

Chapter 3

The Humanitarian-Development Nexus in Pacific Urban Contexts

Lessons From Tropical Cyclone Winston in Fiji

Anna Gero and Keren Winterford

Introduction

This chapter explores disaster response in an urbanising setting in the Pacific. We present empirical research from Fiji—a Pacific island country highly exposed to natural hazards and climate change, and also experiencing rapid urbanisation—providing an example of the humanitarian-development nexus¹ in action. Our research draws on the response to Tropical Cyclone (TC) Winston in Fiji's Western Division, and we unpack the concept of the humanitarian-development divide and relevant issues such as urban disaster policy and localisation of response in the Fiji context. Our findings point to several ways in which urban response policy in the Pacific can better align with development planning going forward.

The remainder of the Introduction provides research background, including a brief historical reflection of the humanitarian-development nexus. The Introduction is followed by a description of the research context and our research approach. We then outline two main findings and reflections from the research: 1) the policy lag in terms of urban development and disaster response in the Pacific; 2) evidence of bridging the humanitarian-development divide from the TC Winston response in Fiji through a) sub-national governance and b) the emerging 'cluster system'.² Our results provide examples of localisation of disaster response in action and we conclude by providing critical reflections and suggested avenues to further overcome the challenges associated with the humanitarian-development divide.

Research Background

Humanitarian action and development approaches both seek to improve conditions for people in need but operate through different systems in terms of policy, stakeholder groups, budgets, terminology, timescales, principles and practice (Stamnes, 2016). The clear distinction between humanitarian action (responding to acute crises) and development (addressing chronic poverty) has led actors on both sides to acknowledge the existence of a divide, despite humanitarian response, recovery and development occurring

along a continuum with no clear delineation of where response stops and where development begins. Bridging the divide between the humanitarian and development practices (inclusive of key stakeholder groups and their ways of working) has been a goal of key actors across both domains for decades. The gap between humanitarian assistance and development activities was first identified in the 1980s through responses to the African food crises, and was first conceptualised as ‘Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development’ (LRRD). LRRD was thought of as a continuum model, where a linear and sequential transition progressed from the disaster relief phase to the development phase (Mosel and Levine, 2014).

Various authors began to critique the LRRD continuum model (e.g. Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell, 1994; Longhurst, 1994), as it assumed a continuum model where disaster response interventions were short-term, and that development was insensitive to the impact of humanitarian crises (Mosel and Levine, 2014). In reality this is not the case, with disaster response and development often occurring simultaneously. The continuum model was therefore replaced with an updated model that allowed for the application of concurrent instruments and approaches—termed a contiguous model (Mosel and Levine, 2014).

Recognition of the importance of linking humanitarian response with development through the concept of LRRD occurred with the informal donor forum called the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative (European Union, 2008). Seventeen donors endorsed good practice principles at a meeting in Sweden in 2003. Since then, membership has increased to 42 and there is increasing recognition that humanitarian response can potentially have negative effects on development. This increased recognition is reflected in global policy frameworks including the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 (UNISDR, 2015), which includes mention of ‘build back better’ as part of disaster recovery. The Sustainable Development Goals, or SDGs, also aim to reduce risk and vulnerability from both humanitarian and development perspectives, with the notion of ‘leave no-one behind’ common to both stakeholder groups.

Contemporary dialogue on the humanitarian-development nexus culminated at the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) in Turkey, where a shared Agenda for Humanity (UN, 2016) was agreed upon. This included a core responsibility to ‘deliver collective outcomes: transcend humanitarian development divides’, and to

Commit to the following elements in order to move beyond traditional silos, and work across mandates, sectors and institutional boundaries, with a greater diversity of partners, towards ending need and reducing risk and vulnerability in support of national and local capacities and the achievement of the 2030 Agenda.

(UN, 2016: 58)

United Nations (UN) agencies and other development stakeholders at global, regional, national and subnational levels have since progressed on agreed actions from the WHS. For example, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA)'s 'New way of working' report (UNOCHA, 2017) further developed the ideas from the Agenda for Humanity and describes the need to overcome the barriers that exist between humanitarian and development workers. The notion of 'localisation' within humanitarian response was also a key theme at the WHS, which provides means to overcome the humanitarian-development divide through local leadership. Since then, commitments to improve localisation of humanitarian response have gained traction, for example the adoption of the 'Grand Bargain' (Metcalf-Hough et al., 2018) by a number of key donors and the Charter For Change,³ which is a non-government commitment to support localisation of humanitarian response. While these commitments are commendable, a clearer articulation of what 'localisation' means (for example, led at national or subnational level) and how it enables the humanitarian-development nexus is still needed.

Within regional forums in the Pacific, for example the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS), humanitarian and development actors have also been discussing the need to think of humanitarian response and development as a continuum, rather than as separate fields of work. The Pacific's Framework for Resilient Development in the Pacific (PIFS et al., 2016) notes that: 'Knowledge brokering, communication and access to meteorological, climate, geological and other relevant information and tools are essential to effectively address key risks across the humanitarian-development continuum' (PIFS et al., 2016: 29).

The Pacific Humanitarian Partnership (a collaboration between the UN, Pacific Island country representatives, NGOs, donors and private-sector actors) has also made efforts to overcome the traditional divide between humanitarian and development work. At the Pacific Humanitarian Team's 2016 meeting, it was noted that transformative change in the traditional ways of working were needed, and this included changes to governance structures to support the humanitarian-development nexus (UNOCHA, 2016a). Examples of such transformation were echoed in our research findings (e.g., 'evergreen clusters'—see our section on Bridging the Divide).

In Fiji, progress is also being made to address the divide between humanitarian response and development. In 2015, the Commissioner of Fiji's Western Division demonstrated his leadership on this issue, preparing a communiqué which provides guidance that all planning and sectoral programming in the Western Division integrates considerations of risk in order to reduce and/or mitigate the impact of climate change and disaster (Western Division Government of Fiji, 2015). Within this context, this chapter explores the interface between humanitarian response and long-term

development in relation to TC Winston in the Western Division of Fiji, which struck in February 2016.

Urbanisation and Development in the Pacific

Within conversations on bridging humanitarian response and development, urban issues remain largely absent. Some authors have acknowledged this gap, highlighting that while humanitarian response has provided much-needed immediate post-disaster assistance, it has done so (and continues to do so) with no regard for local development needs (Tag-Eldeen, 2017). This is particularly true in the Pacific, in part because urban planning challenges are a new and emerging issue. The complex dynamics present in any urban setting are acknowledged to be a challenge in humanitarian response (Dodman et al., 2013), and the Fiji example certainly highlights this to be the case. This research aims to bring some new thinking to the topic of linking humanitarian response and development in urban contexts.

The rates of rural-to-urban migration across the Pacific are increasing. Values and social norms of Pacific Islanders are shifting in line with the influence of Western culture and capitalism. The result has meant shifts away from the communal village lifestyles to those more focused on individual wealth (Mecartney and Connell, 2017). Consequently, many Pacific Islanders are turning from traditional subsistence lifestyles to cash economies, drawn to urban centres seeking paid employment, education and health-related opportunities. Climate change and disasters are also key forces driving rates of urbanisation in the Pacific. Subsistence livelihoods are becoming more difficult as climate change renders land unproductive as a result of sea level rise, salination of soil and coastal erosion (Connell, 2013). This is contributing to high rates of urbanisation in the Pacific, providing a catalyst for migration to urban centres (Connell, 2017).

Urbanisation and urban policy issues are relatively new in the Pacific. Given the rural-to-urban migration trends observed across the region, urban development and urban disaster response are critical policy areas requiring attention. Despite the clear need for urban policy development, authors report a strong ‘anti-urban bias’ among Pacific governments, where little priority is placed on developing appropriate urban policies or appropriately resourcing urban administrations (Butcher-Gollach, 2015). This lack of focus on—and resourcing of—urban areas reflects the legacy of rural development and corresponding governance arrangements, as well as a lack of appreciation and value of the urban economy (Butcher-Gollach, 2015).

Research Context

The research presented in this chapter focuses on Fiji, a Pacific Island nation with a population of 892,000 (World Bank, 2015a), almost 54 percent of

which live in urban areas (World Bank, 2015b). The Fiji Pacific Islands are highly exposed to natural hazards, particularly tropical cyclones and floods, with climate change heightening these risks (Government of Fiji et al., 2017). Furthermore, Fiji is experiencing rapid urbanisation. Therefore, Fiji provided a good location for addressing questions around disaster response and development challenges in urban contexts.

Fiji's subnational government is divided into four divisions: Northern, Eastern, Western and Central, with Divisional Commissioners responsible for coordinating government services and development activities (Rahman and Singh, 2011). This research focused on Western Division (see Figure 3.1), and specifically in and around the city of Lautoka. With a population of 52,000, Lautoka is the second-largest city in Fiji (after Suva, the capital, with a population of 88,000). Lautoka is a low-lying coastal city, vulnerable to flooding, storm surges, coastal erosion and sea level rise.

Our research focused on a major extreme weather event, and explored if and how the response to the disaster that ensued linked to longer-term development planning. TC Winston struck Fiji in February 2016 as the most severe cyclone on record to affect Fiji, making landfall as a Category 5 storm: the highest intensity of tropical cyclones (Joint Typhoon Warning Center, 2016).

TC Winston had one-minute sustained wind speeds of 285 km/h, recorded prior to landfall. Wind gusts peaked at around 306 km/hour. Forty-four




Figure 3.1 Divisional Structure of Fiji Highlighting Western Division.

Source: Netmaps

people were killed as a result of TC Winston (21 in the Western Division, 15 in the Eastern Division, six in the Central Division and two in the Northern Division). An estimated 126 people were injured and approximately 540,400 people (equivalent to 62 percent of the country's total population) were affected by the storm (Government of Fiji, 2016). Twenty-four thousand homes were destroyed, while 30,369 houses, 495 schools, and 88 health clinics and medical facilities were damaged or destroyed. Approximately 80 percent of the population lost power, including the whole of Vanu Levu Island.

TC Winston was the highest-cost cyclone to affect the South Pacific, costing Fiji approximately US\$500 million or 10 percent of Fiji's gross domestic product (GDP) (Government of Fiji, 2016). The storm partly damaged 12,421, while 6,660 were completely destroyed. More than 30,000 people were made homeless and most school buildings were severely damaged, delaying classes for more than a month while some were temporarily closed due to the extent of damages sustained.

The government of Fiji declared a State of Natural Disaster and led the disaster response, which was supported by the Fijian Military Services as well as national and international donors, non-government organisations, UN agencies, the Red Cross and the private sector. Jointly with the United Nations, the Fijian government launched a three-month US\$38.8M flash appeal, of which 51% was funded (UNOCHA, 2016b). Bilateral donors also pledged assistance to the value of US\$66M, comprising cash and in-kind support (Ministry of Economy, 2016). During the response phase, the main humanitarian needs included emergency shelter and support to evacuation centres, access to health services, water, sanitation and hygiene, food and protection, and support to vulnerable communities (UNOCHA, 2016b). The response to the cyclone involved the distribution of cash vouchers for food and rebuilding materials, which was a new approach to humanitarian response in the Pacific. The education and health sectors were able to reopen and resume operations relatively quickly with the use of temporary learning spaces and immediate repairs to health facilities (UNOCHA, 2016b). Within the shelter sector, much emphasis was placed on 'Build Back Safer' for improved future resilience, providing an example of the humanitarian-development nexus, which will be discussed later.

Research Approach

This research was undertaken by the University of Technology Sydney, Institute for Sustainable Futures (UTS-ISF) and funded by the International Institute for Environment and Development's (IIED's) Urban Crises Learning Fund. Fieldwork was undertaken in 2017. The aim of the research was to explore how the humanitarian-development divide was revealed in the response to TC Winston in Western Division, Fiji, with a particular focus

on the governance arrangements for both development and humanitarian response. The research approach was informed by a case-study methodology, focusing on the experience of the TC Winston response in the Western Division, Fiji. The design of the research recognised the leadership of the Western Division subnational government in relation to the nexus of humanitarian response and development planning.

Primary data was collected using key informant interviews and a multi-stakeholder workshop. The key informant interviews were undertaken at both national (Suva) and subnational levels (Western Division). Twenty-eight interviews were conducted (seven female, 21 male). The gender representation of interview participants is indicative of broader trends of men and women in senior government roles in Fiji. The multi-stakeholder participatory workshop was held with 34 participants attending (11 female, 23 male) representing government sectors and the Commissioner's Office from Western Division, and locally based NGOs, for example the Red Cross, Viseisei Sai Health Centre and Empower Pacific.

At the national level and based in Suva, key stakeholders relevant to the TC Winston response were also consulted during the research, and included:

- Fiji National Disaster Management Office (NDMO);
- Donors, including Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and New Zealand's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT);
- United National agencies including UNOCHA, UNDP, UNICEF;
- Humanitarian response agencies (based in Suva) including Save the Children and International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC).

Primary data was supplemented by a document review which focused on generating insight from the TC Winston response and revealing opportunities to strengthen the nexus between humanitarian response and development goals. Data analysis of both primary and secondary data was conducted using the qualitative software NVivo. Inductive thematic analysis was undertaken where areas of inquiry framed by research questions formed the basis of the coding and analysis structure. The research was carried out with ethics approval from the University of Technology Sydney. Informed consent was obtained from all research participants and consideration was made to ensure privacy and protocols for secure data storage were in place.

Findings

Findings across two main areas are presented in the following sections—these relate to the urban policy lag and bridging the humanitarian-development divide.

Urban Policy Lag

The legacy, familiarity and focus on the rural development agenda, and its overriding of urban issues as described earlier in the chapter, clearly emerged in our research findings. Our research found a disconnect and an imbalance between rural and urban policy and planning, where urban issues were absent in broader response and development planning. Policy around urban development (including informal settlements and urban disaster response) was limited and did not reflect the increasing trends regarding the rapid urban-population growth occurring in Fiji. This finding became clear as our research approach sought to focus on urban dimensions of development and humanitarian response, but primary (interview and workshop responses) and available secondary (relevant documentation we gathered and analysed) data focused on rural situations. There was a clear focus on disaster response for rural areas, and urban humanitarian responses were not well integrated within the broader humanitarian response discussions or documentation. This finding is not altogether surprising, as other authors have commented that development initiatives across the Pacific (and indeed elsewhere) have tended to focus on rural issues including infrastructure, access to services and maintaining healthy ecosystems (Jones, 2012). Furthermore, the focus on rural contexts is echoed across other small-island developing states, including in the Caribbean (Butcher-Gollach, 2015). Given the high rates of urbanisation across the Pacific, and increasing populations within informal settlements in urban and peri-urban areas, urban development and response policy needs consideration as part of national and subnational policy frameworks. This is particularly pertinent given the higher levels of exposure and vulnerability faced by people living in informal settlements.

An example of the lag in urban development policy can be seen in relation to people living in informal settlements and access to services. In Lautoka, approximately 20,000 people reside in informal settlements, many of whom have migrated from rural areas across Fiji's islands (UN-Habitat, 2012). The rate of change in urban population growth has outstripped the ability of subnational governments to adequately respond to ensure services and adequate housing and health provisions. The research team was told the city boundary was to be amended (through the Ministry of Local Government and Housing) to include informal settlements on the periphery of the Lautoka city boundary to enable the local government to legally to provide water, sanitation and electricity services. Such amendments would also ensure that residents have formal tenure of their property. It was unclear whether or not these services and rights had been passed on to residents. By definition, residents of informal settlements lack formal land leases. Accessing financing and credit through financial institutions requires a land lease. While Fiji's National Housing Policy includes significant mention of the need to address issues relating to informal settlements, in practice, this

issue remains a gap in policy and practice, as evidenced in the Western Division. It also points to the need for improved institutional capacity around urban policy—a need repeated in other Pacific countries (Keen and McNeil, 2016).

We also found a lack of policy focus around urban disaster response, from both government and donor perspectives. Disaster response policy had a clear rural focus, and research participants were more familiar with rural response mechanisms than those that existed, or were required, for urban settings. This, too, is reported among others in the humanitarian and development sectors, recognising that disaster risk reduction and response in urban areas are often adopted directly from rural experiences (Rey et al., 2017). Analysis of past disaster responses in the Pacific (e.g., April 2014 floods in Solomon Islands) point to the political, institutional and cultural challenges around urban disaster response policy (see Discussion section, as well as Keen and McNeil, 2016). Given the different disaster and humanitarian impacts sustained in urban setting as compared to rural settings, this points to a gap in disaster response policy and the specific response mechanisms and frameworks required for urban settings. Some progress has been made, e.g., the Pacific Catastrophe Risk Assessment and Financing Initiative (PCRAFI, led by the Pacific Community [SPC], World Bank and the Asian Development Bank) is a large collection of geospatial information on disaster risks and risk assessment tools for 15 PICs focused on urban locations.⁴ However, what is missing is a translation of such disaster risk information to national and subnational disaster response policy. Fiji's disaster response policy framework also contains a lack of urban focus. For example, the only mention of 'urban' in the National Disaster Management Plan (NDMO) Plan (1995) is that the Permanent Secretary for Urban Development sits on the National Disaster Management Council and various committees. The NDMO Act (1998) notes that 'The Ministry responsible for the rural housing programme will be responsible for the rehabilitation of urban and rural housing' (Government of Fiji, 1998: 16), highlighting again the dominance of rural over urban focus. Improved institutional capacity around urban disaster policy is therefore needed to meet this shortcoming—as well as a recognition of the potential positive contributions of urban areas for development and economic growth (Phillips and Keen, 2016).

Despite these challenges and limitations, we observed evidence of how the urban policy lag regarding development and disaster response may be (and was) overcome in the case of TC Winston in the Western Division, Fiji.

Bridging the Divide

The foundations for bridging the divide between humanitarian response and development were present in the Western Division of Fiji. Research findings point to two main approaches that helped to bridge the divide: subnational


governance structures and the emerging cluster system. These are described in the following paragraphs.

Subnational Governance as a Means to Overcome the Divide

The research found different governance arrangements for development, response and recovery at the time of TC Winston. Humanitarian response and development planning at the subnational level were informed by different governance and institutional arrangements. Governance arrangements for the recovery period, post-TC Winston, were also different to those for longer-term development and humanitarian response. Figure 3.2 provides a simplified illustration of the institutional arrangements for development planning (left) and humanitarian response (right) in the Western Division.

Government officials acknowledged that humanitarian response and development planning at the subnational level were informed by different governance and institutional arrangements. However, research participants from government and civil society preferred the governance and institutional arrangements they worked within during the humanitarian response to those in place for long-term development. Furthermore, they expressed a strong appetite for stronger coordination that stretched across this divide, a recognition of the value of integrating principles such as ‘risk integration’ and ‘build back better’. Balancing the immediacy of humanitarian response with other goals (e.g., long-term development goals, local ownership and transparency; see DFAT, 2017) is a challenge. However, meeting urgent humanitarian needs in post-disaster settings need not compromise longer-term development goals if risk integration principles are carefully built into response and recovery efforts. These issues are discussed further in the next paragraphs.

The governance structures defined line ministry departments (e.g., education, health, housing) who reported to their Ministers and were responsible for development planning in the Western Division. There were separate governance arrangements for designated urban centres such as Lautoka, who reported through the Ministry of Local Government and Urban Development similarly at the national level. There were also institutional arrangements for rural village-level governance, who reported to Indigenous Affairs (iTaukei Affairs). The Divisional Commissioner coordinated and consulted with heads of departments across these different ministries, but the staff were accountable to their designated ministers at the national level. And while there were a variety of meetings at the divisional level, such as the heads of department meetings which the Commissioner chaired, these were primarily for sharing of information only. The institutional structures and lines of reporting within the multiple institutional fragments meant that whilst the Commissioner could call multiple agencies together for sharing, he was not mandated to coordinate development planning and implementation at the



During disasters, Commissioner Western is lead, representing and reporting through to the NDMO

Figure 3.2 Institutional Arrangements for Development Planning (left) and Humanitarian Response (right).

Source: Anna Gero

subnational level. The fragmentation of governance in Lautoka also links to earlier findings regarding the urban policy lag.

During disasters and humanitarian response, this governance structure changes as the National Disaster Management Act delegates authority from the NDMO to coordinate the response at divisional levels to the divisional commissioners. In the case of this research, the (then) Commissioner for the Western Division was vested with authority for the TC Winston disaster response. In practice, this meant that line ministry administration, urban centre governance, and subnational and village-level governance (i.e., all divisional government staff) all reported to Commissioner for the Western Division. As noted by a divisional staff member, ‘The Ministry of Public Service Commission, they send out a memo to the departments, telling them to release the public servants for disaster operations’ (Government staff, research participant).

This governance arrangement provided the practical experience of bridging the humanitarian-development divide. Divisional staff, whose day-to-day work outside times of disaster was development planning and reporting to multiple departments, particularly at national level, now reported to the delegated NDMO representative at the divisional level (Commissioner Western). However, what was missing was an explicit effort or process to ensure response efforts linked to local development plans. Divisional staff were not encouraged to connect their disaster response activities to their longer-term development planning objectives or plans. This is an opportunity for future response efforts elsewhere, and will be further discussed later.

Our research found that Western Division government officials and civil society representatives preferred the governance and institutional arrangements they worked within during the humanitarian response to those in place for long-term development. They found benefit in working together towards a common goal, and all reporting to one central place (i.e., the divisional head, Commissioner Western). One workshop participant said, ‘In “peace times” we have our own sector plans. We have Head of Department meetings but we don’t have a combined plan. It would be good to have one’.

The Emerging Cluster System as a Means to Overcome the Divide

Another example of overcoming the humanitarian-development divide was through Fiji’s emerging ‘cluster system’. The cluster system, which is modelled on the global cluster system (IASC, 2006), provides governance and institutional arrangements that link the humanitarian responses and the development agenda. At the time of our research, Fiji was developing its national cluster system within its National Humanitarian Policy. Since then, the Humanitarian Policy has been endorsed by the National Disaster Management Council. The policy endorses and supports a national,

government-led cluster system and contains considerable mention of the role of subnational leadership in times of disaster (see next section, Localisation in Action). However, it does not specifically prioritise ongoing activities within or between clusters outside of times of disaster response. Our research found stakeholders at both national and subnational levels expressing strong endorsement for ‘evergreen clusters’ (i.e., maintaining ongoing, continuous activities outside times of humanitarian response) that reach down to the divisional level while also connecting to the national level. By operating outside of times of disasters, clusters can engage in activities that integrate risk and promote resilience whilst building relationships across government and non-government stakeholders.

We found some evidence of some clusters operating in an ‘evergreen’ approach at the national level. An example was the Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) Cluster. The WASH Cluster is led by the Ministry of Health and Medical Services (MoHMS), and the Cluster’s Terms of Reference note that clusters are expected to operate continuously, however, this is not mentioned in the National Humanitarian Policy. Documentation from the WASH Cluster indicated ongoing, continuous coordination between the cluster lead, MoHMS, and UNICEF and WHO, and also included membership lists within the cluster. Research participants commented on the WASH Cluster’s effectiveness, noting that UNICEF’s co-funding of some activities also helped with its ongoing activities. For example, one Suva based stakeholder commented,

They [the WASH Cluster] are using the forums to discuss longer term issues. They are updating of contact details and doing site assessments, they know who are in the positions. They are comfortable with the [development] partners. The partners also know the ministries.

Discussions at the Pacific Humanitarian Partnership Meeting in 2016 also recognised how ‘evergreen clusters’ provide a means to overcome the humanitarian-development divide (see PHT, 2016). Our research further supports this notion, particularly if the clusters are extended, or linked to, local-level governance (see next section).

The examples mentioned highlight that shared experiences of humanitarian response and its impact on development goals provides an entry point for overcoming the humanitarian-development divide. What is still missing from this picture is explicit linkages and alignment with local development plans during times of disaster response. There is a clear need to make local development plans (at both the sector and divisional level) available, for these to highlight the key priorities for development in that sector, and, importantly, for these plans to guide the disaster response. Doing so would further contribute to bridging the humanitarian-development divide in practice at the local level.

Discussion

Findings from this research provide insights into ways to further overcome the humanitarian-development divide in Pacific urban settings, including examples of localisation in action. The World Humanitarian Summit called for a change in the way humanitarian aid was delivered, with localisation of aid providing an approach that respects local leadership—both in terms of government and civil society actors. While most definitions of ‘localisation’ refer to the leadership of national actors (e.g., ARC, 2017), some actors have recognised that a common understanding of localisation in post-disaster settings is needed (e.g., see DFAT, 2017, which includes a specific recommendation for defining ‘localisation’ in a disaster response review of TC Pam, which struck Vanuatu in 2015). Our reflections of localisation in the context of the TC Winston response go further and provide evidence of how Fiji’s disaster response arrangements allowed for leadership at the subnational level. This approach helped to overcome the humanitarian-development divide in the case of the TC Winston response in Western Division.

Fiji has a clear policy, planning and operational framework for disaster preparedness and response, and part of this policy involves decentralisation of authority during times of disaster from the central government (the NDMO) to divisional levels. Humanitarian response is informed by the government of Fiji’s National Disaster Management Plan (1995), the National Disaster Management Act (1998) and the National Emergency Operation Centre’s standard operating procedures (2010). As noted in the previous section, the National Disaster Management Act delegates authority to coordinate disaster response at divisional levels to the divisional commissioners. For TC Winston, this meant Commissioner Western had authority over all divisional government staff. And, as described in the previous section, this governance structure was valued by local government actors.

Localisation, through Commissioner Western’s leadership, allowed for a bridging of the humanitarian-development divide because it was the same government staff leading the TC Winston response as were leading development planning outside of times of disaster. This had two benefits to bridging the divide: 1) During the TC Winston response, staff understood the development needs and priorities in the communities in which they were providing emergency relief; and 2) outside of the TC Winston response, integrating risk into development planning was something many subnational government staff in Western Division could speak about with confidence and experience. Research participants could describe numerous examples of how their everyday work incorporated disaster risk, e.g., Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs), risk screening tools, agricultural practices incorporating risk management and through implementing risk response training for village communities. Their understanding of risk integration into development planning was grounded in their experiences in responding to TC

Winston. Our research therefore highlights how supporting local leadership in disaster response provides the means to help to bridge the humanitarian-development divide and, importantly, ensure localisation.

Finally, research participants raised the idea around subnational localisation of the cluster approach. The National Humanitarian Policy is clear around the need for a national cluster system and includes mention of subnational arrangements. However, our research revealed the desire among some stakeholders to implement the cluster approach at the subnational level, as described by a research participant: ‘The mechanism of clusters should go down to divisional [level] but also connect to the national level as well’.

Subnational government stakeholders had limited exposure to the national cluster system, given it was new and primarily operated at the national level. As such, research participants in Western Division and Suva both commented that the cluster system was not visible at the local level. Despite the lack of a formalised cluster system, some research participants reported that government sectors and NGOs worked well together in Western Division during the TC Winston response. Formalising these relationships through a fit-for-purpose subnational cluster system could further progress efforts of localisation of disaster response. Actions to implement such a mechanism at the local level should consider lessons from other countries, as the cluster approach has not always been regarded as the most appropriate approach (DFAT, 2017).

The research presented in this chapter resonates with findings from other post-disaster reviews in Pacific countries. For example, Rey et al. (2017) highlight the lack of focus on urban disaster response policy in the context of TC Pam in Vanuatu (a 2015 category 5 storm). These authors also found that the negative impacts of TC Pam were amplified by urban growth, given the higher levels of baseline vulnerability faced by those living in tenuous urban situations (e.g., informal settlements). Findings from our research also align with lessons from the April 2014 floods in Solomon Islands, which highlight the gaps in institutional capacity for developing responses to the needs of residents of informal settlements (Keen and McNeil, 2016).

Conclusion

This research explored ways in which the humanitarian-development divide was revealed through the experience of the TC Winston response. While based in and around the urban centre of Lautoka in Fiji’s Western Division, and during a period of rapid urban population growth, we found very little focus on, or prioritisation of, urban disaster response issues or challenges. What we did find was evidence of ways in which the humanitarian-development divide was overcome, primarily through the governance structures that require local and divisional-level government staff and NGOs to report to

the Divisional Commissioner. We also found that the notion of localisation of humanitarian response was present during TC Winston, with the delegation of authority to Commissioner Western allowing for local leadership and coordination.

Our research also revealed several opportunities to more effectively overcome the humanitarian-development divide in the future, and for responses to disasters elsewhere. As such, we propose the following recommendations.

Firstly, development planning should more effectively focus on and prioritise key concepts that strengthen the humanitarian-development nexus. Concepts like 'build back better' and 'risk integration' within long-term development planning that reduce risk while building resilience are widely endorsed by government, civil society and communities. Focusing on such concepts can help anchor governance and institutional arrangements within a coordinated humanitarian-development nexus.

Secondly, and linked to the previous recommendation, is the need to develop subnational development plans (e.g., for Western Division, specific sectors and including an urban focus, inclusive of informal settlements), and to make these widely available. Development agendas can enable the humanitarian-development nexus. The longer-term development agenda can support and create the enabling environment needed for efficient humanitarian response and recovery, which in turn can feed back into and support longer-term development. To practically achieve this nexus, local development plans could be made available to multiple stakeholders, including humanitarian responders, so they can be considered during times of disaster response.

Finally, we recommend a fit-for-purpose subnational cluster system, linked to the national system, that operates in an ongoing, continuous manner. Such a decentralised cluster system could acknowledge subnational development priorities within its preparedness and mitigation activities and ensure these same priorities flow through into humanitarian response and recovery. Decentralised clusters could be led by senior subnational government officials (e.g., Divisional Commissioners) with responsibility for both development and humanitarian response, and could develop standard operating procedures that support better integration.

Notes

1. The humanitarian-development nexus refers to better connectivity between humanitarian and development efforts, and ensuring no one is left behind in development and humanitarian response efforts. See www.unocha.org/es/themes/humanitarian-development-nexus
2. The dominant global approach for coordinated humanitarian response to promote predictability, accountability and partnership is called the cluster approach: www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/about-clusters/what-is-the-cluster-approach
3. <http://charter4change.org/>
4. <http://pcrafi.spc.int/>

References

- Australian Red Cross (ARC). (2017). *Going Local: Achieving a More Appropriate and Fit-for-Purpose Humanitarian Ecosystem in the Pacific*. Carlton, Australia: Australian Red Cross, Centre for Humanitarian Leadership, Fiji National University, Humanitarian Advisory Group.
- Buchanan-Smith, M. and Maxwell, S. (1994). Linking relief and development: An introduction and overview. *IDS Bulletin*, 25, 4.
- Butcher-Gollach, C. (2015). Planning, the urban poor and climate change in Small Island Developing States (SIDS). *International Development Planning Review*, 37(2), 225–248.
- Connell, J. (2013). Soothing breezes? Island perspectives on climate change and migration. *Australian Geographer*, 44(4), 465–480.
- Connell, J. (2017). The urban Pacific: A tale of new cities. *Development Bulletin*, 78, 5–10.
- Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). (2017). *Humanitarian Assistance in the Pacific: An Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Australia's Response to Cyclone Pam*. Canberra: DFAT.
- Dodman, D., et al. (2013). *Understanding the Nature and Scale of Urban Risk in Low- and Middle-Income Countries and Its Implications for Humanitarian Preparedness, Planning and Response*. London: IIED. Available at: <http://pubs.iied.org/10624IIED>.
- European Union (EU). (2008). *Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States Meeting within the Council*. The European Parliament and the European Commission, Joint Declarations Council (2008/C 25/01).
- Government of Fiji. (1998). *National Disaster Management Act*. Available at: http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/images/Legislature/NDM_ACT.pdf.
- Government of Fiji. (2016). *Post-Disaster Needs Assessment: Tropical Cyclone Winston*, February 20, 2016.
- Government of Fiji, World Bank, and Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery. (2017). *Fiji 2017: Climate Vulnerability Assessment—Making Fiji Climate Resilient*. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). (2006). *Guidance Note on Using the Cluster Approach to Strengthen Humanitarian Response*. Available at: <https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/node/7059>.
- Joint Typhoon Warning Center. (2016). *Tropical Cyclone 11P (Winston) Rolling Best Track*. US Naval Research Laboratory, Marine Meteorology, 20 February 2016. Available at: www.nrlmry.navy.mil/tcdat/tc16/SHEM/11P.WINSTON/trackfile.txt.
- Jones, P. (2012). Searching for a little bit of utopia: Understanding the growth of squatter and informal settlements in Pacific towns and cities. *Australian Planner*, 49(4), 327–338.
- Keen, M. and McNeil, A. (2016). *After the Floods: Urban Displacement, Lessons from Solomon Islands. State, Society and Governance in Melanesia*. In Brief 2016/13. Canberra: Australian National University Press.
- Longhurst, R. (1994). Conceptual frameworks for linking relief and development. *IDS Bulletin*, 25, 4.

- Mecartney, S. and Connell, J. (2017). Urban Melanesia: The challenges of managing land, modernity and tradition. In S. McDonnell, M.G. Allen and C. Filer (eds.), *Kastom, Property and Ideology Land Transformations in Melanesia*. Canberra: Australian National University Press.
- Metcalf-Hough, V., Poole, L., Bailey, S. and Belanger, J. (2018). *Grand Bargain Annual Independent Report (2018)*. Humanitarian Policy Group, ODI.
- Ministry of Economy. (2016). *Disaster Recovery Framework, Tropical Cyclone Winston, 20th February 2016*. Report prepared in coordination with The World Bank, United Nations, European Union, Asian Development Bank and the Pacific Community.
- Mosel, I. and Levine, S. (2014). *Remaking the Case for Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development: How LRRD Can Become a Practically Useful Concept for Assistance in Difficult Places*. Humanitarian Policy Group, ODI. Available at: www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/8882.pdf.
- Phillips, T. and Keen, M. (2016). *Sharing the City: Urban Growth and Governance in Suva, Fiji. State, Society and Governance in Melanesia*. In Brief 2016/6. Canberra: Australian National University.
- PHT. (2016). *After Action Review Report: Tropical Cyclone Winston*. Pacific Humanitarian Team.
- PIFs, et al. (2016). *Framework for Resilient Development in the Pacific: An Integrated Approach to Address Climate Change and Disaster Risk Management (FRDP) 2017–2030*. Available at: <http://bit.ly/2HmCsnw>.
- Rahman, M.H. and Singh, S. (2011). Towards strong local governance: Current reform scenario in Fiji. *International Journal of Public Administration*, 34(10), 674–681.
- Rey, T., Le De, L., Leone, F. and Gilbert, D. (2017). An integrative approach to understand vulnerability and resilience post-disaster: The 2015 cyclone Pam in urban Vanuatu as case study. *Disaster Prevention and Management*, 26(3), 259–275.
- Stamnes, E. (2016). *Rethinking the Humanitarian-Development Nexus*. Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Policy Brief, 24/2016.
- Tag-Eldeen, Z.N. (2017). Bridging urban planning knowledge into post-disaster response: Early recovery road map within the International Humanitarian Cluster System. *International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction*, 24, 399–410. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdr.2017.05.023>.
- UN-Habitat. (2012). *Lautoka City Urban Profile*. United Nations Human Settlements Programme, Kenya.
- United Nations (UN). (2016). *One Humanity: Shared Responsibility*. Report of the Secretary General for the World Humanitarian Summit. Available at: <http://sgreport.worldhumanitariansummit.org>.
- United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR). (2015). *Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030*. Geneva, Switzerland.
- UNOCHA. (2016a). *Pacific Humanitarian Partnership Meeting Report*. 19–21 October 2016, Holiday Inn Suva, Fiji.
- UNOCHA. (2016b). *Tropical Cyclone Winston Response and Flash Appeal Final Summary*, 13 June 2016.
- UNOCHA. (2017). *New Way of Working*. UNOCHA Policy Development and Studies Branch (PDSB). Available at: www.unocha.org/story/new-way-working.

Western Division Government of Fiji. (2015). *Communiqué on Disaster and Climate risk Integration into Development Planning*.

AuQ3

World Bank (WB). (2015a). *World Bank Fiji Data*. Available at: <http://data.worldbank.org/country/fiji>.

World Bank (WB). (2015b). *World Bank Urban Population Data*. Available at: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS>.

Taylor & Francis
Not for distribution