offsetting inequalities	Establishing agreements on collective purposes	Inventing institutions

Minimalist power is relatively indifferent to substantive outcomes and the construction of identities; it is more used to minimize the costs of political battles. Redistributive power is used to limit both inequalities in the polity and the power of elite. Developmental power is used to generate shared cultures and educate the people insofar as it constitutes a political community. Structural power is used in the engineering of specific institutions aiming to shape and control the demands of the polity (March & Olsen, 1995, p. 242-245).

Power is likely to be increasingly institutionalized in the organizational world as the futures of power in organizations revolve around two major issues:

- . How will organizations preserve and enhance individual freedom and initiative while relentlessly engineering new managerial institutions that strengthen narrow circles of powerful individuals monitoring the organization from the top? How will they combine a structural and a minimalist agenda?

. How are organizational leaders going to embody the growing societal and political dimensions of their activity? Put differently, the transformation of leadership from a set of managerial practices and rules to a set of institutional capacities implies that we think about power in organizations as a means to educate, socialize individuals, to create and sustain identities ... and to consider the role of elites as governing institutions instead of merely managing organizations.

To comply with a managerial directive is to accede to a moral or political agenda that one does not necessarily share. The role of political power is to invent and engineer powerful institutions that create the necessary obedience-generative constraints and legitimacies inside organizations and societies. One of the most pressing questions posed by a perspective based on a political agenda is that of moral disagreement. The dispersion of individuals and values around the globe in the present context of global 'organizational sprawling' emphasizes the discrepancies between decisions made in some circles of power and the perceptions and interpretations of individuals; put another way, the question of how to manage the common affairs of people who disagree about moral and non-moral matters but live together in the same society/organization should be stressed.

Resistance, Political Apathy, and Transfers of Power

One can agree with the idea that the traditional elements of the old European order, resting on kinship, social class, religion, local communities, monarchy (Nisbet, 1993) were scrambled by the forces of democracy. No longer as sharp and clear, they form an omelette; in some countries the monarchy has been removed from the mix, in others the church has been separated from the state, and so on. Traditions live on in some places like a nightmare in the brain of the living, as Marx once put it. One might think of the noble titles, for instance, which decorate the boards of business organizations. But they are tangled up in new circuits of celebrity, where porn stars are indistinguishable from heiresses and heiresses from porn stars, where celebrity is an end in itself, where people are famous for being famous.

Returning to organizations, the ideological signification of democracy in the organizational world is not only related to a kind of moral utterance. It is also the work of power, since democracy in economic institutions is antagonistic to oligarchic and bureaucratic practices and values. It is power not only in the mechanical sense of 'force applied to a people by external government in the pursuit of its own objectives, but power regarded as arising from the people, transmitted by libertarian, egalitarian and rationalist ends so that it becomes, in effect, not power but only the exercise of the people's own will' as Nisbet (1993, p. 40) says. The question arising from this quotation is not merely how far organizations can be

truly democratic but concerns the peculiar interconnections between democracy, power and morality. As Nisbet (1993) puts it, power without morality is despotism, while morality without power is sterile. Scholars must therefore think through the combination between democracy, power and morality. So far, we have barely begun to do this in the contemporary practices of organizations.

We think that futures regimes of power will be deeply characterized by their capacity to build credible combinations between these three elements. This is why we consider resistance as an outdated topic in the study of power. The tensions and competition between different combinations of identity are much more interesting than the never ending description of the always possible or potential resistance of actors, imagined as if they were puppets waiting the old scripts of solidarity to animate them, forever cast in their workerist identities. Today, the solidarities are more likely to be ethically nationalistic or religiously fundamental or both, and the consequences not so much liberatory but terrible. If nineteenth and twentieth century organizations might have had many occasions to fear their employees *qua* workers – because of the power of organized labour – the twenty first century has more to fear from the anonymous terrorist or the barely recognized ethnic and religious tensions that simmer in their remote branch-plant's or supply chain's hinterland, brought into the organization by those whom they employ or sub-contract.

The Future of Legitimacy

Many contemporary questions surround the future of legitimacy, but they are not the classic questions derived from the Marxist cannon of collective consciousness challenging system legitimation (Habermas, 1976). An example of the kind of contemporary challenge to legitimacy is given by the massive emotional gatherings that occurred in France following the death of Pope John Paul II. While the existing circles of elites (both political and intellectual) were discussing the legitimacy of flying the national flag at half-mast, thousands of people, particularly the young, were heading to Paris in especially chartered trains and coaches. Other gatherings occurred in scattered places in France to share common meetings, create spontaneous communities, and reflect on the significance of the event. Whatever one thinks the significance of these events to be, the point is that on this occasion, the elites had lost control of the people's wills and preferences. And that is probably why these elites so harshly and somewhat uselessly focused their critique on the tricolor and the role of the state in that affair, as something whose separation seemed questioned by this undisciplining of civil society. A similar spectacle was observed at the funeral of Princess Diana (see Clegg, 2000). A

further example would be the defeat of the elite-sponsored referendum in favour of affirming the European constitution that occurred in France on May 27 2005. The masses did not do as the elites would prefer.

Spectaculars may be the only means capable of mobilizing sufficient energy and social vibrations to foster collective social dynamics in future. The power of private emotions in the triggering of contest waves in organizations or in social and emotional collective action is a long way from the dyadic nature of power and micro-social approaches to power and obedience. As Satow (1975) has long suggested, completing the Weberian types of authority might prove more necessary than ever. If, as we have clearly argued, contestation might arise from unexpected events, the power of value-rational forms of social action *à la* Weber is worth exploring, to shed light on the still absent value-rational forms of leadership. One of the missing links between the ethical and environmental realms of legitimization and the subsequent potential transformation of political structures resides in the absence of a coherent model of leadership. Following Willer (1967), a value-based model of leadership would be founded on ‘faith in the absolute value of a rationalized set of norms’ (1967, p. 235). Obedience (of the governors as well as the governed) may be due to an ideology proffering legitimacy such that those in dominant relations of power derive their mandate directly from their exemplary relationship to the goals of that ideology.

Value-based leaders are expected to take decisions, regardless of the consequences of these decisions on the organization, from the moment when the decisions are ‘aligned’ with the goals of the ideology⁽²³⁾. Unless we accept the hypothesis of the emergence of global corporate elites, taking decisions in remote circles of power, defending first and foremost the interests of the global corporate village, regardless of the consequences of these decisions on more parochial aspects and sub-leaders, this seems less the case in business organizations. An uncertain political regime, defending otherworldly objectives, but monitoring simultaneously the necessary adaptations of the concrete organizations in order to survive, would emerge where such events occur⁽²⁴⁾.

CONCLUSION

Realists, unlike utopians who expect reward in the hereafter, while they may still bank on the future, always hedge their bets in the here-and-now by pursuing the most reliable means to ensure whatever bliss is desired, accomplished through social relations that deliver power, wealth, and any

conceivable pleasure that a healthy body and mind might enjoy, in a society where virtually everything is for sale at a price. And for that which cannot be bought directly, such as security from those others whom one offends by one's existence, then sufficient isolation, distance and space can be bought that serves as a practical surrogate. Welcome to the modern, gated, hypersurveilled world of power's outer limits.

Classical theorists such as Weber regarded organizations as having a rationalizing mission, best seen as condensed in the responsibilities of the state for the rules of the overall organization game. He would have thought that corporate leaders should be concerned to reduce poverty and discrimination within their own organizations in order to be legitimate enough to demand the same outside their organizational borders, as a part of this rationalization. If corporate leaders failed in such rationalization then we would expect that, while no doubt corporations might be better places if they were to be democratic, democracy is not necessary to enhance profitable interactions with the rest of society. Thus, they can hardly be expected to shift out of necessity, but only out of the courage and insistence of various forms of leadership in these organizations and their societies more generally. In other terms, organizations can't be expected to play an active 'governmental' role in specific countries without leadership, and the poverty and inequalities embedded in existing hierarchies are unlikely to be reduced by those organizations they serve. But, in the neo-liberal world, it is hardly likely that governments will address these issues systematically instead.

Increasingly the neo-liberal governmental agenda is being delivered by the private sector, acting either alone or through public-private partnerships. Corporate and not-for-profit organizations are now expanding their powers and capacities to occupy the role previously played by the state, which has now become, if not merely a night watchman, an increasingly alert security apparatus with many watchful eyes on those borders threatening its own conceptions of civility. In this scenario, especially as borders are breached by aliens or where, like cuckoos in the nest, aliens have bred within their confines, the old notions of the citizenship state (Marshall & Bottomore, 1992) will be overtaken. In their stead develops a notion of the state as facilitator and underwriter of markets, with varying consumer rights of access, increasingly minimized by exclusion of those considered inadmissible as citizens, mediated by location in the hierarchies of employing organizations. But once again, with power issues in mind, new forms of resistance and activism might arise out the ashes of local communities and corporate sub-groups, around the emergence of new forms of domination – based on non-economic fundamentalisms – with their attendant 'truths'.

The classical sociologists were all big picture theorists. As such, they would agree that scholars should never forget that, related to any new social agenda, there will be new discourses of truth. These discourses might obscure the power dynamics actually shaping the political forms and structures that govern organizations and delimit possible forms of social relations. The classical theorists eschewed the notions of truth as a static entity but saw it as something emergent, contingent, a social fact, a configuration, a social action, something over which battles are fought. Unexpected battles will surely shape the futures of power, and the futures of knowledge. We cannot avoid power relations – and it would be dangerously utopian to assume that we can – but we can exercise freedom in choosing, resisting, rejecting, undermining, accepting, imposing, extending, beguiling, and questioning power. Power is an irreducible element of any imaginable form of life.

NOTES

¹ The argument of this paper draws from the last chapter of the book, *Power and Organizations*, by Clegg, S. R., Courpasson, D., & Phillips, N. (2006). *Power and Organizations*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

² Stewart Clegg also holds a Professorship at Aston Business School, The University of Aston, UK, as well as joint appointments as a Visiting Professor and International Fellow in Discourse and Management Theory, Centre of Comparative Social Studies, Vrije Universiteit of Amsterdam, Netherlands, Visiting Professor of Organizational Change Management, Maastricht University, Faculty of Business, Netherlands and Adjunct Profess EM Lyon, France.

³ The end of history was a thesis advanced by Frances Fukuyama, F. (1992). *The end of history and the last man*. London: Hamish Hamilton. who saw the demise of the Soviet Union as the ultimate triumph of liberal democracy which, having vanquished fascism, had now done the same for communism. After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet empire, he suggested, the future looked assured and safe for market economies. The thesis was subject to criticism by Huntington (1997). who foresaw a clash of civilizations as the future, rather than a benign global economy. It was a thesis that secured some celebrity after 9/11. The account he proposed was equally flawed but for different reasons: He lumped together as singular civilizational blocs societies and beliefs that were far more fissiparous and contested than he allowed. Moreover, Huntington failed to acknowledge the extent to which the 'clashes' in the twentieth century were largely shaped by the rivalry between the respective US and Soviet empires, and their support for whatever corrupt regime, wherever their administration's sense of national interest determined it, that sufficed to guarantee what they defined as their interests. These interests were overwhelmingly strategic, as defined by economic, security and cultural imperatives. The clash of civilizations, in other words, was played out through the mirror of respective imperial interests. Clearly, the demise of the Soviet Union leaves the US as the sole shaper of these global relations – relations within whose context all other inter-organization relations need to be viewed. The start to such an endeavor would be through comparative institutional analysis of local, national elites, their formation and orientations. Such an endeavor has yet to be systematically undertaken.

⁴ Eurocommunism (Carrillo, S. (1977). *Eurocommunism and the state*. London: Lawrence and Wishart) was initiated by the leading Western European communist parties as an electoral project in the 1970s designed to try and attain office through the ballot box, by forming alliances with a broader constituency, including the new middle class – seen through the lens of proletarianization and deskilling – and green and feminist issues and concerns. It failed both to differentiate itself sufficiently from what the social democrat parties were doing and to signal clearly how it differed from what the Soviet empire had to offer.

⁵ We adopt the following convention: post modern refers to the idea that there might be empirical tendencies in the world that are ‘post’ in the sense of being after modernity and not necessarily a constitutive part of it. Where we use the compound form, postmodern, we refer to the idea that there might be such things as postmodernism or postmodern theories.

⁶ By the end of the twentieth century the Internet had enabled the vertically integrated multinational corporation, under unified ownership, to be replaced by networks of externalized relationships between associated but often autonomous firms. This wider separation of networks which link locations in East Asia with the U.S. and Europe is typified by the operations of electronics companies such as Texas Instruments which distributes research and development between Austin Texas and Taipei. Smooth operation relies upon a synchronized corporate database physically replicated on identical hardware at each end of the link using a high-capacity data link. The notion of ‘networked enterprise’ promoted by Castells, M. (1996). *The information age: economy, society and culture*. Oxford: Blackwell. as a means of geographically and temporally constrained collaboration in order to enter and shape specific market has, however, already been superseded by more durable modes of operation. Companies such as ARM Holdings (<http://www.arm.com/>) produce high value intellectual property utilized by global corporations that rely, in turn, upon third party manufacturing facilities such as those provided by Flextronics (<http://www.flextronics.com/>). The actors located at each node of the network have a range of geographical locations available to them across which to distribute intellectual property and physical processes: the furthest development of ICT dependent re-configuration. Computerization within commercial and administrative organizations initially represented an extension of earlier office technologies designed to address internal efficiency. As the potential of computers to manage supply chain and customer relationships became apparent, organizational effectiveness became a primary objective. Finally, as the innovations in business models and inter-firm relationships permitted by the synergies of networking became apparent, inter-organizational management of the production and value chain became the focus of both local and global systems. There is, however, some suggestion that the rhetoric attached to these network tendencies exceeds their actual accomplishment; see, for instance DiMaggio, P. (2001) *The 21st Century Firm: Changing Economic Organisation in International Perspective*. Princeton New Jersey, Princeton: University Press. and Pettigrew, A. M., Whittington, R., Melin L., Sanchez-Runde, C., Bosch, F.A.J., van den Ruijgrok, W. & Numagami, T. (2002) *Innovative forms of organizing: international perspectives*, London: Sage..

⁷ See <http://www.mmm.merseyside.org/cd.htm> and <http://www.mmm.merseyside.org/project.htm>

⁸ The second dispute is archived at <http://mua.org.au/war/> and is discussed in Clegg (1999).

⁹ See <http://mua.org.au/war/cloak.html> <http://www.ilwu12com/global/wharfie/update65.htm>.

¹⁰ In the movie *Gattaca* (Nicoll, A. (Writer). (1997). *Gattaca*. USA: Sony), the main character, Vincent, notes, ironically in the context of the corporate organization *Gattaca* that ‘We now have discrimination down to a science’. It is a science that attempts to ensure that one is what one is coded as being irrespective of what or who one might want to be recognized as being or becoming.

The movie demonstrates that resistance is possible, insofar, as its tagline has it, ‘There is no Gene for the Human Spirit’. In the film, human endeavour is exemplified by a self-disciplined subject who overcomes the fact of being someone with invalid genes, and aspires to and achieves, what he desires, in a journey that is plotted quite consciously as one of redemption through resistance.

¹¹ We make no distinction between fundamentalisms in this regard. In the US abortionists have been shot as well as a government building, and the people in it, blown up by a truck bomb. Such actions, sociologically, have to be thought through the same terms as those other fundamentalisms that receive more attention in the present conjuncture.

¹² It was not just an academic error. The bitter harvest of 9/11 was in large part, if not sown, then at least nourished and fertilized by political decisions made by successive US administrations, notably the Carter-Brzezinski administration in office at the time that the US first provided aid and advice to the anti-Soviet opposition in Afghanistan in mid-1979, before the Soviet invasion. The immediate end of mirroring the Soviet Union in its own Vietnam was certainly achieved; however, one cannot think that the outcome of training, supporting and empowering jihadists who would later turn on their erstwhile sponsors, was a desired outcome. (On these matters it is instructive to read Tariq Ali, T. (2002). *The clash of fundamentalisms: crusades, jihads and modernity*. London: Verso. *The Clash of Fundamentalisms*.) There is an analytic point to this small piece of tragic history. One reason why the episodic approach to power is flawed is because to focus on the episode often means not attending to the unanticipated consequences of the social actions that were initiated in the episode in question.

¹³ While the World Trade Center attack of 9/11 seared itself into the global consciousness, a previous terrorist attack by US citizens, on US citizens, should have been sufficient to raise the possibility that some identities, in that country rather than from outside it, were being shaped in fundamentally different ways to the norms of overall social formation. It was a different kind of fundamentalism, rooted in anti-statism and the defense of a notion of liberty, nourished by fervent religiosity, that lay behind an earlier terrorist attack on US soil – the April 19, 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, itself allegedly related to the events that occurred in Waco, Texas, on April 19, 1993, when, after 51 days of a blockade of the Branch Davidians compound by Federal Government agents from the United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF), supported by the US Army, the blockade culminated in the death of 74 people, including many children. The interpretation of the events that led up to and occurred on each of these April 19ths remains highly contested. The analytical point is one of sociological agnosticism: it is not just one kind of fundamentalism that can lead to disastrous consequences.

¹⁴ It should be clear that the claims made by Islamist fundamentalists are just one of many political positions that find expression within Muslim belief systems. These politics are as complex and deep as politics anywhere usually are; again, Tariq Ali (2002) is an excellent guide.

¹⁵ McGown (1999) is writing, specifically about Somalis in London, whom she contrasts with the community in Toronto, where a more formal multiculturalism leads to different outcomes: ‘it is in large part the political culture of the adoptive society that will determine the quality of the connection between Western Muslims and their non-Muslim compatriots’ (McGown, 1999, p. 231). Adding credence to this important point is research by Ghorashi, H. (2004). How dual is transnational identity? A debate about dual positioning of diaspora organizations. *Culture and Organization*, 10(4), 329–340. which looked at the identities of Iranians in Orange County, California, after 9/11. Ghorashi finds a situation that seems closer to that of Somalis in Ottawa than London: instead of

a binary bilateral positioning she finds instead a far more multi-layered, multi-connected sense of identity being constructed in which the terms are hybrid rather than binary. Her data is drawn from people mobilizing through a Network of Iranian-American Professionals in Orange County (NIPOC), establishing an identity that is neither binary nor between cultures but which draws on plural and fragmented experiences, coded in terms of more than just signifiers of religion or ethnicity, although drawing on common experience. A new imaginary which rethinks ways of being American is invoked and, after the crisis of 9/11, reinstated as a form of identity positioning in which the major difference is not established between the adoptive home and that left behind, but between the adoptive identity and those other identities that are being inscribed – and stand a risk of being ascribed – which are premised on the dominant host societies reading of Islamic otherness. NIPOC as a form of ethnic network organization becomes a valuable resource in countering such ascription and maintaining a claim to difference from the identities being ascribed. Given the cultural hybridity of all major cities in modern nations, the real claims to pre-modern identity are those, from either side of the imagined binary, which assume identity simply ‘is’ or is ‘not’. It is the denial of hybridity that is pre-modern.

¹⁶ In the latter case one is dealing with the phenomenon of suicide bombing, which has spread from its development by the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka to be widely used as in violent, politically motivated attacks, carried out in a deliberate state of awareness by someone willing to blow themselves up in pursuit of what they define as a greater good. In Weberian terms, suicide bombers and those organizations that support them are practicing a blend of value and instrumental rationality. There is an underlying value ethic, which, in the case of Islamic fundamentalisms, has a religious basis, but there is also an instrumental purpose. Suicide bombing is a low cost strategy for achieving high impact results, due to their ‘spectacular’ dimension, which ensures that the images and accounts are obsessively retailed in the media to such an extent that they sear themselves into the consciousness and attitudes of those people who are affected in their everyday life, reflected in polls, reflected in pressure on national politicians. In this sense the strategy is a rational and strategic choice, at least in territorial politics such as those of Palestine: when applied in the context of territorial struggles it can position those organizations that sponsor it as potential players in more conventional politics, once their dominance has been asserted through the strategy. However, in locations such as western cities, where territory is not the issue, but the perceived wrongs being done to a faith-based community, then the politics are more gestural and theatrical, more a spectacle, in an echo of what Kropotkin, P. (1898). *Anarchism: its philosophy and ideal*. San Francisco: Free Society. once advocated as the propaganda of the deed.

¹⁷ Irrespective of one’s views of the legitimacy, or otherwise, of the US-led Coalition in its occupation of Iraq, it is in that poor benighted country that the political insecurity of the body corporeal and politic seems presently to be most severe. For a balanced view of the human rights excesses on all sides the reader may wish to consult the Amnesty International report on Iraq. It can be accessed at <http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/iraq/document.do?id=ar&yr=2005>.

¹⁸ The positive aspects of multiculturalism would hardly do as a basis for identity formation where these were strongly contested by significant strata in the host society, such as the various white supremacists parties and defenders of the faith of the old ways of being before colonial citizens migrated to the ‘Mother country’. The affirmative version of multiculturalism, a positive and inclusive project, and its critique, were routinely hijacked by politicians for their own ends.

¹⁹ Hence there is both too much social integration of such youth in community and urban space and insufficient integration with the broader embedment of ‘British’, ‘American’, ‘French’ or whatever

society (see Durkheim, E. (2002). *Suicide: a study in sociology* (John A. Spaulding & George Simpson, Trans., Introduction George Simpson). London: Routledge.. for the basic concepts of social integration).

²⁰ From the International Herald Tribune (<http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/07/25/news/iraq.php>) of Monday July 25, 2005: 'A suicide truck bomb rammed into barricades at a police station here in the middle of a raging sandstorm on Sunday, killing at least 25 people and wounding at least 33 others, Iraqi officials said. The American military said at least 40 people died.' No names, no human interest, in effect, no human beings – just statistics.

²¹ Understanding why something might happen is not equivalent to condoning it, nor is it evident that this understanding necessarily translates into appropriate action. When the causes of a phenomena – contemporary Islamist terrorism – are so deeply rooted in the dysfunctions of specific societies in the Muslim world, the history of their relations with the Christian world, and of both with the Jewish world, as well as the condensation of all these relations in the internal politics of Islamic belief systems, it should be evident that a problem so complex will hardly admit of a simple answer, or be amenable to just one type of pressure applied liberally through force of arms intended, unsuccessfully, to shock and awe. On no side does the rhetoric suggest that a great deal of rational understanding of the Other is in evidence. In fact, it appears to be a situation where the rhetorical points of reference are so immanent to their own systems of meaning and consequently so far apart, that any rational dialogue is precluded. Those of us concerned about the security of the body – both corporeal and political – have little reason not to be anxious. The state of insecurity stretches out ahead of us as far as the mind can envision. Its organizational implications are not incidental, given existing tendencies to hyper-surveillance.

²² The Spanish general election of 2005 might be seen as a case in point

²³ The decision to invade Iraq by the US and Coalition forces as a part of the 'War on Terror' would seem to be a case in point.

²⁴ This idea is close to the notion of 'formal ideological group' developed by Nahirny, V. C. (1962). Some observations on ideological groups. *American Journal of Sociology*, 67(4), 397–405. for groups committed both to the maintenance of organizational structure and ideology.

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