

"JAZZ FOR GOETHE" ON "POLITICS' THIRD STAGE" ("DRITTE BÜHNE DER POLITIK") WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED JAZZ TOURS DURING THE 1960S: REVISING "OUTDATED IMAGINATIONS OF WEST GERMANY" OR PARTICIPATING IN WESTERN "CULTURAL PENETRATION"?
ANDREW HURLEY

Introduction

In early 1964, Albert Mangelsdorff's West German modern jazz quintet set out on a lengthy tour of Asia. It gave 50 concerts in 65 days from Iran to Japan (Berendt, *Now Jazz Ramwong* (re.)). The tour was financed by the West German language and cultural institute, the *Goethe Institut*, and was reported as being the first tour by a group of West German jazz musicians to be supported in this way with public funds ("Jazz aus Deutschland für Südamerika" 277). The *Goethe Institut* apparently took some convincing that this was an appropriate use for its funds, however by the mid-late 1960s it was regularly sending West German jazz musicians overseas as part of its cultural policy (Berendt, *Now Jazz Ramwong* (re.); Berendt, *Ein Fenster aus Jazz* 227 – 8). As a representative of the *Institut* reported in 1968, it had by then financed 26 tours to all continents but Australia. At this stage almost one fifth of its annual music budget of approximately one million DM was devoted to jazz tours ("Jazz aus Deutschland" 277).

Being novel, the early (1964 – 68) tours were regularly reported on in the West German jazz press. This article will examine a range of sources, including the *Jahrbücher* (yearly reports) of the *Goethe Institut* and the reports of these early tours given in the West German jazz press. It will argue that the *Goethe Institut* jazz tours fulfilled an important purpose: they provided an opportunity to West German jazz musicians and critics (and ultimately to the FRG itself) to advance a modern, liberal and tolerant image of West Germany to overseas and domestic audiences. The desire to do this exhibited itself in a number of ways. Broad mission statements of the *Goethe Institut* outlined the thrust of its cultural policy. At a concrete level, sometimes the jazz tourists expressly prided themselves on having presented an "updated" image of a modern West Germany (Johanns 94). At other times they expressed their respect for other musical cultures ("Now Jazz Ramwong – Asiatische Themen aber Jazz a la Mangelsdorff" 192). Sometimes they concluded that they had performed *Bildungshilfe* ("educational aid work") (Johanns 95) or made a "valuable contribution to global understanding" ("wertvoller Beitrag zur Völkerverständigung"; Berendt, "Jazz für den fernen Osten" 140). These positions coincided with the cultural policy of the *Institut* and allowed those musicians and critics to

emphasise a *caesura* which they (perhaps unconsciously) wished to draw between postwar West Germany and the insular cultural chauvinism of the National Socialist past.

However this article will also suggest that at least some of the recipients (or intended recipients) of these jazz tours had a more critical attitude towards jazz and to activities which introduced western popular culture into their countries. Whilst there is a paucity of Indonesian primary sources, the mid-1960s attitude of the Indonesian President Sukarno and his allies in the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) towards western popular culture (including jazz) will be explored here by way of example.

Finally, the article will examine the points of intersection between these two differing attitudes to jazz. It concludes that West German jazzers may have been unreceptive to the sorts of arguments advanced by Sukarno and other like-minded Asians for two reasons. Firstly, these arguments resonated with anti-jazz arguments which had been advanced in the past by the East German communist regime. Secondly, they were infused with cultural nationalism, which from the postwar West German liberal habitus embraced by champions of jazz such as Berendt, was highly suspect.

Jazz and postwar West German liberalism

In his recent book *Beyond the Swastika*, Peter O'Brien has described what he calls a postwar West German liberal *Weltanschauung* ("world view"), according to which postwar West German history is seen as a protracted struggle between the "Manichaean opposites" (12) of German nationalism (illiberalism) and western liberalism (1-2). O'Brien argues that this *Weltanschauung* was based on an anxiety caused by the memory of the Weimar Republic's failure: as postwar West German intellectuals were only too aware, Hitler had come to power democratically. Seeking to explain this phenomenon, some West German intellectuals argued that Germans were "philosophically predisposed" to welcome a dictator promising a "utopian community" (24). In the 1950s and 1960s, various writers posited a German *Sonderweg* ("special path") to modernity which involved a "modernized society without a modernized (that is liberal) citizenry" (30 - 31). According to O'Brien, this postwar liberal *Weltanschauung* involved a concern that German nationalism/illiberalism was a "dormant virus capable of revival" (40). O'Brien argues that the result was a strong investment in technocratic liberalism on the part of postwar West German liberal intellectuals as well as a compulsion on their part to "keep vigilant watch for the slightest traces of nationalist revival" (3).

The watchdog stance of postwar West German liberalism which jazz was interpreted. Although jazz had Socialist ideologues, some postwar conservative (and inherently) protofascist. According to one away with themselves at jazz concerts succumbed were the fascists of tomorrow (Kotschenreuther anxious interpretation increasingly ceded to that of enthusiasm as being more a harmless (and even d

Joachim Ernst Berendt did not share the anxieties: had expressed in the early 1950s. Since the late 1950s Berendt, jazz had a distinct programmatic value, much on the side of liberalism rather than illiberalism. In his autobiography, Berendt saw his championing of jazz helping to overcome past chauvinism and buildin numerous occasions during the 1950s he advanced expressed to embody a democratic tolerance of of antifascist, anti-ideological and antinationalist (als Ideologie"). This interpretation was advanced by means of catchy aphorisms such as "Jazz does excellence" ("Jazz in Germany [#1]") and by opp artistic sense" ("Kunstgefühl des Diktators"; Der J abated towards the end of the 1950s, such a lib West Germany. Even the arch-conservative CSU 1958 (Berendt, "Was halten Sie vom Jazz Herr V

The liberal interpretation of jazz was quite prod one could demonstrate one's liberal credentials an *jazzfeindliche* ("jazz-inimical") National Socialist - from the illiberalism of the East German comm

During the early 1960s, when West German jazz called "Third World," this reigning liberal interj which O'Brien describes as being part of the post themselves in the way in which those critics and they encountered.

nssciously) wished to draw between postwar
ism of the National Socialist past.

some of the recipients (or intended recipients)
wards jazz and to activities which introduced
hilst there is a paucity of Indonesian primary
sian President Sukarno and his allies in the
estern popular culture (including jazz) will be

rsession between these two differing attitudes
s may have been unreceptive to the sorts of
minded Asians for two reasons. Firstly, these
which had been advanced in the past by the
ey were infused with cultural nationalism,
bitus embraced by champions of jazz such as

sm

O'Brien has described what he calls a postwar
view"), according to which postwar West
e between the "Manichaeic opposites" (12)
n liberalism (1-2). O'Brien argues that this
d by the memory of the Weimar Republic's
were only too aware, Hitler had come to
enomenon, some West German intellectuals
disposed" to welcome a dictator promising
d 1960s, various writers posited a German
involved a "modernized society without a
. According to O'Brien, this postwar liberal
n nationalism/illiberalism was a "dormant
that the result was a strong investment in
West German liberal intellectuals as well as a
r the slightest traces of nationalist revival" (3).

The watchdog stance of postwar West German intellectuals had implications for the way in which jazz was interpreted. Although jazz had been officially disapproved of by National Socialist ideologues, some postwar conservatives took the view that jazz was dangerously (and inherently) protofascist. According to one such view, jazz enthusiasts who got carried away with themselves at jazz concerts succumbed to a herd mentality and, by implication, were the fascists of tomorrow (Kotschenreuther 198–210). By the end of the 1950s, this anxious interpretation increasingly ceded to that of liberal conservatives, who saw youthful jazz enthusiasm as being more a harmless (and even desirable) consumer behaviour (Poiger 6–7).

Joachim Ernst Berendt did not share the anxieties about jazz which West German conservatives had expressed in the early 1950s. Since the late 1940s, he had championed jazz vigorously. For Berendt, jazz had a distinct programmatic value. According to his interpretation, it was very much on the side of liberalism rather than illiberal nationalism. As he admitted in his recent autobiography, Berendt saw his championing of jazz in postwar Germany as being partly about helping to overcome past chauvinism and building tolerance (*Das Leben Ein Klang* 314). On numerous occasions during the 1950s he advanced jazz's liberal credentials. Accordingly, it was expressed to embody a democratic tolerance of opposing viewpoints, and to be fundamentally antifascist, anti-ideological and antinationalist (*Der Jazz Eine zeitkritische Studie* 32; "Jazz als Ideologie"). This interpretation was advanced by Berendt in various articles and essays by means of catchy aphorisms such as "Jazz does not go for nations. It is international par excellence" ("Jazz in Germany [#1]") and by opposing jazz to what he dubbed the "dictator's artistic sense" ("Kunstgefühl des Diktators"; *Der Jazz* 32). As conservative anxieties about jazz abated towards the end of the 1950s, such a liberal interpretation increasingly held sway in West Germany. Even the arch-conservative CSU politician Franz Josef Strauss adopted it in 1958 (Berendt, "Was halten Sie vom Jazz Herr Verteidigungsminister?").

The liberal interpretation of jazz was quite productive too. By displaying an interest in jazz, one could demonstrate one's liberal credentials and distance oneself from the illiberalism of the *jazzfeindliche* ("jazz-inimical") National Socialist past and/or – as in Franz Josef Strauss's case – from the illiberalism of the East German communist regime (Berendt, "Was halten Sie?").

During the early 1960s, when West German jazz critics and musicians began roving the so-called "Third World," this reigning liberal interpretation of jazz and the "watchdog" stance, which O'Brien describes as being part of the postwar West German liberal habitus, manifested themselves in the way in which those critics and musicians commented on other cultures that they encountered.

Berendt and Asian (musical) nationalism

In 1962, a little under two years before Mangelsdorff's inaugural *Goethe Institut* tour of Asia, Berendt spent three months traveling through the region. This trip produced a stream of articles for West German and international newspapers and magazines such as *Downbeat*, *twen* and *Die Welt*. These articles sang the praises of non-European musical cultures. However, they also demonstrated the opposition drawn by Berendt between jazz as the epitome of tolerance and liberalism and illiberal nationalism. When nationalist considerations intersected with jazz, Berendt argued that they interfered with the quality of the jazz produced. He asserted for example that the standard of the Thai King Bhumipol's Royal Jazz Sextet was marred by its All-Thai make up. King Bhumipol's jazz band was restricted in this way for what Berendt called "patriotic and national reasons" ("patriotischen und nationalen Gründen"; "JEBs Asienreise Teil 2" 25). If only, Berendt lamented, the band contained some of the excellent Phillipino musicians resident in Bangkok, it would be truly "regal" ("königlich"; "Asienreise Teil 2" 25).

Javanese cultural nationalism in President Sukarno's Indonesia was also singled out for criticism. According to Berendt, President Sukarno was seeking to instate Javanese culture as the homogenous culture throughout the Indonesian archipelago: Berendt wrote that Sukarno had the "Javanisation" ("Javanisierung"; "Asienreise Teil 1" 23) of Bali well and truly in his sights. In this matter, Berendt took the side of the Balinese. According to him, this cultural minority had managed to keep its culture "pure, without becoming ill-willed towards or rejecting the foreign – as other peoples had had to [do] in order to keep their culture pure" ("rein, ohne abweisend und böse gegenüber dem Fremden zu werden – wie andere Völker das mussten, um ihre Kultur rein erhalten zu können"; "Asienreise Teil 1" 23). The Balinese might have been isolated and have cosseted themselves, but in his view they were not chauvinist or exclusionary: they were "receptive and open, when it comes to something appropriate to them" ("aufnahmebereit und zugänglich, wenn es um etwas ihnen gemässes geht"; "Asienreise Teil 1" 23).

Berendt's siding with the minority Balinese (and also with the minority ethnic Chinese; "Asienreise Teil 2" 23-4) against the homogenising Javanese cultural nationalism of President Sukarno is important for several reasons. As with his other, later comments in relation to cultural nationalism elsewhere in the Third World (*Fenster* 276), Berendt demonstrated a heightened sensitivity towards "exotic" nationalism. This sensitivity to foreign nationalism was a further manifestation of the postwar West German liberal habitus, which, on O'Brien's interpretation, was primarily concerned with domestic nationalism.

Siding with the Balinese and the Indonesian Chir the postwar German context. The Balinese and Berendt as being cultural minorities suffering unposition was analogous with that of the Jews and expressly made a link between the Chinese in In often told [in Indonesia] that the Chinese with us you [in Germany] [...] 'No-one likes them but the bei uns so etwa, was die Juden bei Euch waren' wi sie machen die große Geschäfte"; "Jazz in Djakarta

Supporting the cause of the ethnic Chinese or consistent with postwar West German philosemitism *The Whitewashing of the Yellow Badge*, the philosemitism (and indeed reversing it) and thereby Stern shows that, in the postwar era, and particular the Jewish people and their suffering) was in Germany's political integration into the West. I do or even conscious strategy, however I suggest that by Berendt towards the ethnic Chinese and Bali the oppressed "Jews" of Indonesia demonstrated a National Socialist past. As noted above, Berendt's clear attack on those peoples (and he clearly had a cultural purity had become "ill-willed" towards for be interpreted as both a rejection of the past and not to fall back into the nationalist ways of that p

Jazz for Goethe?

With the *Goethe Institut* jazz tours, West Germany ultimately the FRG itself) had a new avenue through. From 1964 these tours presented a visible, practical Germany was a modern and open country. Before representation took, it is worth pausing for a moment *Institut* and its shifting cultural policies during the

lorff's inaugural *Goethe Institut* tour of Asia, region. This trip produced a stream of articles and magazines such as *Downbeat*, *twen* and European musical cultures. However, they did not see jazz as the epitome of tolerance and nationalist considerations intersected with the quality of the jazz produced. He asserted that Humphil's Royal Jazz Sextet was marred by the fact that it was restricted in this way for what Berendt called "nationalistischen und nationalen Gründen"; "JEBs sind, die Band contained some of the excellent could be truly "regal" ("königlich"; "Asienreise

in Indonesia was also singled out for criticism, seeking to instate Javanese culture as the dominant in the archipelago: Berendt wrote that Sukarno had "ill-willed" (1923) of Bali well and truly in his sights. In According to him, this cultural minority had been "ill-willed towards or rejecting the foreign people and their culture pure" ("rein, ohne abweisend gegenüber anderen Völkern das mussten, um ihre Kultur zu erhalten"). The Balinese might have been isolated and were not chauvinist or exclusionary: they were appropriate to them" ("aufnahmebereit und nicht"; "Asienreise Teil 1" 23).

and also with the minority ethnic Chinese; against Javanese cultural nationalism of President Sukarno. In his other, later comments in relation to Indonesia (Fenster 276), Berendt demonstrated a sensitivity to foreign nationalism. This sensitivity to foreign nationalism was a German liberal habitus, which, on O'Brien's account, was a reaction to ethnic nationalism.

Siding with the Balinese and the Indonesian Chinese also had another special significance in the postwar German context. The Balinese and the Indonesian Chinese were described by Berendt as being cultural minorities suffering under the yoke of a nationalist dictator. This position was analogous with that of the Jews under Hitler: indeed, in a 1967 article Berendt expressly made a link between the Chinese in Indonesia and the Jews in Germany: "One is often told [in Indonesia] that 'the Chinese with us [in Indonesia] are rather like the Jews with you [in Germany] [...] 'No-one likes them but they do the big business'" ("Die Chinesen sind bei uns so etwa, was die Juden bei Euch waren" wird einem oft gesagt, "niemand mag sie, aber sie machen die große Geschäfte"; "Jazz in Djakarta (Indonesien)" 2).

Supporting the cause of the ethnic Chinese or the Balinese in Indonesia was, I argue, consistent with postwar West German philosemitism. As Frank Stern has demonstrated in *The Whitewashing of the Yellow Badge*, the philosemitic gesture involved publicly disavowing antisemitism (and indeed reversing it) and thereby seeking to make amends for the Holocaust. Stern shows that, in the postwar era, and particularly in the 1950s, philosemitism (and with it the Jewish people and their suffering) was instrumentalised as a way of assisting West Germany's political integration into the West. I do not wish to imply that it was a calculating or even conscious strategy, however I suggest that a philosemitic-like attitude was expressed by Berendt towards the ethnic Chinese and Balinese in Indonesia. Put bluntly, siding with the oppressed "Jews" of Indonesia demonstrated distance from the cultural chauvinism of the National Socialist past. As noted above, Berendt's writing about the Balinese also contained a clear attack on those peoples (and he clearly had Germany in mind) who, in order to maintain cultural purity had become "ill-willed" towards foreign cultures. This "watchdog" remark can be interpreted as both a rejection of the past and an admonition to his West German readers not to fall back into the nationalist ways of that past.

Jazz for Goethe?

With the *Goethe Institut* jazz tours, West German jazz critics (and now musicians, and ultimately the FRG itself) had a new avenue through which to demonstrate their liberalism. From 1964 these tours presented a visible, practical forum to show to the world that West Germany was a modern and open country. Before examining the precise forms that this self-representation took, it is worth pausing for a moment to consider the nature of the *Goethe Institut* and its shifting cultural policies during the 1960s.

The *Goethe Institut* (now the *Goethe Institut-Inter Nationes*) is a counterpart to the British Council and the Alliance Française. It was founded by the FRG in 1952 and was initially charged with the responsibility of conducting German language courses in West Germany for foreigners (particularly from the so-called underdeveloped countries) who had been granted scholarships to study at West German universities (Ross 7). In 1960, the federal Foreign Ministry (*Auswärtiges Amt*) gave the *Institut* the additional task of founding and administering so-called "cultural institutes" (*Kulturinstitute*) abroad (Ross 8). These *Kulturinstitute* were soon established in a wide range of locations throughout the "First" and "Third World." They carried on language courses and also presented cultural events (musical concerts, theatre, exhibitions and lectures).

From the outset, the *Kulturinstitute* had a specific cultural-political (*kulturpolitische*) brief. At a basic level, this involved representing West German culture to the world at large. Karl-Ernst Hildepohl, the head of the *Institut's* programming division, outlined the task in 1968. According to him, it involved: providing factual information about West Germany; garnering sympathy for West Germany by means of both cultural representation and the provision of services; collaboration on joint projects; as a result of this, cultural exchange (or what he called the "reciprocal endeavours towards the understanding of the self- and otherness of the other" ("wechselseitigen Bemühen um das Verständnis des So- und Andersseins des Anderen"; 19)); and ultimately the "deliberate collaboration on the growing together, the reciprocal penetration and the self-complementation of the cultures" ("bewußte Mitarbeit am Zusammenwachsen, an der gegenseitigen Durchdringung und am Sich-Ergänzen der Kulturen"; 19).

The question of representation of (West) German culture was a vexed one in the context of postwar Germany. On the one hand, it was felt that after National Socialism it was necessary to rehabilitate or redeem Germany's international reputation. However, given that the cultural politics of the National Socialists and those of the *Goethe Institut* could be seen, in their way, to be both celebrations of "German" culture, it was necessary for the *Goethe Institut* to distinguish strongly between the two. These two dimensions of postwar West German self-representation are evident in the early *Jahrbücher* of the *Institut*.

According to the President of the *Institut*, Peter H. Pfeiffer's introductory remarks in the 1965 *Jahrbuch*, Germany needed to win back "that reputation [...] which she possessed in her great days and which she forfeited through the madness of self-overestimation" ("jenes Aussehen [...], das sie in ihren großen Tagen besessen und durch den Wahn der Selbstüberschätzung eingebüßt haben"; 1965 *Jahrbuch Geleitwort*). However, it was important to distance the

notion of representing West Germany abroad which according to Werner Ross (also writing in 1965) was "politisch überholt oder overtaken or of ill repute" ("politisch überholt oder the *Institut* from the idea of aggressive cultural [culture] on a man by violence" ("mit aller Gewalt *Jahrbuch Geleitwort*). Instead, he stipulated that "as a working-with and an encouragement, as an und Anregung, als Muster oder Möglichkeit"; 1965). It is clear that in the mid-1960s, the *Goethe Institut* was seeking to distance itself from the German past.

The presentation and celebration of German culture was being placed in an expressly liberal, non-national, context. According to Ross and Hildepohl, the representation of West Germany was to be understood as part of a broader non-national understanding aimed at the project of "an unconditioned opening to the world" ("unvorbehaltenen Öffnung zur Einen Welt"; Ross 1968). This was seen as part of an international "world culture" ("Weltkultur") and the *Institut's* cultural work was aimed at securing "a place for the peoples" ("einen würdigen Platz im Konzert der Völker").

This left open the question of what sort of German culture was to be represented and how it was to be actually financed. In the early 1960s, its cultural work was based on a liberal and conservative concept of culture. Berendt saw the *Institut* as representing "Mozart, Beethoven, Goethe etc" (*Now Jazz* 1965). There was a degree of domestic criticism. As Werner Ross pointed out, it was hurried to discern in this "baroque music by canons" ("barocke Musik durch die Kanonen der FRG") ("fleißige Journalisten beeilten sich auch in der restaurativen Grundzug der Bundesrepublik zu erkennen").

Around the time of Mangelsdorff's 1964 Asian tour, the *Institut* was seeking "of pensiveness, of new structuring, of planning" ("von Nachdenklichkeit, von Neustrukturierung, von Planung") which involved a fundamental re-evaluation of German culture (13). According to Ross, the *Institut* was seeking to present a "repertoire to be represented and presented" ("Repertoire") and instead was seeking to translate

r *Nationes*) is a counterpart to the British led by the FRG in 1952 and was initially man language courses in West Germany for developed countries) who had been granted ies (Ross 7). In 1960, the federal Foreign ditional task of founding and administering road (Ross 8). These *Kulturinstitute* were ighout the "First" and "Third World." They cultural events (musical concerts, theatre,

fic cultural-political (*kulturpolitische*) brief. rman culture to the world at large. Karl- mming division, outlined the task in 1968. formation about West Germany; garnering ultural representation and the provision of of this, cultural exchange (or what he called ling of the self- and otherness of the other" s So- und Andersseins des Anderen"; 19)); growing together, the reciprocal penetration ewußte Mitarbeit am Zusammenwachsen, -Ergänzen der Kulturen"; 19).

a culture was a vexed one in the context of at after National Socialism it was necessary al reputation. However, given that the ose of the *Goethe Institut* could be seen, in ure, it was necessary for the *Goethe Institut* wo dimensions of postwar West German ber of the *Institut*.

Pfeiffer's introductory remarks in the 1965 ation [...] which she possessed in her great is of self-overestimation" ("jenes Aussehen durch den Wahn der Selbstüberschätzung owever, it was important to distance the

notion of representing West Germany abroad from any concept of cultural imperialism, which according to Werner Ross (also writing in the inaugural 1965 *Jahrbuch*) was "politically overtaken or of ill repute" ("politisch überholt oder anrüchig"; 13). Pfeiffer similarly distanced the *Institut* from the idea of aggressive cultural politics or what he called "foisting German [culture] on a man by violence" ("mit aller Gewalt Deutsches an den Mann zu bringen"; 1968 *Jahrbuch Geleitwort*). Instead, he stipulated that West Germany should present its culture "as a working-with and an encouragement, as an example or a possibility" ("als Mit-Wirkung und Anregung, als Muster oder Möglichkeit"; 1968 *Jahrbuch Geleitwort*). These comments reveal that in the mid-1960s, the *Goethe Institut* still had one eye firmly fixed on the recent German past.

The presentation and celebration of German culture abroad was also rendered benign by being placed in an expressly liberal, non-national, cosmopolitan context. According to Pfeiffer, Ross and Hildepohl, the representation of West German culture by the *Goethe Institut* was properly to be understood as part of a broader notion of cultural exchange and intercultural understanding aimed at the project of "an unconditional opening up to One World" ("einer vorbehaltlosen Öffnung zur Einen Welt"; Ross 15). Germany's culture was therefore to be seen as part of an international "world culture" ("Weltkultur"; Ross 15). In Pfeiffer's words, the *Institut's* cultural work was aimed at securing West Germany "a worthy place in the concert of peoples" ("einen würdigen Platz im Konzert der Völker"; 1966 *Jahrbuch Geleitwort*).

This left open the question of what sort of German cultural offerings the *Goethe Institut* should actually finance. In the early 1960s, its cultural events abroad tended to be pegged to a narrow and conservative concept of culture. Berendt summed up this tradition-oriented policy as "Mozart, Beethoven, Goethe etc" (*Now Jazz Ramwong (re)*). This policy in turn led to a degree of domestic criticism. As Werner Ross pointed out as early as 1965, "busy journalists hurried to discern in this 'baroque music by candlelight' the restoratory characteristic of the FRG" ("fleißige Journalisten beeilten sich auch in dieser 'Barockmusik bei Kerzenschein' den restaurativen Grundzug der Bundesrepublik zu entdecken"; 8).

Around the time of Mangelsdorff's 1964 Asian tour, the *Institut* was entering into a phase "of pensiveness, of new structuring, of planning" ("der Nachdenklichkeit, der Neuordnung, der Planung") which involved a fundamental re-examination of the notion of "culture" (Ross 13). According to Ross, the *Institut* was seeking to distance itself from the idea of culture as a "repertoire to be represented and presented" ("darzustellendes und vorzustellendes Repertoire") and instead was seeking to translate it into "life, function, mediation, exchange"

("Leben, Funktion, Vermittlung, Austausch"; 15). In other words, the *Goethe Institut* was beginning to view culture less as a handed-down and passively received thing and more as processual. As the 1960s progressed, the *Goethe Institut* continued to express this desire to liberate itself "from the traditional, too noble and narrow concept of culture" ("von dem überkommenen, zu edlen und engen Kulturbegriff"; Pfeiffer 1968 *Jahrbuch Geleitwort*), a desire which appears to have been expressed with more urgency in the years after the unrest of the 1968 student protests. It was also advanced again in 1970, after the *Auswärtiges Amt* reformulated its *Kulturpolitik* (von Herwarth 1970 *Jahrbuch Geleitwort*; Goethe Institut, "Zur Geschichte des Goethe Instituts").

Jazz concerts provided one concrete opportunity for the *Goethe Institut* to reflect a broadened, more up-to-date notion of culture. However, the *Institut's* programming of jazz was not uncontested. Throughout the 1960s, jazz continued to be regarded by some critical voices as not being "German" and therefore, in the context of representing German culture abroad, as being "cheating/wrong playing" ("Falschspiele"; reported in 1968 *Jahrbuch* 60; Mangelsdorff, "Jazz für den fernen Osten" 159). By the late 1960s, detractors of the *Institut* were also suggesting that its programming of jazz was simply an "Alibi" for conservative, business-as-usual programming (reported in 1969 *Jahrbuch* 115).

These domestic concerns with the notion of (German) "culture" did not exist in isolation however. At a foreign policy level, the *Goethe Institut's* change of focus served a distinct purpose too. Its new policy of jazz programming was partly motivated by a desire to broaden the foreign appeal of its overseas cultural events. By the mid 1960s, the *Institut* had identified that its concerts tended to attract a rather small, elite, "society" crowd. As such, there was an unfortunate "gulf" ("Kluft") between those who attended the *Institut's* language courses and those who attended its concerts (Ross 14).

The desire to close the gap and broaden the appeal of the *Goethe Institut* cultural events, however, only went so far. On the whole, the *Institut* exhibited an ambivalent attitude towards what it called the "mass public" ("Massenpublikum"; Hömberg 41). It was clearly proud of the larger, youthful audiences which its jazz concerts attracted. The *Institut* was also excited by the possibilities of telecasts of its jazz concerts reaching very large audiences. This increased coverage must have satisfied those in the *Auswärtiges Amt* who held the purse strings. However, the *Institut* noticeably shied away from programming popular music. As a 1968 report in *Jazz Podium* reveals, the *Institut* indicated that it was not interested in programming "inferior popular functional music" ("minderwertige populäre Gebrauchsmusik") in order to

"attract the masses" ("die Massen anzulocken"; This ambivalence towards popular music was also for the association between commercial records opposed to *Unterrichtung* ("education")), the recordings of its jazz tourists "Deutscher Jazz domestic visibility of its cultural work abroad Munich; Doldinger, *The Ambassador*; 1968 *Jahr*

The "masses" were by no means the primary at Werner Ross indicated in 1965 that it was part events foreign intellectuals, or as he termed the and 'society'" ("zwischen der 'Massen' und der 'those who attended the language courses. R intellectuals thus: "They can learn from us, we lernen, wir können von ihnen lernen"; 14).

This reorientation in the *Goethe Institut's* culture of the artistic merit of jazz in West Germany. it- was increasingly seen as having legitimate a *Unterhaltungsmusik* ("entertainment-music"). initially somewhat tentative, however. In response to the extent of his country's achievements in jazz "little, but perhaps nevertheless one or two things doch das eine oder andere Vorzeigbare" 15). In Berendt and others in the late 1950s and early *Goethe Institut* to countenance financing jazz to Albert Mangelsdorff quintet's 1964 Asian trip *Goethe Institut* made it clear that this trip was to Ramwong (re.)). The expectations placed on the audience, but also to represent West Germany considerable – indeed the future funding of other

The *Goethe Institut* Jazz Tours: liberal

West German jazz musicians and critics connected *Goethe Institut's* cultural policies in a number of

In other words, the *Goethe Institut* was and passively received thing and more as *Institut* continued to express this desire and narrow concept of culture" ("von dem *iff*"; Pfeiffer 1968 *Jahrbuch Geleitwort*), a more urgency in the years after the unrest again in 1970, after the *Auswärtiges Amt Jahrbuch Geleitwort*; Goethe Institut, "Zur

r the *Goethe Institut* to reflect a broadened, e *Institut's* programming of jazz was not d to be regarded by some critical voices as f representing German culture abroad, as orted in 1968 *Jahrbuch* 60; Mangelsdorff, 960s, detractors of the *Institut* were also ly an "Alibi" for conservative, business-as-

rman) "culture" did not exist in isolation *stitut's* change of focus served a distinct as partly motivated by a desire to broaden r the mid 1960s, the *Institut* had identified te, "society" crowd. As such, there was an ended the *Institut's* language courses and

al of the *Goethe Institut* cultural events, exhibited an ambivalent attitude towards Hömberg 41). It was clearly proud of the racted. The *Institut* was also excited by hing very large audiences. This increased rtiges Amt who held the purse strings. programming popular music. As a 1968 that it was not interested in programming e populäre Gebrauchsmusik") in order to

"attract the masses" ("die Massen anzulocken"; "Jazz aus Deutschland für Südamerika" 277). This ambivalence towards popular music was also evident elsewhere: Despite a stated distaste for the association between commercial recordings and *Unterhaltung* ("entertainment") (as opposed to *Unterrichtung* ("education")), the *Goethe Institut* used commercially released recordings of its jazz tourists "Deutscher Jazz 68" and Klaus Doldinger to promote the domestic visibility of its cultural work abroad (The German Allstars, *Live at the Domicile Munich*; Doldinger, *The Ambassador*; 1968 *Jahrbuch* 89; 1969 *Jahrbuch* 116).

The "masses" were by no means the primary audience that the *Goethe Institut* was targeting. Werner Ross indicated in 1965 that it was particularly interested in attracting to its cultural events foreign intellectuals, or as he termed them, the class which exists "between the 'masses' and 'society'" ("zwischen der 'Massen' und der 'Gesellschaft'"; 14). In short, he had in mind those who attended the language courses. Ross baldly formulated the appeal of foreign intellectuals thus: "They can learn from us, we can learn from them" ("Sie können von uns lernen, wir können von ihnen lernen"; 14).

This reorientation in the *Goethe Institut's* cultural policy coincided with a growing acceptance of the artistic merit of jazz in West Germany. By the early 1960s, jazz – or at least some of it – was increasingly seen as having legitimate artistic value, as being distanced from popular *Unterhaltungsmusik* ("entertainment-music"). The embrace of jazz by the *Goethe Institut* was initially somewhat tentative, however. In response to his own 1965 rhetorical question as to the extent of his country's achievements in jazz, Werner Ross argued that it had achieved "little, but perhaps nevertheless one or two things worth showing" ("[w]enig, aber vielleicht doch das eine oder andere Vorzeigbare" 15). It took considerable persuasion on the part of Berendt and others in the late 1950s and early 1960s for the *Auswärtiges Amt* and then the *Goethe Institut* to countenance financing jazz tours. The culmination of these efforts was the Albert Mangelsdorff quintet's 1964 Asian trip (Berendt "Jazz für den fernen Osten"). The *Goethe Institut* made it clear that this trip was to be a one-off experiment (Berendt *Now Jazz Ramwong* (re.)). The expectations placed on the group (not only to attract a larger, younger audience, but also to represent West Germany in an appropriate way) must have been considerable – indeed the future funding of other such tours was effectively riding on it.

The *Goethe Institut* Jazz Tours: liberal tolerance and respect in action

West German jazz musicians and critics connected with the guiding liberal philosophy of the *Goethe Institut's* cultural policies in a number of ways. Their reports in the press reveal that

they understood themselves to be representing West Germany as a modern and open country. This was done variously: by making explicit verbal representations from the bandstand; simply by the act of playing modern jazz; by building a respectful bridge to the audience by means of a jazz adaptation of a local tune; or by participating in what they interpreted as cultural exchange or collaboration.

Joachim Ernst Berendt used his announcements at Mangelsdorff's concerts during the 1964 Asian tour to make representations about modern West Germany. One of these assertions was that West Germany was now a "peace loving country" which had left its militaristic past behind it (*Now Jazz Ramwong*). Some of the jazz tourists understood that simply by playing modern jazz, they were representing West Germany as a modern country, distanced from its tainted past. There is a paucity of primary evidence to indicate how such representations were actually received in the countries that these early jazz tourists visited. However, we do have a number of the jazz tourists' own accounts. Some of these tourists interpreted that their musical representations of a modern West Germany were not falling on deaf ears. This was a cause for some pride.

The jazz singer Willi Johanns, who traveled to North Africa in late 1965 and early 1966 with the Kurt Edelhagen Orchestra, offers one example. Johanns took delight when he interpreted that the Orchestra's music had caused North African audiences to rethink their understanding of West Germany. From the German perspective, what postwar North African audiences thought of Germany was not simply a matter of intellectual curiosity: North Africa had been, a little over twenty years earlier, a significant arena of German military aggression during the Second World War. Johanns proudly noted that his North African audiences had been surprised "that such a lively and contemporary music could come from the land of Wagner and the Nibelungen" ("daß aus dem Lande Wagners und der Nibelungen eine solch lebendige und zeitnahe Musik zu hören war"; 94). He did not need to remind his West German jazz readership of the link between National Socialist ideology and Wagner's antisemitism and music. As a final gloss, Johanns enthusiastically claimed that the Edelhagen jazz tour ensured that "outdated imaginations of Germany and its current cultural life were revised" ("überholte Vorstellungen von Deutschland und seinen heutigen Kulturleben wurden damit revidiert"; 94).

At the level of cultural practice too, these jazz tours offered West German musicians and critics an opportunity to demonstrate their respect for and interest in other cultures, which had previously been marginalized or denigrated from a European perspective. Some of the individual *Kulturinstitute* paid their respects to these musical cultures by inviting local

musicians performing in traditional (as well as those *Kulturinstitute* (1965 Jahrbuch 42; 1970 J is one context for interpreting the praise lavished as Berendt and musicians such as Mangelsdorff. German jazz tourists like Mangelsdorff to play at

When in Thailand, for example, the Mangelsdorff Thai King Bhumipol (Berendt, "Jazz für den fern adaptations as a way of building a bridge to local little exposure to jazz (*Now Jazz Ramwong*). When versions on his return to Germany (*Now Jazz 1* having been conceived as "special musical greeting countries visited" ("Jazz für den fernen Osten" 13 *Podium* concurred when it viewed *Now Jazz Ram* the admired musical culture of Asia" ("ehrfurc Musikkultur Asiens"; "Now Jazz Ramwong – As

This interest in and respect for other musics was clear to an Asian audience. King Bhumipol does not appear to have been impressed with Mangelsdorff's composition: indeed after Mangelsdorff's group they were impressed with Mangelsdorff's efforts: the that the Mangelsdorff quintet had done a "mar Djay Ramwong]" (qtd in Berendt, *Now Jazz Ram* Jack Lesmana and Bubi Chen interpreted *Mangelsdorff's Burungkaka Tua* as a musical greeting to them Lesmana and Chen subsequently repaid the "musician by performing a version of a German jazz composition on their *Bali*. Even a jazz musician such as the Japanese trumpeter Masahiko Mori, from a point of view, interpreted jazz adaptations of western jazz musicians to be "a bit gratuitous, not the actual song itself and just appreciate the musician

West German jazz musicians and commentators (often fleeting) musical collaboration or exchange between "World" musicians occurred. This usually occurred

st Germany as a modern and open country. representations from the bandstand; simply respectful bridge to the audience by means rating in what they interpreted as cultural

t Mangelsdorff's concerts during the 1964 1 West Germany. One of these assertions country" which had left its militaristic past tourists understood that simply by playing any as a modern country, distanced from lence to indicate how such representations arly jazz tourists visited. However, we do . Some of these tourists interpreted that rmany were not falling on deaf ears. This

Africa in late 1965 and early 1966 with the nms took delight when he interpreted that idiences to rethink their understanding of : postwar North African audiences thought riosity: North Africa had been, a little over ilitary aggression during the Second World 1 audiences had been surprised "that such a land of Wagner and the Nibelungen" ("daß ch lebendige und zeitnahe Musik zu hören rman jazz readership of the link between ism and music. As a final gloss, Johanns r ensured that "outdated imaginations of überholte Vorstellungen von Deutschland iert"; 94).

urs offered West German musicians and for and interest in other cultures, which rom a European perspective. Some of these musical cultures by inviting local

musicians performing in traditional (as well as modern) styles of music to give concerts at those *Kulturinstitute* (1965 Jahrbuch 42; 1970 Jahrbuch 74). The desire to "show respect" is one context for interpreting the praise lavished on non-European musics by writers such as Berendt and musicians such as Mangelsdorff. It also contextualises the attempts by West German jazz tourists like Mangelsdorff to play adaptations of local songs whilst on tour.

When in Thailand, for example, the Mangelsdorff group performed a composition by the Thai King Bhumipol (Berendt, "Jazz für den fernen Osten" 138). Mangelsdorff viewed such adaptations as a way of building a bridge to local audiences who might otherwise have had little exposure to jazz (*Now Jazz Ramwong*). When Mangelsdorff made a recording of these versions on his return to Germany (*Now Jazz Ramwong*), they were billed by Berendt as having been conceived as "special musical greetings" ("spezielle musikalische Grüße") to the countries visited ("Jazz für den fernen Osten" 138). The West German jazz periodical *Jazz Podium* concurred when it viewed *Now Jazz Ramwong* as involving a "respectful bow towards the admired musical culture of Asia" ("ehrfurchtsvolle Verneigung vor der bewunderten Musikkultur Asiens"; "Now Jazz Ramwong – Asiarische Themen" 192).

This interest in and respect for other musics was clearly appreciated by some of Mangelsdorff's Asian audience. King Bhumipol does not appear to have been put off by the adaptation of his composition: indeed after Mangelsdorff's group had performed at his court, he invited them to jam with his own "Royal Jazz Sextet" (Berendt, *Now Jazz Ramwong*). Other locals were impressed with Mangelsdorff's efforts: the reviewer from the *Bangkok Post* considered that the Mangelsdorff quintet had done a "marvelous job transforming the folk tune ['Nau Djay Ramwong']" (qtd in Berendt, *Now Jazz Ramwong*). The two Indonesian jazz musicians Jack Lesmana and Bubi Chen interpreted Mangelsdorff's version of the Indonesian folk song *Burungkaka Tua* as a musical greeting to them and their cohort (Berendt, *Djanger Bali*). Lesmana and Chen subsequently repaid the "musical greeting" by performing and recording a version of a German jazz composition on their 1967 European tour and recording *Djanger Bali*. Even a jazzier such as the Japanese trumpeter Terumasa Hino, who, from the musician's point of view, interpreted jazz adaptations of Japanese folk songs performed by visiting western jazz musicians to be "a bit gratuitous, not very interesting" was able to "tune out the actual song itself and just appreciate the musicianship of the performers" (Hino).

West German jazz musicians and commentators also delighted in instances where (often fleeting) musical collaboration or exchange between West German jazz musicians and "Third World" musicians occurred. This usually occurred in the form of a jam session (Hömborg 50)

or where local musicians were spontaneously invited to perform on stage with the Germans (1966 *Jahrbuch* 81). Such instances were lauded as forms of "intellectual exchange" ("geistigen Austausch"; Johanns 95) or "genuine encounters and lively cultural exchange" ("echten Begegnungen und lebendigen Kulturaustausch"; "Doldinger füllt Titelseiten" 175). However the "close collaboration between the German artists and their Latin American, African and Asian colleagues" to which Berendt referred in 1980 (*Now Jazz Ramwong* (re.)) was not yet a reality when Mangelsdorff's group traveled to Asia in 1964. As Mangelsdorff observed at the time, the band was simply too busy rehearsing, traveling and performing to have a great deal of leisure time in which to "really get to know the land[s] and [their] people" ("Land und Leute wirklich kennenzulernen"; "Jazz für den fernen Osten" 158). The extent of the collaboration which occurred on that tour amounted to an occasional jam session, and a short visit, for example, to Ravi Shankar's music school in Bombay (Berendt, "Jazz für den fernen Osten" and *Now Jazz Ramwong*). Longer term Goethe Institut-funded collaborations would come later – for example when the German-based Dave Pike Set traveled to Bahia (Brazil) in 1972 and resided there with the Brazilian group *Grupo Baiafro* for two weeks. This collaboration resulted in performances and a joint recording (Schreiner). It possibly also reflected a 1970 change in Goethe Institut policy which increasingly focused on "dialogic and partnership-based cultural work" ("dialogische und partnerschaftliche Kulturarbeit"; Goethe Institut).

Berendt for one did not shy away from making the boldest claims for these early Goethe Institut jazz tours. On the return of Mangelsdorff's group in 1964, he published an article on the tour in which he expressed the conviction that jazz (and by extension the Goethe Institut jazz tours) stood to make a "valuable contribution to global understanding" ("wertvoller Beitrag zur Völkerverständigung"; "Jazz für den fernen Osten" 140). In Berendt's view, the jazz tours and the intercultural communication which they invoked were a bridge to a future conviviality of countries.

Some of the West German jazz musicians involved with these tours understood themselves to be making a significant contribution to the recipients of their tours: Albert Mangelsdorff connected with the idea of musical *Bildungshilfe* when he reported that "the most rewarding part of [his trip] was that we were allowed to feel that we had given the others something" ("das beglückendste dieser Reise [war], daß wir spüren durften, anderen etwas gegeben zu haben"; "Jazz für den fernen Osten" 159). Willi Johanns also pondered whether these activities might not be considered musical *Bildungshilfe* (95). This was a notion which the Goethe Institut itself also advanced at various times during the mid to late 1960s (Hömborg 49; Hüdepohl 19–20; 1967 *Jahrbuch* 91; Pfeiffer 1968 *Jahrbuch* Geleitwort; Pfeiffer 1970 *Jahrbuch* Geleitwort).

As a final gloss in his article for Jazz Podium, Berendt to be "ambassadors of the lively musical events lebendigen Musikgeschehens der westlichen Welt sent "to eastern Lands" ("in die östlichen Länder: beneficent stance – as well as the notion of music with the guiding liberal philosophy of the Institut. I argue, a desire on the part of some West German cultural chauvinism of the National Socialist era: redemption for that chauvinism.

However, this is only part of the story. There was such as the Goethe Institut jazz tours and the no focus is turned to Indonesia in the early 1960s. M the country in 1964 because of the "political conf (Berendt, *Djanger Bali*; Ticoalu, Telephone inter possibly have met with an interpretation of jazz not see jazz as a medium towards a conviviality jazz adaptation of the Indonesian folk song *Buru* than "special musical greetings."

Reconstructing President Sukarno's attitude

In early 1964, when Mangelsdorff's band was in Indonesia was engaged in a volatile confrontation (203 – 246). Since September 1963, the federal leaders (including the Indonesian communist party President Sukarno). Malaysia was seen by these British sponsors. Related to the Malaysia issue militancy (Mortimer 226). Part of that militancy popular culture, particularly film (Mortimer 244).

Though there is a paucity of historical Indonesian 1960s, based on Berendt's account as well as on Indonesian jazz musicians and writers, jazz appreciation Indonesian leaders' criticism at this time. Berendt

ited to perform on stage with the Germans as forms of "intellectual exchange" ("geistigen ers and lively cultural exchange" ("echten "Doldinger füllt Titelseiten" 175). However ists and their Latin American, African and 380 (*Now Jazz Ramwong* (re.)) was not yet a ia in 1964. As Mangelsdorff observed at the raveling and performing to have a great deal and[s] and [their] people" ("Land und Leute 1sten" 158). The extent of the collaboration occasional jam session, and a short visit, for nbay (Berendt, "Jazz für den fernen Osten" *Institut*-funded collaborations would come e Pike Set traveled to Bahia (Brazil) in 1972 o *Baiafiro* for two weeks. This collaboration ichreiner). It possibly also reflected a 1970 r focused on "dialogic and partnership-based ie Kulturarbeit"; Goethe Institut).

boldest claims for these early *Goethe Institut* up in 1964, he published an article on the z (and by extension the *Goethe Institut* jazz global understanding" ("wertvoller Beitrag sten" 140). In Berendt's view, the jazz tours voked were a bridge to a future conviviality

ed with these tours understood themselves pients of their tours: Albert Mangelsdorff when he reported that "the most rewarding at we had given the others something" ("das durften, anderen etwas gegeben zu haben"; so pondered whether these activities might was a notion which the *Goethe Institut* itself te 1960s (Hömberg 49; Hüdelpohl 19–20; rt; Pfeiffer 1970 *Jahrbuch Geleitwort*).

As a final gloss in his article for *Jazz Podium*, Berendt considered groups such as Mangelsdorff's to be "ambassadors of the lively musical events in the Western world" ("Botschafter des lebendigen Musikgeschehens der westlichen Welt") and that they should continue to be sent "to eastern Lands" ("in die östlichen Länder"; "Jazz für den fernen Osten" 140). This beneficent stance – as well as the notion of musical *Bildungshilfe* – was thoroughly in accord with the guiding liberal philosophy of the *Institut's* cultural work. It also represents, I would argue, a desire on the part of some West German critics and musicians to reverse the harmful cultural chauvinism of the National Socialist era and perhaps to make an unconscious bid for redemption for that chauvinism.

However, this is only part of the story. There was an alternative way of interpreting activities such as the *Goethe Institut* jazz tours and the notion of *Bildungshilfe*. This can be seen if the focus is turned to Indonesia in the early 1960s. Mangelsdorff's group had been unable to enter the country in 1964 because of the "political confrontation" between Indonesia and Malaysia" (Berendt, *Djanger Bali*; Ticoalu, Telephone interview). Had they been able to, they would possibly have met with an interpretation of jazz on the part of some Indonesians which did not see jazz as a medium towards a conviviality of countries and which may have held their jazz adaptation of the Indonesian folk song *Burungkaka Tua* to be something more harmful than "special musical greetings."

Reconstructing President Sukarno's attitude to jazz

In early 1964, when Mangelsdorff's band was waiting in Singapore to gain entry to Indonesia, Indonesia was engaged in a volatile confrontation with the Malaysian federation (Mortimer 203–246). Since September 1963, the federation had been a burning issue for Indonesia's leaders (including the Indonesian communist party (PKI), which increasingly had the ear of President Sukarno). Malaysia was seen by these leaders to be an imperialist creation of its British sponsors. Related to the Malaysia issue was an upsurge in general anti-imperialist militancy (Mortimer 226). Part of that militancy was specifically directed at American popular culture, particularly film (Mortimer 244).

Though there is a paucity of historical Indonesian primary sources relating to jazz in the 1960s, based on Berendt's account as well as on the supporting comments of a number of Indonesian jazz musicians and writers, jazz apparently did not escape Sukarno's and other Indonesian leaders' criticism at this time. Berendt first wrote about Sukarno's opposition to

jazz after his 1962 Asian trip ("Asienreise Teil 2"). He also discussed it when the Indonesian Allstars performed in Europe in 1967, that is, after Sukarno's and the PKI's fall. According to Berendt, this opposition to jazz manifested itself in several ways: firstly, jazz recordings were hard to come by (*Berliner Jazztage 1967* program notes 4). Further, in 1961 the American jazz musician Tony Scott (who had been residing in Indonesia in the early 1960s and participating in his own jazz proselytizing) was ordered to leave the country (*Berliner Jazztage* notes 4). Finally, the Indonesian guitarist Jack Lesmana (who occasionally performed in President Sukarno's presence and who had a penchant for jazz improvisation) was requested by Sukarno to desist from improvising. A recording by Lesmana's ensemble dating from 1965 which expressly received the imprimatur of President Sukarno – it even bore a song penned by him – gives a hint as to what sort of music was ideologically acceptable to the President. The album contains, for example, a straight, Indonesian "Lenso" version of the folk song *Burungkaka Tua*. It is quite different from the jazz version recorded by Lesmana and his jazz colleagues only two years later for their album *Djanger Bali*.

Berendt's explanation for what he clearly interpreted as President Sukarno's opposition to jazz was to rely on the "Dictators don't swing" aphorism, which had, thanks partly to his own efforts, gained currency in postwar West Germany. According to Berendt, jazz was "political music everywhere in the world and during the Sukarno era, it was blacklisted the same as under most other dictatorships, whether of leftist or rightist persuasions" (*Djanger Bali*). Earlier, in the 1950s, he had expressed the cause of the dictator's constitutional aversion for jazz: a dictator was unable to cope with the rhythm in jazz, which embodied the idea of listening to those with opposing viewpoints (*Der Jazz* 32). And as Berendt had pointed out in 1962, Sukarno was "a regular dictator" ("ein ordentlicher Diktator"; "Asienreise Teil 2" 23). This lumped him together with the National Socialists (as well as with the East German communist regime, which as will be shown, had also campaigned against jazz from time to time). Recourse to the "Dictators don't swing" aphorism reflected favourably on West German jazz enthusiasts: since jazz "[inoculated] against all totalitarianism" ("[impft] gegen jeden Totalitarismus"; Berendt "Für und wider den Jazz" 890), a jazz enthusiast could not be protofascist. Nevertheless, the aphorism did little to explore or explain Sukarno's opposition to jazz. It also could not account for the fact that Sukarno's successor (the equally dictatorial President Suharto) was, by Berendt's own account, quite well disposed to jazz (*Berliner Jazztage* notes; *Djanger Bali*).

It is not straightforward to plumb the reasons for Sukarno's ideological opposition to jazz, given the paucity of Indonesian primary sources on jazz from the era. However, on the basis

of Berendt's and others' observations, a number of reasons can be suggested. On the one hand, I suggest that Sukarno's attitude of opposition to jazz which could be observed from communist countries including East Germany. It can be termed "anti-US cultural penetration." On the other hand, the hallmarks of a strong cultural nationalism in a postcolonial country. This dimension of anti-jazz cultural nationalism." These two dimensions were

Jazz and US "cultural penetration"

In order to appreciate the "anti-US cultural penetration" to jazz, it is worthwhile pausing for a moment to consider the role of jazz promoted by the USA and received in the communist countries during the Cold War. During the 1950s, jazz was not merely a cultural phenomenon in communist regimes, such as East Germany, but also a tool of cultural imperialism (Noglik, "Hürdenlauf zum Jazz", covered in the West German jazz media. In a verbatim passage from the East German paper *Neues Deutschland* expressed this ideological opposition to jazz:

The current 'Boogie-Woogie' is a channel through which American culture penetrates and threatens to anaesthetize the people. It is as dangerous as a military attack with poison gas. The role of American music in the preparation for the invasion of the Canal, through which the poison gas of Americanism is being poured, is to be feared. This threat is also with chemical warfare... It is false, the danger of war preparation is to be recognized; "Jazz in Germany"

Even before anxieties such as these were being expressed, jazz was also aware of the possibilities of jazz in winning the East. Field Marshal Montgomery had notably commented that jazz could conquer the communist east with the weapon of the trumpet" (qtd in Noglik "Osteuropäischer Jazz in der DDR" was this empty rhetoric. From the mid-1950s.

). He also discussed it when the Indonesian President Sukarno's and the PKI's fall. According to me in several ways: firstly, jazz recordings were banned (see notes 4). Further, in 1961 the American Embassy in Indonesia in the early 1960s and ordered to leave the country (*Berliner Jazztage* by Lesmana (who occasionally performed in Indonesia) was requested to leave the country by Lesmana's ensemble dating from the time of President Sukarno – it even bore a song of jazz music which was ideologically acceptable to the Indonesian government, Indonesian "Lenso" version of the folk song "The Jazz Version" recorded by Lesmana and his ensemble in *Djanger Bali*).

Interpreted as President Sukarno's opposition to jazz, which had, thanks partly to his own policy. According to Berendt, jazz was "political" during the Sukarno era, it was blacklisted the same as communist or rightist persuasions" (*Djanger Bali*). This was a result of the dictator's constitutional aversion for jazz, which embodied the idea of "jazz" (*Der Jazz* 32). And as Berendt had pointed out, "ein ordentlicher Diktator"; "Asienreise Teil 1" National Socialists (as well as with the East German government, had also campaigned against jazz from the beginning" aphorism reflected favourably on West Germany) against all totalitarianism" ("[impft] gegen den Jazz" 890), a jazz enthusiast could not be expected to explore or explain Sukarno's opposition to jazz. Sukarno's successor (the equally dictatorial Suharto), quite well disposed to jazz (*Berliner*

or Sukarno's ideological opposition to jazz, and jazz from the era. However, on the basis

of Berendt's and others' observations, a number of tentative speculations can be advanced. On the one hand, I suggest that Sukarno's attitude towards jazz resembles the ideological opposition to jazz which could be observed from time to time in several Eastern European communist countries including East Germany. This dimension of anti-jazz sentiment might be termed "anti-US cultural penetration." On the other hand, Sukarno's opposition also has the hallmarks of a strong cultural nationalism grounded in postwar Indonesia's status as a postcolonial country. This dimension of anti-jazz sentiment might be termed "Indonesian cultural nationalism." These two dimensions were interrelated and are not easily separated.

Jazz and US "cultural penetration"

In order to appreciate the "anti-US cultural penetration" dimension to Sukarno's opposition to jazz, it is worthwhile pausing for a moment to consider the way in which jazz had been promoted by the USA and received in the communist and non-aligned world during the Cold War. During the 1950s, jazz was not merely a neutral cultural form. Eastern European communist regimes, such as East Germany, periodically denigrated jazz as an agent of US cultural imperialism (Noglik, "Hürdenlauf zum freien Spiel"). These attacks were often covered in the West German jazz media. In the 1950s, for example, Berendt reported verbatim a passage from the East German paper *Musik und Gesellschaft* which eloquently expressed this ideological opposition to jazz:

The current 'Boogie-Woogie' is a channel through which the poison of Americanisation penetrates and threatens to anaesthetize the brains of working people. This threat is just as dangerous as a military attack with poison gas ... It is wrong to mistake the dangerous role of American music in the preparation for war. (Der heutige 'Boogie-Woogie' ist ein Kanal, durch den das Gift des Amerikanismus eindringt und die Gehirne der Werktätigen zu betäuben droht. Diese Bedrohung ist ebenso gefährlich wie ein militärischer Angriff mit Giftgasen... Es ist falsch, die gefährlichen Rolle der amerikanischen Musik bei der Kriegsvorbereitung zu verkennen; "Jazz in Germany [#2]").

Even before anxieties such as these were being expressed in the Eastern bloc, the West was also aware of the possibilities of jazz in winning over Eastern European "hearts and minds." Field Marshall Montgomery had notably commented for example that: "[i]f we are unable to conquer the communist east with the weapon, then [we will be able to do so] with the jazz trumpet" (qtd in Noglik "Osteuropäischer Jazz im Imbruch der Verhältnisse" 148 – 9). Nor was this empty rhetoric. From the mid-1950s, the US State Department was engaged in

sending so-called "Jazz Ambassadors" on tours of the communist and unaligned world: In 1956 Dizzy Gillespie's Big Band traveled through Asia. Benny Goodman did likewise in 1956-7. In 1961 Goodman traveled to South America and in 1962 to the USSR. Dave Brubeck and Duke Ellington undertook tours of Asia in 1958 and 1964 respectively. Herbie Mann traveled to Africa in 1959 (Pfleiderer 57). Referring to such activities, Frank Kofsky (writing in 1970) polemically labeled jazz a "Cold War secret weapon" (qtd in Pfeleiderer 57).

Given President Sukarno's increasing ideological alliance with the PKI (Indonesian communist party) during the early-mid 1960s, it is possible that his opposition to jazz was partly akin to the opposition to jazz displayed (from time to time) in communist countries such as East Germany. According to this approach, jazz was probably seen as simply another agent of what the PKI referred to in 1963 as US "cultural penetration" (qtd in Mortimer 244). It should be pointed out that, during this era, the USA was not the only country being accused of imperialism in Indonesia, rather, that accusation was also being leveled by Indonesian PKI leaders at other western countries, including Great Britain and West Germany (Mortimer 210). If the USA was being accused of "cultural penetration," then there was no logical reason why other countries accused of imperialism could not also be accused of "cultural penetration." On this approach, the *Goethe Institut* jazz tours might well have been thought to be "Cold War secret weapons."

One can make out certain continuities between the *Goethe Institut* jazz tours and the US "Jazz Ambassador" tours. In many ways, the West Germans were literally following in the footsteps of the American jazz ambassadors – Mangelsdorff reported, for example, that they often played concerts hot on the heels of Duke Ellington and Benny Goodman ("Jazz für den fernen Osten" 159). The West German jazz tourists were also referred to as *ambassadors* at the time. As noted above, Berendt argued in 1964 (to his West German audience) that (German) jazzers should be sent as "ambassadors of the lively musical happenings in the Western world" ("*Botschafter des lebendigen Musikgeschehens der westlichen Welt*"; "Jazz für den fernen Osten" 140, my emphasis). Regular *Goethe Institut* jazz tourist Klaus Doldinger named his 1970 *Institut* co-funded record "The Ambassador." The West Germans were perceived by some westerners to be continuing or even taking over the jazz proselytising work of the Americans. West German pianist Wolfgang Dauner expressed the view that the American "Jazz Ambassador" tours had tailed off in the late 1960s. Dauner, who traveled with an Allstar West German band through South America in late 1968, lamented that the United States was not doing nearly enough to spread the jazz message through the world ("Mit Jazz in Südamerika [#2]"). Other observers, including Berendt, also saw the *Goethe*

Institut tours as exemplary for the USA ("Jazz representative of the United States Information *Goethe Institut's* jazz work, which in his view may (reported in Berendt, "Jazz für Goethe – negat perceive a significant difference between the We US "Jazz Ambassador" tours.

Based on their reports in the West German jazz do not appear to have paid much heed to Third US (or western) "cultural penetration." Yet as were confronted with these types of objections, their downplaying of this interpretation. Firstly, expressly avoid aggressive cultural imperialism. all too familiar from East German jazz discou attitudes to jazz had been ridiculed in the past. Finally, the idea that jazz could be an agent of c also inconsistent with the image of jazz which themselves. Put bluntly, if jazz was fundament could it be an agent of western cultural penetra encountered Anti-Americanism in Burma, which youth" ("jugendverderbend"), he dismissed this a that in the play of politics, some of the most asto is actually obvious, namely [jazz] music's truly : is overlooked or denied" ("Man sieht, im politis Feststellungen und das eigentlich Naheliegen völkerverbindende Charakter der Musik, wird ül fernen Osten" 159).

West German jazz tourists also possibly did not j to jazz for an aesthetic-based reason: being Germ expressly affected by that Anti-Americanism. confronted with local attitudes which made aes American jazz. Berendt and Mangelsdorff pointe audiences had not tarred their music with the san den fernen Osten"; Mangelsdorff, "Jazz für den) that his Burmese audience had distinguished bet

f the communist and unaligned world: In
 h Asia. Benny Goodman did likewise in
 America and in 1962 to the USSR. Dave
 Asia in 1958 and 1964 respectively. Herbie
 Referring to such activities, Frank Kofsky
 "War secret weapon" (qtd in Pfeleiderer 57).

liance with the PKI (Indonesian communist
 that his opposition to jazz was partly akin
 time) in communist countries such as East
 ably seen as simply another agent of what
 tration" (qtd in Mortimer 244). It should
 as not the only country being accused of
 was also being leveled by Indonesian PKI
 at Britain and West Germany (Mortimer
 netration," then there was no logical reason
 not also be accused of "cultural penetration."
 ght well have been thought to be "Cold War

he *Goethe Institut* jazz tours and the US
 it Germans were literally following in the
 ngelsdorff reported, for example, that they
 illington and Benny Goodman ("Jazz für
 urists were also referred to as *ambassadors*
 1964 (to his West German audience) that
 s of the lively musical happenings in the
 geschehens der westlichen Welt"; "Jazz für
 oethe Institut jazz tourist Klaus Doldinger
 Ambassador." The West Germans were
 r even taking over the jazz proselytising
 lfgang Dauner expressed the view that the
 in the late 1960s. Dauner, who traveled
 1 America in late 1968, lamented that the
 read the jazz message through the world
 s, including Berendt, also saw the *Goethe*

Institut tours as exemplary for the USA ("Jazz für den fernen Osten"). In the 1970s, a
 representative of the United States Information Service expressed sheer admiration for the
Goethe Institut's jazz work, which in his view made the USA's efforts seem pale by comparison
 (reported in Berendt, "Jazz für Goethe – negativ"). These commentators at least did not
 perceive a significant difference between the West German *Goethe Institut* jazz tours and the
 US "Jazz Ambassador" tours.

Based on their reports in the West German jazz press, the early *Goethe Institut* jazz tourists
 do not appear to have paid much heed to Third World objections that jazz was an agent of
 US (or western) "cultural penetration." Yet as will be shown, at least some of the tourists
 were confronted with these types of objections. I wish to posit several possible reasons for
 their downplaying of this interpretation. Firstly, the guiding philosophy of the *Institut* was to
 expressly avoid aggressive cultural imperialism. Secondly, these objections were presumably
 all too familiar from East German jazz discourse. As I have shown above, East German
 attitudes to jazz had been ridiculed in the past by influential commentators like Berendt.
 Finally, the idea that jazz could be an agent of dangerous western "cultural penetration" was
 also inconsistent with the image of jazz which postwar West Germans had fashioned for
 themselves. Put bluntly, if jazz was fundamentally international and anti-ideological, how
 could it be an agent of western cultural penetration? When, in 1964, Albert Mangelsdorff
 encountered Anti-Americanism in Burma, which denigrated American jazz as "corrupting of
 youth" ("jugendverderbend"), he dismissed this attitude in the following terms: "One can see
 that in the play of politics, some of the most astonishing claims are made and that that which
 is actually obvious, namely [jazz] music's truly international and nation-bonding character,
 is overlooked or denied" ("Man sieht, im politischen Spiel kommt es zu den erstaunlichsten
 Feststellungen und das eigentlich Naheliegende, nämlich der wahrhaft internationale,
 völkerverbindende Charakter der Musik, wird übersehen – oder verschwiegen"; "Jazz für den
 fernen Osten" 159).

West German jazz tourists also possibly did not pay heed to Asian Anti-American opposition
 to jazz for an aesthetic-based reason: being German jazz musicians, they were not necessarily
 expressly affected by that Anti-Americanism. These musicians were not infrequently
 confronted with local attitudes which made aesthetic distinctions between their music and
 American jazz. Berendt and Mangelsdorff pointed out, for example, that Anti-American Asian
 audiences had not tarred their music with the same brush as American jazz (Berendt, "Jazz für
 den fernen Osten"; Mangelsdorff, "Jazz für den fernen Osten"). Mangelsdorff also reported
 that his Burmese audience had distinguished between acceptable "academic" German jazz and

"youth-corrupting" American jazz ("Jazz für den fernen Osten" 159). According to the Asian reviews, which were quoted on the cover of the *Now Jazz Ramwong* album, several Asian jazz connoisseurs did perceive an aesthetic distinction between jazz as played by Mangelsdorff's group and American jazz. Mangelsdorff posited that these reviews must have been gratifying to the *Goethe Institut*, which might otherwise have been accused of spending their money on presenting "American" rather than "German" culture ("Jazz für den fernen Osten" 159). Though Mangelsdorff demonstrated both modesty and a distaste for the notion of "national" varieties of jazz ("Jazz für den fernen Osten" 159), it is likely that he also found such reviews personally gratifying. They suggested that he might have succeeded in "emancipating" himself from the postwar West German pattern of slavishly copying American jazz innovators.

Indonesian cultural nationalism and jazz

As noted above, I suggest that Sukarno's apparent opposition to jazz also had an "Indonesian cultural nationalism" dimension. From this perspective, any fine aesthetic distinction between "academic" or "emancipated" West German jazz and American jazz may have been a little beside the point. Well before Sukarno's informal alliance with the PKI in the early 1960s, nationalism was an important element in his politics. In fact it was one of the *Pantja Sila* (five fundamental principles) formulated by President Sukarno in 1945 by which the Indonesian Republic was to exist (Wertheim 228). This nationalism was in turn partly a consequence of Indonesia's postcolonial status. In that context, nationalism played a distinct role. Writing in 1959, the Dutch scholar W.F. Wertheim noted that the cultural nationalism advanced by Sukarno was a "source of the spiritual strength needed to build a new Indonesian society" (331). Wertheim argued that whilst nationalist phenomena "may sometimes smell of chauvinism" they were "only too understandable reactions to a colonial past and at the same time conditions to free themselves from an inferiority feeling" (332). Sukarno's nationalist ideology had little room for "Western music and dance," which as early as the 1950s he had considered an affront to youths' "Indonesian Identity" (Mortimer 244). The exact source of affront to this (imagined) Indonesian identity (be it West German jazz tourists, American "Jazz Ambassadors," the ethnic Chinese or the Balinese minority) was perhaps not always relevant.

Had President Sukarno been aware – and we have no evidence that he was – that some West German jazz musicians and critics regarded the early *Goethe Institut* jazz tours as *Bildungshilfe*, he may well have taken a dim view of this. Such a position (as well-intentioned as it might have been) could be interpreted as inimical to the goal of instilling Indonesian

cultural pride, since the notion of *Bildungshilfe* recipients of that *Hilfe* was underdeveloped.

As demonstrated earlier, Asian attitudes four likely to endear themselves to postwar West trajectory of German nationalism and anxious this perspective Sukarno's nationalist program criticism. This postwar West German liberal hal cultural nationalism such as that displayed by understandable reaction in the postcolonial cont

Conclusion

Writings about *Goethe Institut* jazz tours in the musicians' and critics' as well as the *Goethe Institut's* tolerant, liberal credentials and to place distance be of the National Socialist past. The West German itself in a desire to "pay respect" to other musical European perspective. However this respect only and critics often reacted strongly to instances of cu postcolonial countries such as Indonesia. Comme affinities between these nationalist ideologies and and, as a result, were unwilling to entertain the idea in a postcolonial context. This sensitivity to "exoti the postwar West German liberal habitus describ domestic German nationalism to be a "dormant vir and the concomitant interpretation of jazz as inh militated against commentators like Mangelsdorff (American) jazz on the basis that it was an agent of Asian youth. In the context of Cold War Germ close to the anti-jazz rhetoric advanced in the past seriously contemplated by many in the West Germ

ernen Osten" 159). According to the Asian
 on *Jazz Ramwong* album, several Asian jazz
 between jazz as played by Mangelsdorff's
 hat these reviews must have been gratifying
 ve been accused of spending their money
 culture ("Jazz für den fernen Osten" 159).
 y and a distaste for the notion of "national"
 , it is likely that he also found such reviews
 it have succeeded in "emancipating" himself
 ly copying American jazz innovators.

opposition to jazz also had an "Indonesian
 perspective, any fine aesthetic distinction
 an jazz and American jazz may have been
 informal alliance with the PKI in the early
 is politics. In fact it was one of the *Pantja*
 President Sukarno in 1945 by which the
 8). This nationalism was in turn partly
 . In that context, nationalism played a
 ir W.F. Wertheim noted that the cultural
 if the spiritual strength needed to build a
 l that whilst nationalist phenomena "may
 oo understandable reactions to a colonial
 nselves from an inferiority feeling" (332).
 'Western music and dance," which as early
 hs "Indonesian Identity" (Mortimer 244).
 onesian identity (be it West German jazz
 ic Chinese or the Balinese minority) was

ave no evidence that he was— that some
 d the early *Goethe Institut* jazz tours as
 this. Such a position (as well-intentioned
 mical to the goal of instilling Indonesian

cultural pride, since the notion of *Bildungshilfe* implicitly suggested that the culture of the
 recipients of that *Hilfe* was underdeveloped.

As demonstrated earlier, Asian attitudes founded in cultural nationalism were hardly
 likely to endear themselves to postwar West German liberals mindful of the historical
 trajectory of German nationalism and anxious about its potential to be revived. From
 this perspective Sukarno's nationalist program was reprehensible and worthy of vehement
 criticism. This postwar West German liberal habitus was unwilling to entertain the idea that
 cultural nationalism such as that displayed by Sukarno might, following Wertheim, be an
 understandable reaction in the postcolonial context.

Conclusion

Writings about *Goethe Institut* jazz tours in the mid to late 1960s exhibit West German jazz
 musicians' and critics' as well as the *Goethe Institut's* desire to demonstrate their (and their country's)
 tolerant, liberal credentials and to place distance between themselves and the cultural chauvinism
 of the National Socialist past. The West German jazzers' liberal habitus sometimes manifested
 itself in a desire to "pay respect" to other musical cultures which had been marginalized from a
 European perspective. However this respect only went so far – West German jazz musicians
 and critics often reacted strongly to instances of cultural nationalism which they encountered in
 postcolonial countries such as Indonesia. Commentators like Joachim Ernst Berendt identified
 affinities between these nationalist ideologies and the National Socialist ideologies of the past
 and, as a result, were unwilling to entertain the idea that such sympathies might be understandable
 in a postcolonial context. This sensitivity to "exotic" nationalism was, I suggest, an extension of
 the postwar West German liberal habitus described by Peter O'Brien, which regarded forms of
 domestic German nationalism to be a "dormant virus capable of revival" (40). The liberal habitus
 and the concomitant interpretation of jazz as inherently international and anti-ideological also
 militated against commentators like Mangelsdorff from giving credence to Asian objections to
 (American) jazz on the basis that it was an agent of US "cultural penetration" or that it "corrupted"
 Asian youth. In the context of Cold War Germany, such an interpretation was probably too
 close to the anti-jazz rhetoric advanced in the past by the East German communist regime to be
 seriously contemplated by many in the West German jazz scene.

Endnotes

¹ Unlike earlier, privately-initiated jazz tours such as a 1957 trip by two German jazz groups to the Polish Zopott Jazz Festival, the *Goethe Institut* jazz tours were funded by the *Auswärtiges Amt* (Foreign Office). For a short history of the *Goethe Institut* and the way in which its brief has changed over the years, see *Goethe Institut "Zur Geschichte des Goethe Instituts."* See also Ross.

² A survey of West Germany's leading jazz periodical of the day, *Jazz Podium*, gives an overview of these tours. The *Goethe Institut Jahrbücher* also indicate the extent of these fully- and partly-funded tours. Klaus Doldinger's group toured South America between March and June 1965 ("Das Klaus Doldinger Quartet in Südamerika"; "Doldinger füllt Titelseiten"; Hömberg 50). The Kurt Edelhagen Orchestra toured North Africa in late 1965 and early 1966 (Johanns 94 – 5; Hömberg 51). In January and February 1966, the Gunter Hampel Quintet toured Italy and Tunisia (1966 *Jahrbuch* 103). Mangelsdorff's group toured Spain, Portugal and North Africa in February and March 1966 (Untitled Article [#1]; Untitled Article [#2]; 1966 *Jahrbuch* 104). They were in Budapest in April (1966 *Jahrbuch* 104). In October 1966, the Schoof Quintet were in Prague (1966 *Jahrbuch* 104). The Spree City Stompers toured Africa in late 1966 (1966 *Jahrbuch* 103). Mangelsdorff's Quintet were in Italy and Tunisia in January and February 1967 (1967 *Jahrbuch* 140) and in the USA and Canada in February and March of that year (1967 *Jahrbuch* 139). In October and November they were then in Great Britain (1967 *Jahrbuch* 140). Doldinger's Quartet was in France in February and March 1967 (1967 *Jahrbuch* 139). In April 1967, the Joe Haider ensemble traveled to Ireland (1967 *Jahrbuch* 140). In July 1967, the Kühn Quartet was in the USA (1967 *Jahrbuch* 140). Manfred Schoof's Quintet traveled to Czechoslovakia in March 1967 and then to Poland in October 1967 (1967 *Jahrbuch* 141). A West German Allstar band toured South America in 1968 ("Jazz aus Deutschland für Südamerika"; Dauner, "Mit Jazz in Südamerika [#1]"; Dauner, "Mit Jazz in Südamerika [#2]"; 1968 *Jahrbuch* 107). Such tours continued in the following years.

³ See for example Kater for an in-depth treatment of jazz under National Socialism.

⁴ Kotschenreuther's argument is explicitly influenced by Theodor Adorno's negative interpretation of jazz "enthusiasm." For a succinct outline of Adorno's attitude towards jazz, see Schaal.

⁵ The equation of jazz with antifascism was commonly adhered to in postwar West Germany. See for example Hoffmann 97, where he quotes the German jazz musician Volker Kriegel in support of this assertion.

⁶ See for example the reports in the following *Jahrbücher* in which the *Institut* reported on the popular success of its jazz concerts: 1965 *Jahrbuch* 50 (reporting on Klaus Doldinger's success in South America); 1965 *Jahrbuch* 51 (the Kurt Edelhagen Orchestra in North Africa); 1966 *Jahrbuch* Plate caption (the Spree City Stompers in Africa); 1969 *Jahrbuch* 86 (an Allstar Big Band in South America); 1969 *Jahrbuch* 66 (Klaus Doldinger in Asia).

⁷ See for example 1965 *Jahrbuch* 41 (reporting on the telecast of the Edelhagen Orchestra in Cairo, which reportedly reached an audience of 5 million). Similar claims were later made in relation to the telecast of the "Deutscher Jazz 1968" Allstar band in South America (1969 *Jahrbuch* Plate caption).

⁸ Berendt notes that the Thai King Bhumipol even requested of the German Government in the early 1960s that it send a German jazz group on tour to Asia ("Jazz für den fernen Osten").

⁹ Germany's military aggression in North Africa during World War I, was well aware. In 1967 he made a point of referring to "the German colonial empire by Rommel's Afrika Korps" during the early 1940s (Noon in 1967).

¹⁰ On the link between Wagner's antisemitism and National Socialism, see in particular his chapter, "Wagner, Hitler and the German 'Racial' Problem: The problematic nature of Wagner's oeuvre in the postwar years.

¹¹ Klaus Doldinger, who traveled under the auspices of the *Goethe Institut*, took a similar approach to that of Mangelsdorff, performing adapted jazz in South America (1966 *Jahrbuch* 112).

¹² The Ramwong (also spelled Rambong or Ram wong) is a form of traditional music (Pfleiderer 272).

¹³ However, as early as 1965 there had been calls for West Germany to take a longer period (rather than simply to travel through and perform) under such circumstances could more effectual cultural exchange take place (Hömberg 49).

¹⁴ The Indonesian writer Alfred D. Ticoalu, who has researched the Indonesian Allstars was unable to locate any In Indonesian or PKI position in relation to jazz; at this time he had conducted with associates of Sukarno, whatever the P music might have been (and the evidence suggests that there was such as jazz), he was, at a personal level, an ardent admirer of jazz (interview). The Indonesian jazz concert organizer and writer interviewed for this book had jazz gigs in Indonesia at this time and that this had not been done simply as "parties" to avoid unwelcome attention from the authorities.

¹⁵ P.R. Sudibyo and Alfred D. Ticoalu both intimated to me that their interest in jazz had not have been entirely related to his being a jazz musician, but rather to other reasons (Sudibyo; Ticoalu, Telephone interview).

¹⁶ Alfred D. Ticoalu, who interviewed the late Jack Lesmana, did not deny Berendt's anecdote. Ticoalu did note, however, that he had told him that it was not straightforward at this time for him to interview Lesmana. P.R. Sudibyo confirmed this (Sudibyo).

¹⁷ *Bersuka Ria* was recorded by the Orkestra Irama (under the leadership of Lesmana). It showcases music to accompany the "Lenso", a traditional dance from Molucca. According to Alfred D. Ticoalu, Sukarno "adopted" the 1960s ("Ticoalu, 'Ret Jazz in Indonesia'").

¹⁸ This passage derives originally from a 1952 book by the East German writer Zeitgeschichte. (qtd in Noglik "Hürdenlauf zum freien Spiel")

¹⁹ The Japanese trumpeter Terumasa Hino attended the Manilla Jazz Festival and identified the music as being European. He recalls being "ver-

trip by two German jazz groups to the Polish led by the *Auswärtiges Amt* (Foreign Office). For a brief has changed over the years, see Goethe

18. *Jazz Podium*, gives an overview of these of these fully- and partly-funded tours. Klaus Doldinger June 1965 ("Das Klaus Doldinger Quartet The Kurt Edelhagen Orchestra toured North 51). In January and February 1966, the *Jahrbuch* 103). Mangelsdorff's group toured Spain, titled Article [#1]); Untitled Article [#2]; 1966 ch 104). In October 1966, the Schoof Quintet toured Africa in late 1966 (1966 *Jahrbuch* uary and February 1967 (1967 *Jahrbuch* that year (1967 *Jahrbuch* 139). In October Doldinger's Quartet was in France in 57, the Joe Haider ensemble traveled to Ireland the USA (1967 *Jahrbuch* 140). Manfred and then to Poland in October 1967 (1967 erica in 1968 ("Jazz aus Deutschland für t, "Mit Jazz in Südamerika [#2]"; 1968 *Jahrbuch*

er National Socialism.

dor Adorno's negative interpretation of jazz rds jazz, see Schaal.

d to in postwar West Germany. See for sician Volker Kriegel in support of this

ich the *Institut* reported on the popular success idinger's success in South America); 1965 1966 *Jahrbuch* Plate caption (the Spree City 1 South America); 1969 *Jahrbuch* 66 (Klaus

of the Edelhagen Orchestra in Cairo, which vere later made in relation to the telecast of the *Jahrbuch* Plate caption).

f the German Government in the early 1960s n fernem Osten").

⁹ Germany's military aggression in North Africa during World War II was a matter of which Berendt, for one, was well aware. In 1967 he made a point of referring to Tunisia's benighted past when it was "conquered by Rommel's Afrika Korps" during the early 1940s (*Noon in Tunisia*).

¹⁰ On the link between Wagner's antisemitism and National Socialist ideology, see for example Perris. See in particular his chapter, "Wagner, Hitler and the German 'Race.'" See also Mann for a discussion of the problematic nature of Wagner's oeuvre in the postwar years.

¹¹ Klaus Doldinger, who traveled under the auspices of the *Goethe Institut* to South America in 1965 adopted a similar approach to that of Mangelsdorff, performing adaptations of local songs ("Das Klaus Doldinger Quartet in Südamerika" 112).

¹² The Ramwong (also spelled Rambong or Ram vong) is a form of dance practiced in South East Asia (Pfleiderer 272).

¹³ However, as early as 1965 there had been calls for West German musicians to stay in one location for a longer period (rather than simply to travel through and perform a single concert). It was interpreted that only under such circumstances could more effectual cultural exchanges between the Germans and the locals take place (Hömburg 49).

¹⁴ The Indonesian writer Alfred D. Ticoalu, who has researched the 1967 *Djanger Bali* recording by Tony Scott and the Indonesian Allstars was unable to locate any Indonesian newspaper articles referring to the official Indonesian or PKI position in relation to jazz at this time. He did indicate that, based on interviews he had conducted with associates of Sukarno, whatever the President's ideological objections to western music might have been (and the evidence suggests that there was an ideological opposition to western music such as jazz), he was, at a personal level, an ardent admirer of western classical music (Ticoalu, Telephone interview). The Indonesian jazz concert organizer and writer P.R. Sudibyo told me that he had organized jazz gigs in Indonesia at this time and that this had not been impossible, however he had had to bill the gigs simply as "parties" to avoid unwelcome attention from the authorities (Sudibyo).

¹⁵ P.R. Sudibyo and Alfred D. Ticoalu both intimated to me that Scott's being advised to leave Indonesia may not have been entirely related to his being a jazz musician, but rather that it may have been for more personal reasons (Sudibyo; Ticoalu, Telephone interview).

¹⁶ Alfred D. Ticoalu, who interviewed the late Jack Lesmana, indicated that Lesmana had neither confirmed nor denied Berendt's anecdote. Ticoalu did note, however, that other jazz musicians such as Nick Mahamit had told him that it was not straightforward at this time for Indonesians to play jazz (Ticoalu, Telephone interview). P.R. Sudibyo confirmed this (Sudibyo).

¹⁷ *Bersuka Ria* was recorded by the Orkestra Irama (under the leadership of Jack Lesmana) in 1965 (Lesmana). It showcases music to accompany the "Lenso", a traditional form of dance from Celebes and Molucca. According to Alfred D. Ticoalu, Sukarno "adopted the Lenso as Indonesia's national dance" during the 1960s (Ticoalu, "Re: Jazz in Indonesia").

¹⁸ This passage derives originally from a 1952 book by the East German Ernst H. Meyer titled *Musik im Zeitgeschehen*. (qtd in Noglik "Hürdenlauf zum freien Spiel" 208).

¹⁹ The Japanese trumpeter Terumasa Hino attended the Mangelsdorff quintet's concert in Tokyo. He too identified the music as being European. He recalls being "very stimulated by what he calls 'European jazz'"

and its "high intellectual elements" (Hino). Other local commentators advanced similar opinions in relation to later *Goethe-Institut* funded jazz tours and made distinctions between German and American jazz. See for example some of the local reviews of the North American tour that Mangelsdorff undertook for the *Goethe Institut* in 1967 (reported in 1967 *Jahrbuch* 92). South American critics also contended that the 1968 German Allstar tour of South America may have been more significant than the tour concurrently being undertaken by the American jazz giant Duke Ellington (reported in 1968 *Jahrbuch* 61).

²⁰ "Emancipation" was a concern of Mangelsdorff's at this time (Knauer "Emanzipation wovon?" 147).

²¹ According to Alfred D. Ticoalu, there is no evidence that Sukarno was aware of Mangelsdorff's attempts to enter Indonesia in 1964 or of his version of the Indonesian folksong *Burungkaka Tua*. Ticoalu asserts that these specifics would probably have been more minor concerns at the time, given the more pressing matter of the escalation of the confrontation with Malaysia (Ticoalu, Telephone interview).

Works cited

- Berendt, Joachim Ernst. "Berendts Asienreise Teil 1." *Twen* 4.9 (1962): 17 – 23.
 ---. "Berendts Asienreise Teil 2." *Twen* 5.1 (1963): 22 – 27.
 ---. *Berliner Jazztage*. 1967. program notes.
 ---. *Das Leben. Ein Klang*. Munich: Knauer, 1998.
 ---. *Der Jazz Eine Zeitkritische Studie*. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1950.
 ---. *Djanger Bali*. Saba. 1967. cover notes
 ---. *Ein Fenster aus Jazz. Essays, Portraits, Reflexionen*. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1978.
 ---. "Für und wider den Jazz." *Merkur* 7 (1953): 887 – 890.
 ---. "Jazz als Ideologie." Berendt *Variationen über Jazz*. 105 – 113.
 ---. "Jazz für den fernen Osten." *Jazz Podium* 13.6 (1964): 138 – 140.
 ---. "Jazz für Goethe – negativ." typescript. Jazz Institut Darmstadt.
 ---. "Jazz in Djakarta (Indonesien)." typescript. Jazz Institut Darmstadt.
 ---. "Jazz in Germany [#1]" typescript. Jazz Institut Darmstadt.
 ---. "Jazz in Germany [#2]" typescript. Jazz Institut Darmstadt.
 ---. *Noon in Tunisia*. Saba. 1967. cover notes.
 ---. *Now Jazz Ramwong*. CBS (Germany). 1964. cover notes.
 ---. *Now Jazz Ramwong*. L & R. 1980 (reissue). cover notes.
 ---. *Variationen über Jazz*. Munich: Nymphenburger Verlagshandlung, 1956.
 ---. "Was halten Sie vom Jazz Herr Verteidigungsminister?" *Iserlohner Kreisanzeiger* 22 August 1958.
 "Das Klaus Doldinger Quartet in Südamerika." *Jazz Podium* 14.5 (1965): 112.
 Dauner, Wolfgang. "Mit Jazz in Südamerika [#1]." *Jazz Podium* 17.12 (1968): 383 – 5.
 ---. "Mit Jazz in Südamerika [#2]." *Jazz Podium* 18.1 (1969): 16 – 17.
 "Doldinger füllt Titelseiten – überwältigender Erfolg einer Südamerika-Tournee." *Jazz Podium* 14.7 (1965): 175 – 6.
 Doldinger, Klaus. *The Ambassador*. Liberty. 1970.
 The German Allstars. *Live at the Domicile Munich*. CBS. 1969.

- Goethe Institut. 1965 *Jahrbuch*. Munich: Goethe Institut, 1965.
 ---. 1966 *Jahrbuch*. Munich: Goethe Institut, 1967.
 ---. 1967 *Jahrbuch*. Munich: Goethe Institut, 1968.
 ---. 1968 *Jahrbuch*. Munich: Goethe Institut, 1969.
 ---. 1969 *Jahrbuch*. Munich: Goethe Institut, 1970.
 ---. 1970 *Jahrbuch*. Munich: Goethe Institut, 1971.
 ---. "Zur Geschichte des Goethe-Instituts" 17 March 2004 h
 Hino, Susan. "Re: 'Sakura Sakura' questions for 'Terumasa.'" I
 Hömberg, Johannes. "Musikreferat: Größere Ensembles, Bild
 1965. 49 – 51.
 Hoffmann, Bernd. "Die Mitteilungen. Anmerkungen zu einer
 93 – 136.
 Hüdepohl, Karl-Ernst. "Das Kulturprogramm – Stand und I
 "Jazz aus Deutschland für Südamerika." *Jazz Podium* 17.9 (1
 Johanns, Willi. "Notizen von einer heißen Reise von Willi Jol
 Kater, Michael. *Different drummers. Jazz in the Culture of Na
 1992.*
 Knauer, Wolfram. "Emanzipation wovon?" Knauer. *Jazz in D
 ---. ed. Jazz in Deutschland*. Hofheim: Wolke, 1996.
 ---. ed. *Jazz in Europa*. Hofheim: Wolke, 1994.
 Kotschenreuther, Helmut. "Glanz und Elend des Jazz." in *M
 Musikalische Bilanz einer Viermächtestadt*. Berlin an
 Lesmana, Jack. *Bersuka Ria*. Irama. 1965.
 Mangelsdorff, Albert. "Jazz für den fernen Osten." *Jazz Podi
 ---. Now Jazz Ramwong*. CBS (Germany). 1964. cover notes.
 Mann, Thomas. *Pro and contra Wagner*. Trans. Allan Blunde
 Press, 1985.
 Mortimer, Rex. *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*. Ideol
 Press, 1974.
 Noglik, Bert. "Hürdenlauf zum freien Spiel. Ein Rückblick a
 205 – 221.
 ---. "Osteuropäischer Jazz im Umbruch der Verhältnisse." *Ki
 "Now Jazz Ramwong – Asiatische Themen aber Jazz a la M
 O'Brien, Peter. *Beyond the Swastika*. London; New York: Ro
 Perris, Arnold. *Music as Propaganda. Art to Persuade. Art to
 Greenwood Press, 1985.*
 Pfeiffer, Peter H. Untitled *Geleitwort*. Goethe Institut. *Jahrb
 ---. Untitled *Geleitwort*. Goethe Institut. *Jahrbuch* 1966.
 ---. Untitled *Geleitwort*. Goethe Institut. *Jahrbuch* 1968.**

mentators advanced similar opinions in relation
 ns between German and American jazz. See
 1 tour that Mangelsdorff undertook for the
 h American critics also contended that the 1968
 significant than the tour concurrently being
 rred in 1968 *Jahrbuch* 61).

se (Knauer "Emanzipation wovon?" 147).
 ukarno was aware of Mangelsdorff's attempts
 1 folksong *Burungkaka Tua*. Ticoalu asserts that
 ns at the time, given the more pressing matter of
 'telephone interview).

.9 (1962): 17 – 23.

Jags-Anstalt, 1950.

rt am Main: Fischer, 1978.

13.

– 140.

stadt.

armstadt.

t.

t.

ndlung, 1956.

röhmer Kreisanzeiger 22 August 1958.

4.5 (1965): 112.

17.12 (1968): 383 – 5.

6 – 17.

amerika-Tournee." *Jazz Podium* 14.7 (1965): 175

Goethe Institut. 1965 *Jahrbuch*. Munich: Goethe Institut, 1966.

---. 1966 *Jahrbuch*. Munich: Goethe Institut, 1967.

---. 1967 *Jahrbuch*. Munich: Goethe Institut, 1968.

---. 1968 *Jahrbuch*. Munich: Goethe Institut, 1969.

---. 1969 *Jahrbuch*. Munich: Goethe Institut, 1970.

---. 1970 *Jahrbuch*. Munich: Goethe Institut, 1971.

---. "Zur Geschichte des Goethe-Instituts" 17 March 2004 <http://www.goethe.de/uun/ges/deindex.htm>.

Hino, Susan. "Re! 'Sakura Sakura' questions for Terumasa." Email to the author. 18 March 2004.

Hömbert, Johannes. "Musikreferat: Größere Ensembles, Bildungshilfe und Ostkontakte." *Goethe Institut. Jahrbuch* 1965. 49 – 51.

Hoffmann, Bernd. "Die Mitteilungen. Anmerkungen zu einer 'verbotenen' Fanpostille." *Knauer, Jazz in Deutschland*. 93 – 136.

Hüdepohl, Karl-Ernst. "Das Kulturprogramm – Stand und Entwicklung." *Goethe Institut. Jahrbuch* 1968. 19 – 23.

"Jazz aus Deutschland für Südamerika." *Jazz Podium* 17.9 (1968): 277.

Johanns, Willi. "Notizen von einer heißen Reise von Willi Johanns." *Jazz Podium* 15.4 (1966): 94 -5.

Kater, Michael. *Different drummers. Jazz in the Culture of Nazi Germany*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.

Knauer, Wolfram. "Emanzipation wovon?" *Knauer, Jazz in Deutschland*. 141 - 157.

---. ed. *Jazz in Deutschland*. Hofheim: Wolke, 1996.

---. ed. *Jazz in Europa*. Hofheim: Wolke, 1994.

Kotschenreuther, Helmut. "Glanz und Elend des Jazz." in *Musikstadt Berlin zwischen Krieg und Frieden*.

Musikalische Bilanz einer Viermächtestadt. Berlin and Wiesbaden: Ed. Bote and G.Bock, 1956. 198 – 210.

Lesmana, Jack. *Bersuka Ria*. Irama. 1965.

Mangelsdorff, Albert. "Jazz für den fernen Osten." *Jazz Podium* 13.7 (1964): 158 – 9.

---. *Now Jazz Ramwong*. CBS (Germany). 1964. cover notes.

Mann, Thomas. *Pro and contra Wagner*. Trans. Allan Blunden. Ed. Patrick Carnegie. London: University of Chicago Press, 1985.

Mortimer, Rex. *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno. Ideology and Politics*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1974.

Nogliki, Bert. "Hürdenlauf zum freien Spiel. Ein Rückblick auf den Jazz der DDR." *Knauer, Jazz in Deutschland*. 205 – 221.

---. "Osteuropäischer Jazz im Umbruch der Verhältnisse." *Knauer, Jazz in Europa*. 147 – 162.

"Now Jazz Ramwong – Asiatische Themen aber Jazz a la Mangelsdorff." *Jazz Podium* 13.8 (1964): 192.

O'Brien, Peter. *Beyond the Swastika*. London; New York: Routledge, 1996.

Perris, Arnold. *Music as Propaganda. Art to Persuade, Art to Control*. Westport, Connecticut & London: Greenwood Press, 1985.

Pfeiffer, Peter H. Untitled *Geleitwort*. *Goethe Institut. Jahrbuch* 1965.

---. Untitled *Geleitwort*. *Goethe Institut. Jahrbuch* 1966.

---. Untitled *Geleitwort*. *Goethe Institut. Jahrbuch* 1968.

- Pfleiderer, Martin. *Zwischen Exotismus und Weltmusik. Zur Rezeption asiatischer und afrikanischer Musik im Jazz der 60er und 70er Jahre*. Karben: Coda, 1998.
- Poiger, Uta. *Jazz, Rock, and Rebels. Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany*. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 2000.
- Ross, Werner. "Das Goethe-Institut gestern, heute, morgen." *Goethe Institut. Jahrbuch 1965*. 7 - 15.
- Schaal, Hans-Jürgen. "Theodor W. Adorno und der Jazz. Synthese aus Salonmusik und Marsch." *Jazz Podium* 32.11 (1983): 17 - 19.
- Schreiner, Claus. *Salomao*. MPS. 1972. cover notes.
- Stern, Frank. *The Whitewashing of the Yellow Badge. Antisemitism and Philo-Semitism in Postwar Germany*. Oxford, New York, Seoul and Tokyo: Pergamon Press, 1992.
- Sudibyo, P.R. Telephone interview. 15 March 2004.
- Ticoalu, Alfred D. Telephone interview. 15 March 2004.
- Ticoalu, Alfred D. "Re: Jazz in Indonesia." Email to the author. 30 March 2004
- Untitled article [#1]. *Jazz Podium*. 15.1 (1966): 4.
- Untitled article [#2]. *Jazz Podium*. 15.3 (1966): 59.
- von Herwarth, Hans. *Untitled Geleitwort*. Goethe Institut. *Jahrbuch 1970*.
- Wertheim, W.R. *Indonesian Society in Transition. A Study of Social Change*. The Hague and Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1959.

RECONTEXTUALISING GERMAN: EMIN KATE ROY

"Our translations, even the best ones, proceed Hindi, Greek, English into German instead of [...] The basic error of the translator is that he happens to be instead of allowing his language to (Rudolf Pannwitz qtd. in Benjamin 80).

Why write in a language that is not your mother tongue? The possibilities of making that language resonate with the works of Emine Sevgi Özdamar, begin with a short biography to set the scene. Özdamar has lived in Germany for more than thirty years of her literary expression. She has been described (Kübler). Born in Malatya, Eastern Anatolia, Germany took place when she was nineteen, a "worker". On her return to Turkey in 1967 she was trained for three years. She was arrested and this decided her return to Germany. Her early work where she worked with Benno Besson (the famous works, a former assistant of Brecht who began and later worked for *Deutsches Theater* and then travelled to France. On returning to Germany, Bochum, where she began to write, while continuing her career as a freelance writer progressed with stay most recently taken her to Frankfurt, where she lives for Bergen-Enkheim.

Özdamar has authored two plays, "Blackeye in Germany" ("Keloglan in Alamania") and "Baldhead in Germany" ("Keloglan in Alamania") which has two doors I came in through one and went out through the other. The first is referred to as *Caravanserei* - and the second, *vom Goldenen Horn*), two collections of short stories.