



KOREA AUSTRALIA  
호주 한국  
1961-2021

## KOREA RESEARCH CENTRE PAPER SERIES

### TOWARD DEEPER ENGAGEMENT: PROSPECTS AND REFLECTIONS ON THE 60TH ANNIVERSARY OF ROK-AUSTRALIA DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS




ISSUE 1 / NOV 2021



Korea  
Research  
Centre



THE UNIVERSITY OF  
**WESTERN  
AUSTRALIA**



# KOREA AUSTRALIA

## 호주 한국

1961–2021

### KOREA RESEARCH CENTRE PAPER SERIES #1

© 2021 Korea Research Centre. All rights reserved.

The University of Western Australia does not take positions on public policy issues; the views represented here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the University, its staff, its trustees, or any related external funding body.

Except as permitted under the Copyright Act (1968) (including provisions by educational institutions), no part of it may, in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, microcopying, photocopying, recording or otherwise) be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted without prior written permission from the Korea Research Centre.

Please direct inquiries to: [krc@uwa.edu.au](mailto:krc@uwa.edu.au)



# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABOUT THE EDITORS.....	4
ABOUT THE AUTHORS .....	6
INTRODUCTION.....	8
<i>Toward Deeper Engagement: Prospects and Reflections on the 60th Anniversary of ROK-Australia Diplomatic Relations</i> – Joanna Elfving-Hwang and Peter J.Dean	
CHAPTER 1 .....	10
<i>Australia-Korea: Sixty years of benign neglect</i> – Jeffrey Robertson	
CHAPTER 2 .....	13
<i>Investing in Australia's diverse partnership with South Korea: Evidence from the AKF grants scheme</i> – David Hundt	
CHAPTER 3 .....	16
<i>Six ways to boost the Australia-Korea Trade Relationship</i> – Bronwen Dalton	
CHAPTER 4 .....	20
<i>Reflecting on 60 Years of Academic Korea Expertise in Australia: (Missed) Opportunities and Challenges Ahead</i> – Joanna Elfving-Hwang	
CHAPTER 5 .....	24
<i>Why Investing in Screen Cultures Pays Off: Lessons for Australia from the Korean Film Industry</i> – Caleb Kelso-Marsh	
CHAPTER 6 .....	28
<i>Untold stories: Australian links to South Korea's Pro-Democracy Movement (1960s-1980s)</i> – Younghye Seo-Whitney	
ABOUT THE KRC .....	31



# ABOUT THE EDITORS



## ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR JOANNA ELFVING-HWANG

DIRECTOR, KOREA RESEARCH CENTRE

Dr Joanna Elfving-Hwang is an Associate Professor and Director of Korea Research Centre at the University of Western Australia where she teaches and researches contemporary issues relating to Korean society and culture. She has published on and does consultancy work on Korean beauty and cosmetic industry, sociology of ageing, as well as Korean popular culture and cultural industries.

An enthusiastic 'Koreanist', she has served in a number of elected positions to promote Korean Studies both in academia and in the industry. Jo serves on the Board of the Australia Korea Business Council of WA is the current Vice President of the Korean Studies Association of Australasia (KSAA) and was the immediate past President.

## PROFESSOR PETER J. DEAN

DIRECTOR, UWA DEFENCE AND SECURITY INSTITUTE

Professor Peter J. Dean is Chair of Defence Studies, Director of the UWA Defence and Security Institute, and a Senior Fellow at the Perth USAsia Centre. Prior to the commencement of this role Professor Dean was Pro Vice-Chancellor (Education) at UWA. He has been a Fulbright Professional Fellow and Endeavour Research Scholar in Australia-United States Alliance Studies, as well as a non-resident fellow with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Australia, New Zealand and Pacific Studies at Georgetown University in Washington D.C. Professor Dean was the founding editor of the Melbourne University Press Defence Studies Series, is a member of the Editorial Board of the Australian Army Journal, Global War Studies and the Military Studies Journal, and a former managing editor of the journal Security Challenges. An international award-winning author, his most recent book (with Brendan Taylor and Stephan Fruhling) is *After American Primacy: Imagining the Future of Australia's Defence*, (Melbourne University Press, 2019).



## About the Korea Research Centre Paper Series

The Korea Research Centre Paper Series is a peer-reviewed publication series of the Korea Research Centre of Western Australia (KRC).

The Series aims to provide a forum for established and emerging scholars to present evidence-based Korea-focused research, particularly with a view to enhance the Australia-Republic of Korea relationship.

The series will include research and policy-focused articles, and act as a forum for both established and emerging scholars.







# ABOUT THE AUTHORS



## DR JEFFREY ROBERTSON

YONSEI UNIVERSITY

Dr Jeffrey Robertson is an Associate Professor of Diplomatic Studies at Yonsei University. Before moving to academia, he worked for the Australian Government in the field of foreign policy and North Asia, focusing on China, the Korean Peninsula, and Japan. He is author of multiple works on South Korea's diplomatic practice and administration, including *Diplomatic Style and Foreign Policy: A Case Study of South Korea* (Routledge, 2016), which explores analytical insight gained through the recognition and comprehension of diplomatic style. His research interests include diplomatic practice, foreign policy, Korean peninsula affairs.

## ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR DAVID HUNDT

DEAKIN UNIVERSITY

David Hundt is an Associate Professor of International Relations at Deakin University, Melbourne. He is a political scientist by training, and his main areas of interest are the international relations and political economy of East Asia. Most of David's research touches on Korea in one way or another: he recently completed a study about the possibility of improving human rights in North Korea, and another about how the Candlelight Protests in 2016/17 affected ideas about democracy and nationalism in South Korea. He is also the Editor-in-Chief of *Asian Studies Review*, an interdisciplinary area-studies journal. With colleagues from Deakin University, David has been one of the editors of *Australia in World Affairs*, 2016–2020, the definitive account of Australian foreign affairs in the past five years, and the latest instalment in a long-running series sponsored by the Australian Institute for International Affairs.



## PROFESSOR BRONWEN DALTON

UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY SYDNEY

Professor Bronwen Dalton is the Head, Department of Management at the University of Technology Sydney. Bronwen completed her PhD at the University of Oxford, where she was awarded the Oxford University Larkinson Award for Social Studies and was the recipient of the British Vice-Chancellors Committee Overseas Research Scholarship and the Korea Foundation Scholarship. Dr Dalton also has a BA from the Australian National University and a MA from Yonsei University, Korea. She served two terms on the Board of the Department of Foreign Affairs' Australia Korea Foundation. Bronwen was a Director of the National Korean Studies Centre (NKSC). Dr Dalton has focused her interests on North Korea. In 2014 she was awarded an ARC Discovery grant titled "North Korea's Quiet Transformation: Women in the Rise of the Informal Market". This is the first major research project to investigate the role played by women in the emergence of a nascent capitalist economy in North Korea.



## CALEB KELSO-MARSH

KOREA RESEARCH CENTRE,  
UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Caleb Kelso-Marsh is a Korean film expert from the University of Western Australia and is currently completing a PhD thesis on film noir in Korea. Caleb is also an Associate Lecturer in the Korea Research Centre of Western Australia, where he teaches on Australia-Korea relations. Prior to this, Caleb completed degrees in Law, English, and a postgraduate certificate in Chinese law at Murdoch University, Perth. Caleb was also the sole Australian recipient of the 2019 Korea Foundation Fellowship for Korean Language Training, for which he graduated from the Korean language program at Sogang University, Seoul.

## YOUNGHYE SEO-WHITNEY

COLLEGE OF ASIA AND THE PACIFIC,  
AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

Younghye Seo-Whitney is currently working on her PhD through the Australian National University, School of Culture, History and Language. Her doctoral research project focuses on the role played by transnational intellectual networks in South Korea's pro-democracy movement during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. By applying a social network analysis approach to primary source materials, Younghye is endeavouring to rediscover an intricate network of actors that operated between Korea, Japan and beyond during this period.

Younghye also tutors Korean at the University of Western Australia and is the Centre Manager of the Korea Research Centre of Western Australia. In the Centre, Younghye assists the project team with communications and stakeholder engagement; organising and coordinating workshops, seminar series, and conferences; and engaging with Centre-related external projects and activities.





# INTRODUCTION

## Toward Deeper Engagement: Prospects and Reflections on the 60th Anniversary of ROK-Australia Diplomatic Relations

On Thursday 10 June 2021, the Korea Research Centre and the Defence and Security Institute at the University of Western Australia organised a one-day workshop to reflect on the past 60 years of diplomatic engagement between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Australia. While this year marks the 60th anniversary of ROK-Australia diplomatic relations, Australia's people-to-people encounters with Korea go back for well over a century. This significant milestone comes at the point when the relationship has perhaps never been closer or more significant in terms of strategic security, trade, diplomatic and cultural linkages.

The aim of this event was therefore to enhance strategic understanding of the importance of ROK-Australia relations in areas that have been less explored in the past, and yet present opportunities for deeper engagement in the future. An often rehearsed narrative around the ROK-Australia relations highlight what have been seen as the two main aspects of this relationship: the legacy of loyalty and lasting links forged during the Korean War (1950-1953) when 17,000 Australian service personnel fought alongside the ROK troops, and the long-standing and increasingly significant trade relationship centred around Australia's resources sector as a reliable source to power Korea's industry, and Korean consumer goods and popular culture to service Australia.

As the two middle powers share remarkably complementary economies, it is perhaps no wonder that the measure of success of this relationship has focused on quantity: number of visitors, students and migrants, the total value exports, and imports value. However, as the relationship matures and edges toward the signing a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the two countries, the aim of this one-day dialogue was to provoke new narratives

beyond the material focus, to consider how in this now-mature partnership, meaningful cultural and educational exchanges between ROK and Australia should and could look like, and the directions for the bilateral alliance partnership and strategic security cooperation in the future. Participants invited to speak and take part in this dialogue were both established and early-career scholars, business leaders with interest in the defence and security industries, as well as government representatives and diplomats with a deep understanding of the ROK-Australia relations.

The first part of the day, which the chapters of this KRC Research Papers volume are based on, focused on considering where the Korea-Australia prospects for people-to-people, research, educational and cultural industries bilateral cooperation and engagement should focus in the future. The second half of this dialogue was an invitation-only event held under the Chatham House Rule, with the aim of assessing the implications for the future of the Australia-Korea relationship in the context of Defence and Security in the changing landscape of the Indo-Pacific region. The policy recommendation report arising from this session has already been published by the UWA Defence and Security Institute as part of their Black Swan Strategy Paper series, and which can be downloaded on the DSI website (<https://defenceuwa.com.au/>).

The chapters in this publication aim to develop clear priority agendas for further research and investigation, and provide recommendations for developing and enhancing the ROK-Australia bilateral relationship, particularly in education, culture, research and building people-to-people links. As shared trade and strategic security interests have continued to inform the primary forms of engagement for Korea-Australia relations, the contributors to this publication point to both the need to pay attention to hitherto unexplored



histories of Australia-Korea engagement, and to consider areas that require addressing in building closer education, research and people-to-people links. In moving to the next decade of this increasingly important relationship, we argue that while Australians are perhaps more aware of Korea than at any point in our shared history, the need to enhance 'Australia-literacy' (to borrow the Federal government's own term) in Korea is a priority that requires urgent attention. Going forward, there should be not only Australian Federal and State governments' support for Korean Studies and Korean language education in Australia in schools and universities, but significant investment also in supporting Australian Studies education in Korea; joint ROK-Australia research projects in humanities and social sciences; and support for more Korean students to study in Australia.


### **Acknowledgements**

The event and the publications arising from it would not have been possible without the support of our partners. We wish to acknowledge the funding through the Academy of Korean Studies Promotion Service that supports the research engagement of the Korea Research Centre, and the support provided by the Australian Government both through the Department of Defence in supporting the UWA DSI. We also wish to acknowledge the support of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Australian Embassy in Korea.

A special acknowledgement also to Younghye Seo-Whitney, Fiona Considine and Caleb Kelso-Marsh for the design and coordination support of this publication.

ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR  
JOANNA ELFVING-HWANG  
Director, Korea Research Centre

PROFESSOR PETER J. DEAN  
Director, UWA Defence and  
Security Institute





# CHAPTER 1

## Australia-Korea: Sixty years of benign neglect

Jeffrey Robertson

### Executive Summary

- The Australia - Korea bilateral relationship is successful but lacks the foundations upon which stronger relationships are built, including people-to-people, cultural and education links.
- Both countries have much to gain from greater interaction, but interest and effort is lacking. Current levels of interaction support only intermittent, surface-level engagement.
- The expatriate community in each country is relatively small and lacks voice. There is much that could be done to facilitate expatriate communities to enable them to grow and serve as foundations to build the bilateral relationship.

### Policy Recommendations

- A comprehensive study looking at improving people-to-people links, including a focus on expatriate living, needs to be undertaken.
- Australia needs to promote itself as a relevant international partner in Seoul. This includes through a stronger targeted digital diplomacy presence, facilitating thinktank and academic interaction, and supporting stronger people-to-people links.
- Australia desperately needs a long-term plan to support Australian studies in South Korea with a focus on growth industries and areas of public policy relevance.





2021 celebrates sixty years of the Australia-Korea diplomatic relationship – or sixty years of ‘benign neglect’ in which the relationship has prospered despite a lack of attention. This article goes through five talking points to argue that benign neglect will no longer suffice.

First, in measures commonly used to assess bilateral relationships, the relationship is successful.<sup>1</sup> In political, economic, and security terms, there is ample evidence of this: an acceptable number of high-level political visits, a mutually beneficial trade relationship, and growing cooperation in defence and intelligence. This is marked by a number of key diplomatic achievements: the Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, Australia (MIKTA) informal consultative group, the Korea Australia Free Trade Agreement (KAFTA), the MOU on Development Cooperation, the Foreign and Defence Ministers’ (“2+2”) meetings, and a “strategic partnership”. Each achievement ticks the Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) boxes in foreign ministry annual reports – a kind of bureaucratic theatre that obfuscates a lack of deeper engagement. These indicators gloss over underlying weaknesses of mutual disinterest and misunderstanding, and above all, neglect.

Second, the relationship is not as strong as it should be.<sup>2</sup> With all due respect to Australia’s hardworking diplomats, success in the relationship has not resulted from focused government effort. The relationship is more borne of circumstance and luck than anything else: compatibility as middle power liberal democracies, mutual trade compatibility, and compatibility within the existing US alliance framework. The relationship could be much stronger. As middle powers with divergent economic and security interests balanced between Beijing and Washington, the two states should have much to discuss. In South Korea, strategic dialogue regularly questions the utility of the US alliance,<sup>3</sup> relations with China, an independent nuclear weapons capability, and even armed neutrality.<sup>4</sup> These topics are rarely discussed, even at conferences specifically targeted towards bringing together Australian and South Korean strategic and international relations thinkers. Dialogue undertaken for a day or two at an academic or thinktank conference hardly scratches the surface. Such conferences bring together visitors with “gatekeepers” – the cosmopolitan, often overseas-educated, English-speaking foreign policy and political elites. They rarely delve into deeper, less mainstream views. Yet, dialogue on strategic affairs is just one topic that is lacking. For both Australian and South Korean policy makers, there are lessons to be learned from each other on energy, climate, immigration, population, e-governance, gender, public health, and every area of governance and regulation.

Third, the Australia-Korea bilateral relationship is not a priority. In both countries, there is a distinct lack of interest. In Australia, before *Squid Games*, it was rare to see Korea on TV outside the usual North Korea routines (the recent deployment of an ABC correspondent to Seoul is a welcome exception – save for the awkward pronunciation of Korean names!). Most of Australia’s commentators are still defence or strategic studies specialists treating Korea as a headline-grabbing sideline, or at best China or Japan specialists spreading themselves to reach a wider audience.<sup>5</sup> Significantly, with Korean studies programs at several Australian universities under pressure to cut research capability it is increasingly difficult for students to commit to research programs on Korea.

In Korea, there is even less interest in Australia. Just over twenty years ago a DFAT-sponsored study pointed out that to most Koreans, Australia was a farm, a quarry, and a nice place to visit, but little more.<sup>6</sup> Nothing has changed. Aus-

tralia remains an afterthought as evidenced by the array of texts in libraries and bookshops. There are books on holidays, working holidays, migration, and little else. Most research on Australia is undertaken by academics with a connection to Australia.

Expatriate communities are building blocks of people-to-people links. Yet, both countries put little effort into encouraging or facilitating these communities. For South Korean citizens resident in Australia, and Australian citizens resident in Korea, there are a myriad of hurdles to maintaining residence, such as maintaining bilingual education for children, recognition of school leaving qualifications and gaining entry into university, dual citizenship renunciation, and securing expatriate mortgages and business loans – it is strange to think that in Australia’s fourth largest export partner, not a single Australian bank provides dual currency accounts or expatriate mortgages, as they do in Singapore, Hong Kong, the US, UK, and multiple other locations.

Fourth, the narratives used to frame the relationship are inadequate. In a recent study, I investigated G20 member embassy website, promotional material, and ambassadorial relationship narratives. I tested them for effectiveness on students studying in the fields of international relations and public administration at Korea’s top universities with plans to enter the public service. Australia’s narratives were largely ineffective. They were either considered bland and meaningless or confused with other countries. There is more that Australia could do to promote itself to a Korean audience, including through more targeted digital diplomacy, facilitation of links between the Australian thinktank and academic community and their Korean counterparts, and stronger support for initiatives that build person-to-person links, such as the Geelong Korea Australian Baseball League team.<sup>7</sup>

Fifth and last, if we were to apportion any blame on the current state of the relationship, I would argue it is largely an Australian problem (with no blame apportioned to Australia’s overseas representation). As most Australian students and academics would be aware, there are rewards for making Korea your focus.<sup>8</sup> Despite threats to existing programs, there are currently ample courses, even majors, to pursue; scholarships for language study or research; and well-respected and globally recognized academics to study under. There are careers to pursue in Korea, and as always, Korea remains important in an international relations and strategic studies context.

In Korea, there are no rewards for making Australia your focus – or rather, it is impossible to make Australia your focus. In major universities you would be lucky to find one course that focuses on Australia. The only Australian studies centre in Korea consists of one academic with a Facebook page attracting scant media interest.<sup>9</sup> Canberra needs to invest in Australian studies in Korea.

Education builds long-term relationships. Students studying a country and its region year after year make an investment of time, money and effort. Ultimately, some of them will become government and business leaders who see Australia as an ideal partner, rather than merely a beach, a mine, or a good place to study English. Parliamentary groups, business groups, professional groups and others may sustain relationships, but it is cohorts of students developing skills and profiles that stay with them throughout their careers that build bilateral relationships.

## Endnotes

- 1 Peter K. Lee, 'Ministerial meetings show deepening', ASPI Strategist, September 17, 2021, <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/ministerial-meetings-show-deepening-ties-between-australia-and-south-korea/>.
- 2 Bill Paterson, 'Missed opportunity: an appraisal of Australia-Korea relations', Asialink, March 15, 2021, <https://asia-link.unimelb.edu.au/insights/missed-opportunity-an-appraisal-of-australia-korea-relations>.
- 3 Jeffrey Robertson, 'South Korea: the next strategic surprise?', in Vol. 1, Issue Middle Power Conference Papers, 2020 (Queensland: Bond University Australia, 2019), <https://easc.scholasticahq.com/article/14358-south-korea-the-next-strategic-surprise>.
- 4 Jeffrey Robertson, 'Coming soon: A neutral South Korea?', The Interpreter, November 4, 2020, <https://www.lowy-institute.org/the-interpreter/coming-soon-neutral-south-korea>.
- 5 Jeffrey Robertson and Addie Gerszberg, 'Australia's South Korea problem', Melbourne Asia Review, November 22, 2020, <https://melbourneasiareview.edu.au/australias-south-korea-problem/>.
- 6 Michael Porter, Steve Doszpot and Ron Maxwell, Australia-Korea: Strengthened economic partnership, report prepared for the Australia-Korea Foundation (Canberra: DFAT, 2001), 53.
- 7 See <https://geelongkorea.com.au/>.
- 8 Ruth Barraclough, '20 Years of Korean Studies in Australia', Asian Studies Association of Australia, March 23, 2020, <https://asaa.asn.au/20-years-of-korean-studies-in-australia/>.
- 9 See <https://www.facebook.com/AustralianStudiesKorea/>.



# CHAPTER 2

## Investing in Australia's diverse partnership with South Korea - Evidence from the AKF grants scheme


David Hundt

### Executive Summary

- Australia and South Korea have solidified their bilateral relationship via partnerships between various non-government organisations (research, arts, and other), but the record is uneven.
- The Australian government has made a modest yet meaningful commitment to fostering these relationships through the Australia-Korea Foundation grants scheme, but analysis of six completed rounds of the scheme indicates that most of the funding tends to go to comparatively larger and better resourced organisations.

### Policy Recommendations

- A robust and meaningful bilateral relationship requires partnerships across a diverse range of non-governmental organisations, so the AKF should commit to continuing to support partnerships in the research, arts, and other sectors.
- The AKF should seek to maximise depth, breadth, and diversity in partnerships, as all three aspects enrich bilateral relations in different ways.
- Reversing the funding cuts since 2019/20 would help the AKF to avoid unnecessary and unfortunate trade-offs between different aspects of the bilateral relationship.






It is often asserted that Australia and South Korea have a strong partnership, and that both sides are committed to strengthening it. As recently as June 2021, for instance, South Korean president Moon Jae-in referred to Australia as an 'everlasting friend and partner'. Analysts of the bilateral relationship, however, are more skeptical about this claim. Jeffrey Robertson (Yonsei University), for instance, argues that Australia 'is not actually recognised as a significant or serious partner'<sup>1</sup> by most political and foreign-policy leaders in South Korea. Similarly, says Peter Lee (ANU), 'Australia's interest in Korea has waned in recent years'.<sup>2</sup>

The Australia-Korea Foundation (AKF), which the Australian government set up in 1992, is one of the more concrete attempts to foster partnerships with South Korea through non-governmental channels, especially through its grants scheme. The objectives of the scheme are to increase mutual public awareness, develop 'partnerships in areas of shared interest', and increase 'Australians' capacity to effectively engage with Korea'. Of course, not all partnerships between the two countries need or get public funding. But analysing the data available about the grants scheme gives us some insights into the partnerships that have been built between Australia and South Korea in recent years.

### A modest commitment to partnership-building

The first thing to say about the AKF scheme is that it is rather modest and generally becoming more so over time. For the six rounds running from 2013/14 to 2018/19,<sup>3</sup> a total of \$5.2 million was allocated to the scheme. As Figure 1 shows, annual disbursements exceeded \$1 million just three times and these peaks in funding were followed by sharp reversals. In the 2021/22 round, just \$600,000 was allocated to the scheme, the lowest in at least a decade. Funding per project is also quite modest: the smallest grant offered in these six rounds was worth \$1,500, and the biggest was \$83,000. Grants are not expected to cover project costs in their entirety, and successful applicants usually contribute something in cash or kind. The six-year average was \$22,500, but by 2018/19 it had increased to almost \$28,000. The contraction in the overall budget, coupled with the increase in funding per project, means that the number of grants offered has fallen: whereas 47 grants were awarded in 2015/16, there were just 29 in 2018/19.

Fig. 1: Total value of AKF grants (\$), 2013/14 to 2021/22



### A growing share of funding goes to 'research' institutions


So, who gets these grants? Of 235 grants awarded in the six rounds that I was able to analyse, recipients generally fell into one of three categories: research institutions (mainly universities, but also including organisations such as the CSIRO), arts bodies (including individual artists), and 'others' (everything other than arts or research). This does not tell the full story, of course: the grants to universities were

mainly used to develop 'collaborations to enhance engagement', such as internship programs, rather than conventional academic research. There were also partnerships between different kinds of institutions, with a view to building long-term collaborative relationships. But the broad trend in terms of recipients was clear (see Figure 2).

First, an increasingly large share of the grants, by number and value, went to academic and/or other research institutions. These organisations won half of all grants (118 out of 235) and received more than half of the funds (\$2.9 million out of \$5.2 million).

Second, there were fewer grants (and less funds) for recipients in other two categories. Arts bodies received 79 grants (worth \$1.25 million) and the catchall 'other' group received 38 (valued at just over \$1 million). Grants for Arts projects generally became smaller, while those for 'other' projects increased.

Fig. 2: AKF grants, by institutional category, 2013/14 to 2018/19



### Three degrees of partnership-building

My analysis also suggests that some recipients demonstrated a greater willingness and/or capacity to sustain build and maintain partnerships than others. Three quite different degrees of partnership-building were evident.

Eight organisations developed lasting partnerships, at least as measured by frequent success in the grants scheme. These organisations, which were mainly Australian universities and their South Korean partners, received about 30% of all grants (55). The University of Sydney (12 grants) enjoyed the most success, while U/Melbourne, RMIT, UNSW, U/South Australia, U/Western Australia, and U/Newcastle each won at least seven. An interesting exception was the Walkley Foundation for Journalism (nine grants). The frequency of the success of this group would suggest a fairly strong record of building partnerships between the two countries.

At the other end of the scale were those applicants who only received one or two grants each. Collectively, these infrequent recipients were awarded 38% (89) of all grants in the six-year period. It is difficult to generalise about such a large group (72 recipients), but a lot of the projects appeared to be specific, one-off events, such as arts performances (54 grants). Funding was also secured for meetings, conferences, and events such as Australia's hosting of the 2015 Asian Cup, as well as training and internship programs. If these projects were indeed one-off events, this would imply a smaller effect in terms of building and sustaining bilateral partnerships.

A third group was somewhere in between: organisations who won from three to six grants each (76 in total, or 32%). They included universities (e.g., Australian National University, Swinburne University of Technology, and Griffith Uni-

versity) and other research institutions (such as CSIRO), as well as arts organisations and festivals (e.g., the Busan International Film Festival, the Adelaide Festival, and Australian Art Orchestra) and other bodies (including the Australia Korea Business Council, the Australian Baseball Federation, and the Korean Adoptees in Australia Network). These recipients appear to have made some progress in developing partnerships, but not to the extent of the first group.

### **Investing more in bilateral partnerships**

This brief analysis illustrates how the AKF grants scheme has contributed to building partnerships between with South Korea via non-governmental channels. It concludes with some thoughts about how the scheme can foster the depth, diversity, and breadth of partnerships between the two countries.

The capacity of the AKF scheme to build depth in bilateral relations is most apparent in its effects on research institutions. Universities have enjoyed a comparatively high degree of success in the AKF scheme. Especially when grants support internship and exchange programs, this type of funding has fostered institutional and personal links between Australia and South Korea. The reduction in funding in 2020/21 and 2021/22, however, reduces the capacity of universities to build bilateral partnerships. It is to be hoped that the reduction is temporary and reflective of the restrictions on international travel caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, rather a permanent shift to a lower level of support. The government should commit to restoring and maintaining annual funding at least to the symbolic level of \$1 million for the foreseeable future.

If research institutions illustrate the potential for the AKF scheme to build depth, then arts organisations showcase the challenge of fostering diversity within bilateral relations between Australia and South Korea. Organisations in the arts sector are typically smaller and less well-resourced than their counterparts in the other categories of applicants. The process of applying for a grant is a vastly different undertaking for smaller arts organisations (including individuals) as compared to larger ones, such as film festivals, which are better equipped. This can significantly reduce the range and diversity of the projects that are funded through the AKF scheme and its ilk. Arts projects, which often involve the creative efforts of just a handful of individuals, have the potential to foster mutual understanding and appreciation of the cultures of each country, by providing opportunity for creative people to tell the stories of their countries and their connections with the rest of the world. In future funding rounds a special dispensation could be made for the arts sector, especially if they were able to demonstrate that their activities were adversely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The AKF scheme also needs to consider breadth. The analysis presented in this report indicates that scheme has had some positive effect on building partnerships between civil society organisations in the two countries. For instance, it has fostered cooperation between sporting organisations, and the Walkley Foundation's annual grants has sponsored visits by delegations of journalists. Ideally these interactions will translate into the development of lasting networks between a wide range Australia and South Korean organisations.

Australian and South Korean political leaders do not need to reinvent the wheel if they want to build stronger and more diverse partnerships: a renewed commitment to schemes such as the AKF grants will go a long way towards achiev-

ing that goal.

### **Endnotes**

1 Jeffrey Robertson, 'A Letter to Australia's Next Ambassador to South Korea', *Australian Outlook*, January 13, 2021; <https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/a-letter-to-australias-next-ambassador-to-south-korea/>.

2 Peter K. Lee, 'Beyond the rhetoric of close friendship, the Australia-South Korea security relationship is adrift. As Peter K. Lee argues, a recalibration of international outlooks is needed to forge a genuine strategic partnership and realise their shared potential, *Asialink*, June 29, 2021; <https://asialink.unimelb.edu.au/insights/friends-in-need-realigning-the-australia-south-korea-partnership>.

3 In general the statistical data relating to grants cited in this paper are the author's calculations, made on the basis of the information provided on the AKF website: <https://www.dfat.gov.au/people-to-people/foundations-councils-institutes/australia-korea-foundation/grant-recipients>.

# CHAPTER 3

## Six ways to boost the Australia-Korea Trade Relationship

Bronwen Dalton

### Executive Summary

The Australia-Korea relationship is strong and stable and built on the foundations of shared values, shared regional strategic interests, and strong people-to-people links. However, the trade relationship has not reached its full potential and remains concentrated in the resource sector. Here I suggest just six ways that could broaden and deepen this trading relationship. That is by:

- building more resilient bilateral supply chains;
- experimenting with new visa arrangements to encourage Australians and Koreans to holiday, work and study in each other's countries;
- promoting collaboration in science and technology;
- developing the Australia-Korea start-up ecosystem;
- facilitating film and other media co-production collaborations; and,
- promoting Australian and Korean investment in new asset classes.

### Policy Recommendations

Initiatives and policies to realise these outcomes could include:

- Australian and Korean governments resourcing a taskforce to explore supply chain risk management strategies, including the roles of, and options for, government and businesses to develop closed loop supply chains.
- Extending holiday, work and students visas, for example extending Working Holiday Maker (subclass 417) visa holders for Korean nationals.
- Further harmonising diverging film regulations, providing more incentives in bilateral film co-production treaties and campaigns to promote Australia/Korea as a filming locations.
- Developing a substantially funded multi-year grants program to support cooperative research projects.





- Developing a start-up exchange program to assist emerging entrepreneurs to build the networks and connect with the types of expertise that can accelerate their own start-ups and provide access to angle investors.
- Developing a program supporting Australian and Korean fintech companies to collaborate and establishing an annual dialogue between fintech regulators.
- Jointly developing industry-specific plans for bilateral investment and campaigns targeted to non-traditional areas to raise awareness of each other's business environments and trade opportunities including possibility of companies dual or cross-listing on each other's stock exchanges.

Australia and Korea have a three-decade long trade relationship based on Australia's role as a reliable supplier of minerals and energy for Korean industry and Korea's role as a supplier of a range of consumer goods from cars, to telecommunications equipment to computers. However, this historic trading relationship has much scope to evolve to meet new regional and global security and climate change related challenges.

Shifts in geopolitical power settings, in particular global supply chain disruptions and tensions emerging between various governments and China, are leading to foreign policies and trading relationships across the region being reappraised. At the same time, recognition of the dire consequences of climate change is driving an unprecedented flow of R&D activity and investment into new industries. In this context, it is timely to build on the strong and stable base of the Australia-Korea relationship to pursue a more diversified set of trade and investment linkages that build both countries' capacity to deal with these challenges. This involves not only exploiting the full range of existing complementarities but exploring new opportunities for shared growth and closer collaboration. Building on the Korea-Australia Free Trade Agreement,<sup>1</sup> new trade relationships are already beginning to emerge in a range of new industries. For example, Woodside has invested in HyStation to construct and operate hydrogen refuelling stations to service Korea's public busses.<sup>2</sup> POSCO has named Australia as a "regional strategic base" in the production of low-carbon hydrogen<sup>3</sup> and also acquired stakes in First Quantum Minerals and Pilbara Minerals to secure lithium and nickel for batteries,<sup>4</sup> Korea Zinc Co's Ark Energy Corporation is investing in Queensland to produce green zinc.<sup>5</sup> But there is scope for much more to be achieved.

Below I suggest just six possible ways to support new and emerging trading relationships. I also propose some new modes of engagement that can potentially grow the trade relationship across multiple fields and steer engagement in new directions. These trade areas and modes of engagement include: building more resilient supply chains; experimenting with new visa arrangements; promoting collaboration in science and technology; facilitating film and other media co-production collaborations; developing an Australia-Korea start-up ecosystem; and, promoting Australian and Korean investment in new asset classes.

### **Managing the risks of supply chain disruptions through closed loop supply chains**

Recent exposure to several types of exogenous shocks: societal (the Covid pandemic), environmental (natural disasters), economic (financial crises), geopolitical shocks (trade

tension) and infrastructure-related (cyber-attacks) developments has highlighted how we now face an increased likelihood of global supply chain disruptions. Now, more than ever, innovation in supply chain risk management is needed and, this has been specifically identified as a driver for closer relationship in the Joint Statement by Australia-Republic of Korea Foreign and Defence Ministers' 2+2 Meeting held in September 2021.<sup>6</sup> However, for the most part, pre-existing international trade linkages and dependencies have prevailed. Consequently, both countries' supply chains remain vulnerable to shocks, in particular those relating to building trade tensions in the region.

Trade statistics illustrate current supply chain vulnerabilities with a 2021 Productivity Commission Report finding that one in five (1327 of 5862) products came from concentrated import markets.<sup>7</sup> To address this issue, the Federal Government announced measures to subsidise local production and market diversification including a \$1.5 billion Modern Manufacturing Strategy,<sup>8</sup> to increase the competitiveness, scalability and resilience of Australia's manufacturing capability within six National Manufacturing Priorities.

Within this Strategy, Korea is well placed to assume priority status. Bilateral trade accounted for around \$41.3 billion of Australia's international trade in 2019.<sup>9</sup> Australian consumers will continue to demand Korea's high quality motor vehicles and parts; electrical, optical and other specialised equipment; fuel; pharmaceuticals; and chemicals and Korean consumers will continue to demand high quality food, beverage, consumer goods and education that Australia can provide. But there is further scope to build the resilience in the commodity to consumer good supply chain to cope with future disruptions. One way to do this could be through developing closed loop supply chains across commodity markets to avoid intermediate processing, particularly in the PRC.

One critical supply chain relates to what will become the dominant mode of transportation, the development of batteries and electric vehicles (EVs). As both countries shift away from fossil fuels, Australia will be a key if not dominant source of supply for the critical minerals for batteries to power EVs.<sup>10</sup> Yet many of these resources are currently not extracted, or effectively trapped. Korea is dominant in anode, cathode and cell manufacturing and has a growing demand for Australian resources. Korean OEMs can invest upstream and JVs can be created around mid-stream processing plants that will help upskill the Australian workforce and draw Australia into advanced manufacturing. There are some standout examples, such as Ark Energy Corporation's deals in Queensland,<sup>11</sup> but more can be done to develop processing capacity in Australia in the areas of lithium hydroxide, nickel sulfate and graphite SPG processing plants. Such arrangements are likely to be propelled by Australia's ambition to go further upstream and Korea's to go further downstream in this supply chain.

### ***Policy recommendation:***

To realise robust supply chains, the Australian and Korean governments should first resource a taskforce to explore supply chain risk management strategies, including the roles of, and options for, government and businesses to develop closed loop supply chains. The taskforce can identify initiatives that develop networks of firms to participate in the process of transforming inputs into final products entirely within the two jurisdictions. This would involve not simply reshoring to one country but bi-reshoring so that together both countries can collectively protect key supply and capabilities. To support JVs, new thinking around tax

arrangements, credit access (e.g. Korean companies having greater access to credit from Australian banks) and cross listing on stock exchanges may be worthy of consideration (see point six below).

### **From Hollywood to Hallyu: Facilitating Australia-Korea cultural exchange through co-production collaborations**

In terms of cultural exports, Korea is the world's global outperformer. Within a short period of time, Korea has grown to become the 6<sup>th</sup> largest movie industry in the world with the number of feature films produced in Korea more than doubling in less than a decade: 216 in 2011 to 464 in 2017.<sup>12</sup> In 2019, Korea exported a total of \$US600 million worth of screen content, 41 per cent of which were films and 69 per cent television. And we all know of the recent megahits *Parasite* (2020 Best Picture Oscar) and Netflix's no.1 drama *Squid Game*.

While a number of Korean films have been shot or, more often, post-produced in Australia, Australia has focussed on luring large US franchises such as Disney. More can be done to promote Australia to Korea as a filming location. Australia has a lot to offer when it comes to filming locations. As Ausfilm says: "Australia offers world-class film studios, a wide range of inspiring film locations, depth of experienced crews, Oscar-winning talent and competitive film and TV production incentives which make for cost-effective production."<sup>13</sup>

Australia and Korea have had an official co-production treaty and under the new Australia tax incentives provides a 40% Producer Offset for Feature Films, 30% PDV Offset, 20% Producer Offset for Television, and a 16.5% Location Offset.<sup>14</sup> Korea's Korean Film Council (KOFIC) offers a rebate of 20-25% on qualifying production expenditure and the 10 regional film commissions offer rebates and discounts on costs incurred in regional areas. But more can be done.

#### ***Policy recommendation:***

Governments should strengthen official co-production treaty to facilitate ongoing international cultural exchange via film and other media co-production collaborations, collective financing for projects, and supporting new distribution channels to access emerging consumption markets by offering substantial creative and financial benefits.

### **Visa arrangements for Korean nationals in Australia**

Pre pandemic, Korea was Australia's tenth largest source of visitor arrivals and eighth largest source of international student enrolments. From 2016 to 2019, tourist arrivals averaged around 290,000 per year and Australia consistently received around 30,000 international student enrolments.<sup>15</sup> To support Australian education and agri-businesses currently facing significant labour shortages, it is worth considering new student, work and working holiday maker visa arrangements. For example, the period in which Working Holiday Maker (subclass 417) visa holders can stay with the same agricultural (plant and animal cultivation) employer, recently increased from 6 to 12 months, can be extended.<sup>16</sup>

#### ***Policy Recommendation:***

The Australian government should explore the option of a third year for Working Holiday Maker (subclass 417) visa holders for Korean nationals who can undertake a further 6-months of specified work in a specified regional area during their second year.

### **Promotion of collaboration in social sciences, science and technology**

Enabling communities and businesses to harness innovation and technology to drive growth are policy priorities of both governments. Realisation of this goal will rely on finding new ways to build the potential for ongoing knowledge transfer and joint commercialisation of new technologies and ideas.

One area is the field of science and technology research. There is scope to bolster national level top-down policies by the governments, institutional level exchanges of researchers and students, and individual level networking opportunities that may boost and sustain research collaboration between Australia and Korea.

#### ***Policy recommendation:***

Both governments jointly develop and fund a significant multi-year grants program to support multi-year cooperative research projects between Australian and Korean academics conducting research in priority Science and Technology areas.

### **Development of the Australia-Korea start-up ecosystem**

The start-up ecosystem in Australia is now one of the fastest-growing globally, with the start-up rate being one of the highest in the world.<sup>17</sup> In particular, Australians have embraced fintech start-up development, with the rate of fintech adoption in the period 2015 to 2019 quadrupling.<sup>18</sup> Korea has invested heavily in developing a start-up ecosystem. For example, through the Seoul Innovation Growth Fund the Seoul Metropolitan Government plans to invest more than \$1 billion in blockchain and fintech start-ups by 2022.<sup>19</sup>

Australia and Korea have much to learn from each other's start-up ecosystems, including identifying and capitalising on the key strengths and complementarities between each other's start-up sector, and network of accelerators and co-working locations.

#### ***Policy recommendation:***

Both governments jointly develop and fund a program to assist emerging entrepreneurs to build the networks and connect with the types of expertise that can accelerate their own start-ups. The program could involve mentoring entrepreneurs in both countries and work with innovation hubs, universities, start-ups and Chaebol R&D departments in both countries and provide ongoing support for an Australian-Korean entrepreneur real and/or virtual network.

To foster further innovation in financial technology of both governments, create forums for knowledge sharing and mutual understanding in order to improve the relationship between regulatory authorities and encourage fintech companies to drive collaboration.

### **New approaches to support investment flows**

Compared to the trade in commodities, the Australia-Korea investment relationship is under-developed. While Korean direct investment in Australia has grown sharply over the past 15 years, totalling \$31.4 billion in 2019 (0.8% of total), Australian investment in Korea, at around \$23 billion in 2019, is less than 1% of the country's total foreign investment portfolio.<sup>20</sup>

However, there are a range of innovative financial vehicles that may have the potential to boost Australia-Korea investment flows. New asset classes such as diversified agricultural asset funds, and the Asian Region Funds Passport

(ARFP) initiative, launched through APEC in 2013 by Australia, Korea, New Zealand and Singapore have the potential to boost investment.

### **Policy Recommendation:**

Both governments can support development of industry-specific plans for bilateral investment and campaigns targeted to non-traditional areas to raise awareness of each other's business environments and trade opportunities.

Together both governments should explore the possibility of dual or cross-listing on each other's stock exchanges.

### **Conclusion**

The Korea Australia Free Trade Agreement (KAFTA) may be hailed as one of the strongest and most complementary economic agreements of its time. However, the Australia-Korea trade relationship remains concentrated in the resource sector. As geopolitical power settings shift and the governments accept that we face the prospect of irreversible climate change, it is imperative that these two democratic middle powers work add to the range of mutually beneficial trading opportunities to create a more diversified and vibrant trade relationship, but the kind of relationship that good for the prosperity of the Indo Pacific region and, more importantly, the good of our planet. To do this, both countries must be open to new ways of engagement.

There is cause for optimism. On 12 June 2021, Prime Minister Scott Morrison and President Moon Jae-in met in the margins of the expanded G7 summit and agreed to work towards elevating the Australia-ROK bilateral relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.<sup>21</sup>

This optimism is founded not only a relationship based on existing economic complementarities, but goes much deeper as it is anchored in shared values as expressed by Australia and Korea's:

- unerring adherence to international law and, support for a rules-based international order;
- commitment to a stable, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific region;
- commitment to democratic values and human rights;

and, most importantly,

- strong people-to-people links developed over 60 years of friendship.

Ultimately trade and investment relationships are about trust and understanding. Australia and Korea's 60 years of friendship has embedded these qualities in our three decades of close interactions. This bodes well for the flourishing of warm, prosperous and creative partnership in which our economies, our citizens, the citizens of the region and, ultimately, the earth's future generations will benefit.

### **Endnotes**

1 See <https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-force/kafta/Pages/korea-australia-fta>.

2 See <https://hydrogen-central.com/woodside-initiative-hydrogen-bus-adoption-south-korea/>.

3 Angela Macdonald-Smith, 'POSCO eyes Australia for strategic hydrogen base', Financial Review, October 5, 2021, <https://www.afr.com/policy/energy-and-climate/posco-eyes-australia-for-strategic-hydrogen-base-20211005>.

p58x94.

4 Hon Bill Johnston MLA, 'South Korean investment powers up WA's battery industry', Government of Western Australia, May 21, 2021, <https://www.mediastatements.wa.gov.au/Pages/McGowan/2021/05/South-Korean-investment-powers-up-WAs-battery-industry.aspx>.

5 See <https://arkenergy.com.au/>.

6 See <https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/marise-payne/media-release/joint-statement-australia-republic-korea-foreign-and-defence-ministers-22-meeting-2021>.

7 Australian Government, 'Vulnerable Supply Chains: Study Report', <https://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/completed/supply-chains/report>.

8 See <https://www.industry.gov.au/policies-and-initiatives/supporting-australias-manufacturing-industry/>.

9 Australian Government, 'South Korea County Profile', <https://www.exportfinance.gov.au/resources-news/country-profiles/asia/south-korea/bilateral-relations/>.

10 Australian Government, 'Australia's critical minerals strategy', March 28, 2019, <https://apo.org.au/node/227646>.

11 See <https://arkenergy.com.au/>.

12 The UNESCO Institute for Statistics, <http://data.uis.unesco.org/?ReportId=5545>.

13 See <https://www.ausfilm.com.au/why-film-in-australia/>.

14 Ibid.

15 Australian Government, 'South Korea County Profile'.

16 Australian Government, 'Working Holiday visa', <https://immi.homeaffairs.gov.au/visas/getting-a-visa/visa-listing/work-holiday-417>.

17 See <https://www.statista.com/statistics/268786/start-ups-in-leading-economic-nations/>.

18 Ibid.

19 Seoul Metropolitan Government, March 6, 2018, <http://world.seoul.go.kr/seoul-launches-1-1-billion-worth-innovative-growth-fund-promote-startups-2022/>.

20 Australian Government, 'South Korea County Profile'.

21 Australian Government, 'Republic of Korea', <https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/republic-of-korea/republic-of-korea-south-korea-country-brief>.



# CHAPTER 4

## Reflecting on 60 Years of Academic Korea Expertise in Australia:

- (Missed) Opportunities and Challenges Ahead -

Joanna Elfving-Hwang

### Executive Summary

- Korean Studies in Australia is typically seen as pure language and cultural training rather than a critical area of research and academic discipline.
- Key barriers for utilising the growing expertise in Korean Studies in Australia are lack of coordinated policy planning and targeted funding to support Korea-focused or Korea-Australia comparative research at tertiary level.
- Korean Studies and Korean language education in Australia are still insufficiently supported and resourced by State and Federal governments from primary to tertiary sectors. Moreover, the recent Jobs Ready Graduates Package has inadvertently undermined Korean language provision in Australian universities.

### Policy Recommendations

- Provide funding for significant projects for research collaborations in social sciences and humanities with partners in both Korea and Australia to explore areas of strategic importance to ensure readiness for advanced education, research and policy engagement.
- Externally funded and interdisciplinary Korean studies research centres in Australia will strengthen coordinated research capacity in under-researched areas of Korea-Australia relations and Korea-specific expertise while ensuring that Korean Studies researchers are not siloed in revenue-raising focused language institutes that focus solely on providing language education. This would address the current underutilisation of our University-level capacity to contribute to government policy, teacher training and industry level innovation.
- There is a need to revise the way “Asia literacy” is taught in schools, and ensure that Korean Studies is part of those cross-curricular plans. There also needs to be an Australian Federal or State government-led strategic investment in helping schools to initiate Korean language education in selected schools to ensure steady flow of students into Universities. This will train future generations of Australians, who are fluent in Korean language and also thoroughly educated in Korean Studies research.



iStock.com/alexis84

## Korean Studies in Australia

This paper will be less of an overview of the state of Korean studies in Australia as such good overviews already exist.<sup>1</sup> Rather, in this paper I will focus on considering what Korean Studies is, why investing in Korean Studies matters for Australia-Korea relations as we build on the solid foundations of bilateral friendship forged over the past 60 years and more, and the role that Korean Studies can play in further enhancing this important relationship.

Korean Studies as an area of academic research and teaching is generally little understood. It focuses on the study of the two Koreas through interdisciplinary and often comparative lens. As an area of research and teaching, it is most often allied with the Humanities and Social Sciences disciplines of Political Sciences, Sociology, Anthropology, Economics, History, Cultural Studies, Archaeology, Literature, Language Education and Linguistics.

As an area of critical enquiry it sits within Asian area studies, which developed in the Western academia – and in the US in particular – in response to a number of critical defence intelligence failings during the Second War, and a subsequent recognition that the Allies' understanding of "other" cultures, languages and societies were severely lacking. Since then, Asian area studies struggled for a long while to move on from the Cold War ethos of "know thine enemy" or to master an Asian language and culture to best trade with that particular country. As an American area studies scholar Marshall Powers noted as early as in 1955: "our national survival hinges, in considerable measure, upon our understanding of friend and potential foe alike."<sup>2</sup> While in Australia understanding Japan, China and Indonesia took prominence in developing critical mass in the study of Asia early on, Korean Studies was a relative latecomer as compared to the other Asian Studies disciplines. It was not really until the 1980s when Korea gained importance as a trading partner that the first Korean Studies programs were set up in the 1990s with the assistance of the Korea Foundation.<sup>3</sup>

In fact, Korean Studies in Australia owes its existence to the generous funding provided by the Republic of Korea's Department of Foreign Affairs (Korea Foundation) and Department of Education and Research (Academy of Korean Studies). Since the 1990s these two funding bodies have not only provided research funding to individual researchers, but also seed funding for academic positions in Korean Studies, for HDR student grants, learned societies such as the Korean Studies Association of Australasia, and larger research centre initiatives such as the Korea Research Centre at the University of Western Australia. For us in Australia, where international students are a key market to ensure the viability of our institutions, the idea that a foreign government would invest in Australian students' education in this way without even expecting an input into the curricula may be hard to comprehend. Yet the truth is that from the outset it is clear that what Korea-expertise we have in this country today, we owe it by and large to the funding of the Korean government. This is an example of the value that the Korean government has placed on fostering better understanding between our two nations, and a point often not sufficiently recognised and celebrated at federal and state government level.

### Korean Studies in Australia: Its Role and Challenges

Korean Studies, as a teaching approach, aims to create a transformative learning space for students in Australia to encounter Korean culture, history and society, as well as enabling competency in Korean language. Korean Studies thus also plays an important role in "bringing the world to the classroom" where students may have limited chances

to travel or live in Korea otherwise.<sup>4</sup> These limitations are particularly pressing for students from lower SES backgrounds who may seek careers in international-facing organisations and in that sense Korean Studies creates opportunities for widening future career prospects.

However, Korean studies is not about teaching students to "appreciate Korean culture". We are also not in a business of promoting Korean tourism or an attractive image of Korea as a travel or study destination. Developing deep cultural understanding is not easy – it requires the recognition that one does not have the complete view of the world and that others may have valid ways of seeing the world too. This can be terrifying to our students: just imagine being 19 years old, living in Korea, barely able to string together a sentence people around you understand, and realising that you do not know absolutely everything! Korean studies education helps to facilitate and scaffold this process of learning to see the world from different angles, and to make sense of that difference.

But how to "sell" the necessity to invest in Korean Studies in Australia to Universities and the Federal and State governments? Jeffrey Robertson in his excellent study on government communications of Australia-Korea relations observes how "diplomacy places a premium on storytelling".<sup>5</sup> He goes on to note how the focus of past Australia-Korea narratives has resorted to emphasising the transactional and material aspects of the bilateral relationship in order to justify the ongoing engagement.

In the education sector, we also often find ourselves caught up in a similar need to construct narratives to justify our existence. However, the main hindrances for growth of Korean Studies in Australia have less to do with Federal or State governments' objection to Asian Studies – quite the opposite. Subsequent governments, both at State and Federal levels, have identified "Asia Literacy" as an area of important development in both secondary and tertiary education.<sup>6</sup> However, the term "Asia Literacy" itself is poorly understood by educators and rarely defined by policy makers and educators. At best, it describes the aims of area studies a field of critical thinking that helps students to develop new ways of seeing the world and societies in it; and at worst, it is conflated into language learning.

Take Korean language education for an example. While the programs in Sydney, Melbourne, Monash, UQ, UNSW, ANU and at UWA have benefitted from past government's 2012 "Asian Century White Paper" which have nominated Korean (among other Asian languages) as a priority for Australia, most Australian students still try their hand at language learning for the first time at University. This is because in practice in schools and universities language teaching and learning is not a priority for our education system. It is sold as an 'optional extra', and something that will set your CV apart or earn some additional points for entering tertiary education of your choice. Universities are also part of the problem for continuing to sell language competency as an "exceptional" skill for our graduates' CVs.

As a result, and despite the Federal and various State Governments' attempts to support language education in schools, we have an acute and near crisis situation with shortage of qualified language teachers in our schools, and Korean language education in secondary schools is no exception. Schools struggle to fit more language and Asia literacy education in their already packed curriculum, and given that very few teachers are fluent or have degrees in languages other than English, it is difficult to see how the situation will improve in near future without any decisive and far reaching action.

Currently, language education is limited to couple of hours per week and when there is focus on language studies it tends to, as Wells and Coaldrake noted as early as in 1998, turn “the medium into the message” (1998, 151).<sup>7</sup> Yet learning a language is a medium, not an outcome. The outcome is the pursuit of knowledge and understanding of ways of thinking that are different to mine, to what is comfortable to me. The problematic outcome of the concept of “Asia literacy” has been that it externalises the understanding of Asia, and of Korea, as separate from or completely different to Australia through focusing mostly on the material benefits of the relationship rather than as an opportunity to learn from cultures other than one’s own.<sup>8</sup> This is also where many miss the main point of Korean Studies education and how it is marketed to prospective students. It also continues to undermine efforts to develop Korean Studies beyond language education.

### **Challenges for Korean Studies in Australia: Korean Studies Research**

While undergraduate student numbers continue to break records year on year, one of the areas of critical weakness in Australia is Korean Studies research. There are a number of drivers that have meant that excellent staff continue to punch above their weight in producing high quality Korean Studies research despite often carrying heavy administrative and teaching loads to justify their continuing academic positions.

So why is it that Korean Studies continue to be marginalised as research area in our institutions? Given the interdisciplinary nature of Korean Studies, there are some in the academia who object to calling it an academic discipline, because Korean Studies is seen to lack a “core literature” that would define its disciplinary expertise. The Australian Research Council’s categorising system is partially to blame here: Korean Studies is not recognised as a field of research for funding purposes, which leaves Korean studies scholars the option of reporting their research as “Korean language” or “Korean literature”, or within their other disciplinary context. For political scientists, business and management studies experts, popular culture experts, historians, sociologists and anthropologists, this conflation of Korean Studies into “language and literature” is all too descriptive of the value economy that underpins the understanding of area studies in Australia today.

Moreover, the key enablers and barriers tend to be institutional, and typically driven by both internal competition for students and influence, and often reflect the internal power brokers’ personal ideas of the perceived value of area studies. This has been made clear since COVID-19, which caused a widespread “rationalisation” of University courses at the expense of many area studies programs across Australia. Even at institutions where language education is still recognised as being of value, research capability in Korean Studies has in many cases been diminished. Unlike in the US where private funders have often stepped into the breach where government funding have failed to recognise the importance of area studies, Australia does not have a similar resource to draw on. Even large numbers of students will no longer save a program (unless they are international student enrolments). In fact, the Federal government’s Jobs Ready Graduates package has had a perverse effect on supporting Asian Studies and Language at universities. The expected income per student is now around \$20,000. For each unit, the student contributes some, and the Commonwealth pays the difference. While the student contributions for Korean language units has been significantly reduced from \$6,000 to \$3,985, the Universities are not keen to promote their area studies programs. This is because each Uni-

versity has an institutional cap on how much funding they can receive in Commonwealth contributions to bridge the cap, and once this limit has been reached, each enrolment in language units becomes a potential fiscal burden. Since learning Asian languages require a significant number of contact hours, the student contributions barely cover the staffing costs once the cap has been reached. This makes language programs even less attractive for Universities to run, and explains why you would see very little advertising of language-based majors in Australia despite their relatively low student contribution costs. If the Commonwealth thus truly saw intercultural education as important to the nation’s future, they would remove the cap altogether for these units.

Despite the popularity of Korean pop culture, all these factors put together still make Korean Studies highly vulnerable to institutional decisions which may not always consider the national significance of ensuring securing a supply of “Korea-literate” graduates for the industry, diplomatic corps and education, as well as critical research in understanding one of Australia’s key trading partners, and increasingly, aligns within the Indo-Pacific security alliances.

### **What our Students Think: Future Opportunities for Enhancing Korea-Australia Relations through Korean Studies and Research**

If Korean Studies staff sometimes feel the need to justify themselves to prospective student parents and even University managements why the study of Korean society, history and culture is as an important part of cultural literacy as linguistic fluency, increasingly prospective students themselves no longer need this kind of hard sell. They come to Universities already interested in Korean culture, and not just K-pop but also cinema, TV dramas and see Korea as an exciting travel destination and a potential place to live and work for longer term. Korean cultural industries have played a significant part in this shift, and they have been a powerful tool for cultural diplomacy as Caleb Kelso-Marsh also argues in this volume. For the generation in our classrooms Psy’s Gangnam style is pre-history: they have grown up with TVQX, Shinhwa, Red Velvet, Girls Generation, EXO and BTS. For them, Korean popular culture is part of their childhood, which means that there is no need for us to explain what students can learn from Korea and how the Korean experience relates to their own lives. Quite the contrary, for many students, Korean culture is part of growing up an Australian global citizen, and it is part of the cultural landscape of what they consume and understand as “everyday” culture inasmuch as any other global pop culture. Students join programs for affective reasons, rather than because of future career goals.

It is this aspect of Korea in Australia that I would like to now focus on and which I think is something that Australia should pay attention to. The reality is that students come to Korean Studies to learn the language in order to master Korean culture, history and politics, and to engage in Korean cultural products from popular culture to traditional, and to do so through the medium of the Korean language. This is where decision makers, whether those who make policy at national or state level, or those within our tertiary institutions, have misunderstood the drivers behind student motivations to study Korean Studies.

University marketing materials in prospectuses are often indicative of this broad misconception: despite a disappearing small percentage of Korean Studies graduates working in the field of translation, the University prospectuses tend to list “translator” as the most common job destination for graduates. In reality, most students work in business,



NGO's, media and civil service where their social sciences and humanities specific understanding of the two Koreas and their societies are crucial. Graduates who have basic language skills in Korean rarely see huge returns to those skills, whereas graduates with a deep and nuanced understanding of Korean history, culture, politics and culture, coupled with intermediate or advanced Korean language skills are typically the ones who are quickly recognised as highly desirable by potential employers in the industry, not-for-profit sector, civil service and diplomatic services.

Human societies are complex and we need to see that complexity as a form of richness and potential rather than a threat. In many ways it is true that Korea and Australia have more in common than they have differences, but in order to create something truly unique we need to allow for difference rather than insist on narratives of sameness. Agreed and shared rules are important in international relations and in the field of diplomacy, but co-explorations in areas of cultural production, arts and humanities also have a place in deepening connections and allowing for conversations that create unique crossing points and unique hybrid ways of seeing. Perhaps the way forward is to move away from narratives of sameness or complementarity, but to encourage recognition and appreciation of difference. The missed opportunity that we have had in the past 30 or so years of researching and teaching Korea in Australia has been that we have, by and large, thought of this relationship as external to Australia.

We therefore need courses that explore connections between Korea and the world, as well as Korea and Australia. We need cultural experts, both in Korea and Australia. Exchange programs already exist but these need to be deepened, they need to go beyond student tourism. We also need programs that encourage students do research and internship programs in Korea, and apply the Korean Studies skills base they have acquired in Australia. Moreover, Australia could learn from overseas programs such as the Korean residential language village *Sup sogüi hosu* (Forrest Village) in Minnesota, which was established with significant funding from the Korean corporate sector, and provides a 24/7 immersion environment for language learning.<sup>9</sup>

### What of Australian Studies in Korea?

Korea's cultural industries have taught us that the soft power that comes with popular culture extends far beyond the sales of music downloads, cinema tickets or beauty products. They promote an image of a technologically advanced, exciting, youthful and forward looking country with "can do" spirit. This is what our students now see when they see Korea. So while there are probably no young people left in Australia who have never heard of K-pop, it is difficult find young people in Korea who can name one Australian band, TV program or film. Australia in Korea remains an unknown land of stretched out white sand, desert, koalas, kangaroos and life-threatening spiders, sandy long-haired men in thongs clutching onto surf boards. We are indeed a source of mining riches and high quality agricultural products, but as the bilateral relations move to their 61<sup>st</sup> year, is that really all this relationship can be? I suggest that Australia takes the Korean Studies (and indeed any area studies) model to promoting Australian Studies in Korea. This should happen both supporting at least two ongoing academic positions in Korea that offer Korean students opportunities to explore what is unique about Australia, including the knowledge and histories of the First Nations people. The Korea Foundation's competitive model that requires the host institutions to demonstrate long-term commitment to investing in Korea-Australia links and education is a good starting point here. Moreover, Australian Studies in Australia can further

help to foster people to people links as well as academic exchanges and even online learning collaborations between Australian and Korean university students.

Korea has invested heavily in Australia, what has Australia done in Korea? And more importantly what is special and specific about Australia that can enhance the way Korean students see of the world? Because ultimately, Australia-Korea relations need to be built on a two-way exchanges, which are equally transformative and create new spaces of collaborative innovation.

So going forward, to move beyond the transactional toward collaborative and co-creative, we need spaces for research – scientific, social scientific and cultural – supported by grants that call for collaborative innovation. If we are to be partners, why are we not investing in creating meaningful spaces for innovation? This will, however, require large scale social sciences comparative research projects that recognise the importance Humanities and Social Sciences approaches as applies to Australia-Korea area studies. Externally funded and interdisciplinary Korean studies research centres in Australia will strengthen coordinated research capacity in under-researched areas of Korea-Australia relations and Korea-specific expertise while ensuring that Korean Studies researchers are not siloed in revenue-raising language institutes that focus solely on providing language education. This would address the current underutilisation of our University-level capacity to contribute to government policy, teacher training and industry level innovation.

### Endnotes

- 1 Ruth Barraclough, 20 Years of Korean Studies in Australia, <https://asaa.asn.au/20-years-of-korean-studies-in-australia/>.
- 2 Marshall K. Powers, Area Studies, *The Journal of Higher Education*, Vol. 26, No. 2 (1955), p. 84.
- 3 See further reading here: Ruth Barraclough, 20 Years of Korean Studies in Australia, <https://asaa.asn.au/20-years-of-korean-studies-in-australia/>.
- 4 Maurizio Marinelli, A Transnational Approach to ReOrient Asian Studies to Global Studies, *Asia Pacific Journal of Education*, Vol. 27 No. 2 (2007), p. 116.
- 5 Jeffrey Robertson, 'More Than Old Friends? Narrative in Australia's Relationship with Korea,' *The Australian Journal of Politics and History*, vol. 63, no. 1 (2017), p. 15.
- 6 <https://www.australiancurriculum.edu.au/f-10-curriculum/cross-curriculum-priorities/asia-and-australia-s-engagement-with-asia/>.
- 7 Coaldrake, William and Wells, Ken. Japanese and Korean studies, in *Knowing ourselves and others: The Humanities in Australia into the 21st century*. Vol. 2, ed. Reference Group for the Australian Academy of the Humanities (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia), p. 51.
- 8 Joanna Elfving-Hwang, Theo Mendez and Masafumi Monden, 'Where is Asia in 'Fortress Australia'?', *Asian Currents* (2021): <https://asaa.asn.au/where-is-asia-in-fortress-australia/>.
- 9 See more here: <http://www.concordialanguagevillages.org/youth-languages/korean-language-village>.

# CHAPTER 5

## Why Investing in Screen Cultures Pays Off:

- Lessons for Australia from the Korean Film Industry -

Caleb Kelso-Marsh

### Executive Summary

- Korea's recent cinematic success has come about through sustained, long-term efforts by the Korean government to support its domestic film industry, coupled with the government's ability to incentivise private investment in the film industry through public-private partnerships.
- Korea's filmic success has not only resulted in immense economic benefits, but it has also helped Korea foster a positive national image which, in turn, has had positive ramifications for many other industries in Korea.
- The Korean film industry provides a series of lessons and opportunities for Australia to develop its own film industry as both a source of income and means of enhancing its national image.

### Policy Recommendations

- Australia should pursue targeted filmic collaborations with Korea. Doing so would benefit the domestic Australian film industry by providing local filmmakers with opportunities to develop their expertise by working on international productions while also providing a source of income which could be used to fund domestic productions.
- To stimulate filmic collaboration, Australia should consider signing a co-production treaty with Korea, similar to that between New Zealand and Korea. Doing so would develop Australia's Asia literacy, enhance diplomatic ties between the two nations, and increase trade and business.
- Australia could look to the Korean model as a blueprint by which to develop its own film industry. Korea provides a pertinent example of how to combine government support with incentivised public-private partnerships as a means of developing a domestic film industry.





## Introduction

In recent decades, Korean cinema has risen to global prominence. From the early-2000s, Korean films have routinely been critically acclaimed on the international film festival circuit, most recently culminating in the Academy Award success of *Parasite* (2019), the first foreign film to win Best Picture, and *Minari's* (2020) Yoon Yuh-jung, the first Korean actor to receive an Academy Award for acting. Rather than sheer coincidence, such cinematic success is a result of sustained, long-term efforts by the Korean government to develop its domestic industry, coupled with its ability to incentivise private investment through public-private partnerships. Comparatively, despite having a similarly sized economy and a healthy domestic film industry of its own, Australia has been unable to capitalise on the income earning potential of its film industry nor receive critical recognition to the same extent as Korea. The Korean film industry can therefore offer a series of lessons and examples of potential opportunities to develop the Australian film industry. It not only provides a blueprint Australia could follow to utilise film as a means to develop its economy and enhance its national image, but also presents an opportunity to engage in filmic collaboration, an initiative that could be stimulated by way of a co-production treaty. Such collaboration would both benefit the domestic Australian film industry, affording opportunities for both Korean and Australian filmmakers to further develop their expertise through cross-fertilisation, as well as helping fund domestic Australian productions. It also presents a means by which Australia could develop its Asia literacy and further strengthen its trade and cultural ties with Korea.

## How Did Korea Develop Its Film Industry?

While Korean cinema's success has come about due to long term, sustained efforts from the Korean government to develop its domestic film industry, it was also a result of the government having to think on its feet in response to economic crisis, the outcome of which was a renewed focus on public-private partnerships within the film industry. In terms of centralised efforts, the Korean government has long supported domestic cinema through a range of initiatives. It established both the Korean Film Council and Korean Academy of Film Arts, the latter of which to date has trained over 700 film industry members including Academy Award winner Bong Joon-ho.<sup>1</sup> The Korean government has also developed a range of public bodies charged with overseeing the development of its cultural industries, such as the Korea Culture and Contents Agency (KOCCA) and the Presidential Council on Nation Branding (PCNB).<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade has declared cultural industries to be an official area of focus, recognising it as one of its three pillars of diplomacy.<sup>3</sup>

While such centralised efforts have proven integral to the growth of Korea's film industry, the industry would not have developed to the extent it has today without the addition of significant private investment. In 1997, following the IMF crisis, Korea descended into severe economic recession and, to mitigate financial loss, the Korean government looked for alternative sources of income. The Korean government recognised its cultural industries as a potential growth area and looked to invest in them with the aim of exporting cultural products to other parts of East Asia to generate profits.<sup>4</sup> Recognising that private sectors would be integral to the success of such an initiative, the Korean government offered a series of lucrative tax breaks and grants to attract private investment in cultural industries such as film.<sup>5</sup> These incentives were successful in stimulating numerous public-private partnerships in Korea's cultural industries. Korea's cultural products proved to an overwhelming suc-

cess within the East Asian market, a phenomenon termed 'Hallyu' or the 'Korean Wave', and so the Korean government invested further with an aim to harness the Korean Wave as a long-term source of income.<sup>6</sup> Such public-private partnerships have since underpinned the Korean film industry, indicating this as one area the Australian film industry could enhance further. In recent years, Korea has also looked to international collaboration and co-productions, particularly with China, as a means of further boosting its filmic output.<sup>7</sup> Korea's willingness to collaborate on film presents an opportunity for the Australian film industry.

## Why Did the Korean Government Invest in Film?

The Korean government's incentive to invest in film was two-fold. Firstly, the Korean government recognised its film industry as a potential source of income, and film has since gone on to become a significant earner for the Korean economy. Domestic films regularly hold the majority share of the top ten films at the Korean box office and in 2020 eight of the top ten films in Korean cinemas were Korean productions.<sup>8</sup> Comparatively, Australian films rarely, if ever, even enter the top ten films at the Australian box office; in 2020 there was not a single Australian film in the top ten films at the box office.<sup>9</sup> Furthermore, in 2020 domestic Korean films represented approximately 68% of all films screened in Korean cinemas,<sup>10</sup> while in Australia domestic productions accounted for only 5.6% of films screened in cinemas, a significant increase from 3.3% a year earlier.<sup>11</sup> While certain socio-historical differences, such as Korea's long-running quota system, partly account for such disparity in viewership, it nonetheless stands that Korean films have a far wider reach compared to Australian ones, namely because development of the Korean film industry has resulted in a dedicated audience both domestically and globally. This is an important consideration because such a domestic creative output has translated into a significant income for the Korean economy. In 2019, Korean domestic films generated almost one billion dollars at the Korean box office, representing 51% of the market share.<sup>12</sup> While 2020 saw a substantial decrease to \$321 million, namely due to COVID, this nonetheless represented a whopping 69% of the market share.<sup>13</sup> Korea's income from film is even more astounding when its overseas successes are taken into account. For instance, in 2018 alone, the Korean film industry generated \$18.45 billion globally.<sup>14</sup>

Not only has Korea's film industry proven itself a significant domestic earner, but Korea's filmic success has also resulted in significant foreign investment into the country. For example, Netflix recently entered the Korean market, citing the global popularity of Korean content coupled with Netflix's aim to expand the number of subscribers in the Asia region, something they see Korea as being integral to, as their motivations for doing so.<sup>15</sup> Between 2015 and 2020 Netflix invested \$700 million in Korean productions and plans to spend a further \$500 million this year alone on Korean content.<sup>16</sup> Netflix has also struck a number of deals with private Korean companies. For example, in 2019, Korean company CJ Entertainment signed a landmark deal with Netflix for both content production and a distribution agreement,<sup>17</sup> and in 2021, Netflix began leasing a number of production studios in Seoul.<sup>18</sup> Between 2016 and 2020, Netflix added \$4.6 billion of GDP to the Korean economy, with almost half of this coming in the past year alone.<sup>19</sup> To put it bluntly, film is big money, and Korea provides Australia an example of the economic potential of a well-developed film industry.

Aside from the obvious financial incentives, the Korean government also invested in its domestic film industry as a means of enhancing its national image. Following the

1997 financial crisis, the Korean government have utilised popular culture to foster a positive national image of Korea and its people, culture, institutions and policies.<sup>20</sup> In turn, this positive national image has been shown to have resulted in other tangible benefits for Korea such as an increase in exports, foreign investment, and tourism.<sup>21</sup> This has also generated a newfound broader interest in hybrid forms of Korea's traditional culture and heritage more generally.<sup>22</sup> Comparatively, in the global popular imaginary Australia is known for its resources and beaches but little else, and thus is unfamiliar to many people abroad. Australia's filmic exports arguably contribute to such unfamiliarity, particularly through their routine use of outback settings, and as a result the nation is often perceived abroad as an exotic yet unfamiliar locale, not dissimilar to how Korea was seen five to ten years ago. It is questionable whether these filmic depictions of Australia's outback help to promote the nation as an attractive location to visit or invest in, especially given such a location is unfamiliar to the majority of urban-dwelling Australians themselves. As Korea has shown, culture can play an integral part in shifting a nation's image. Cultural industries, such as film, have the potential to create a positive image of Australia which in turn would have real, tangible benefits for other national industries more broadly. While this will take time and not simply occur overnight, the Korean film industry's success in doing so provides a series of lessons and opportunities for Australia to follow suit.

## **Opportunities**

### **A) Collaboration**

One opportunity the Korean film industry presents to Australia is to collaborate on co-productions, allowing the Australian film industry to tap into the success of Korean film. As mentioned earlier, Korea already routinely engages in international filmic collaboration and view co-productions as a means of boosting its filmic output, suggesting a demand exists.<sup>23</sup> To date, a number of Korean filmmakers, including Parasite director Bong Joon-ho, have also collaborated with Australian post-production, digital and visual effects studios, evidencing the feasibility of co-production between the two nations.<sup>24</sup> Given there are no co-production treaties in place between Australia and Korea to incentivise this, the decision of Korean filmmakers to work with Australian studios has been purely driven by the ability of Australian studios to deliver specific work at a high standard.<sup>25</sup> These instances evidence the demand for Australian expertise in Korean productions, indicating the feasibility of targeted collaboration. Such filmic collaboration would also be of immense value to the domestic Australian film industry. Not only would working on international productions afford Australian filmmakers with the opportunity to cultivate their expertise by working on international productions, but the income from it would help fund domestic film, developing the Australian film industry further.<sup>26</sup>

### **B) Co-Production Treaty**

The likelihood of collaboration would increase if an official co-production treaty was in place. New Zealand, renowned as a provider of "film friendly" services, has a long history of targeted filmic collaboration and partnership, having run a number of successful programs designed to encourage international productions to enter the country from abroad.<sup>27</sup> In terms of its engagement with Korea, a co-production treaty has proven essential. In 2003, Korea and New Zealand signed a film cooperation agreement which New Zealand considered an integral part of its aim to enhance its Asia literacy, one of the goals outlined in its Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade's Asia White Paper titled "Our Future With Asia".<sup>28</sup> This agreement resulted in filmic collaborations

between the two nations, such as Korean film *Antarctic Journal* (2005) which was filmed on location in New Zealand, as well as private partnerships, like the strategic alliance signed between Korean company Daesung and New Zealand company Park Road Post, the outcome of which was the film *Black Sheep* (2006), the first New Zealand film to be funded by Korea.<sup>29</sup> In 2008, following the success of such collaborations, this cooperation agreement was elevated to a co-production treaty which provided tax breaks and incentives for co-productions.<sup>30</sup> This further stimulated co-productions and partnerships between the two nations, as evidenced by *The Warrior's Way* (2010). The film was recorded in New Zealand, its visual effects were co-made by Korea's MOFAC Studio and Peter Jackson's Weta Digital, and the film was co-produced by Korean producer Lee Joo-ik and New Zealand producer Barrie M. Osborne, most noted for his work on the *Lord of the Rings*.<sup>31</sup>

Similarly, a co-production treaty between Australia and Korea would provide tangible benefits for both nations. As Australian film studios' past engagement with Korean cinema already suggests, there is a demand for Australian expertise on Korean productions. An official co-production treaty between Australia and Korea would not only further stimulate Australia's domestic film industry, providing both a source of income and opportunities for filmmakers to develop their expertise by working on international productions, but it would provide a means for Australia to further develop its Asia literacy. A co-production treaty would also have significant diplomatic ramifications, both enhancing Australia's cultural diplomacy and fostering an increase in trade and business between Australia and Korea.<sup>32</sup> The Western Australian government's recent pledge to commit \$100 million to the construction of new film studios plus a further \$20 million towards a screen and production fund so as to also utilise the federal government's \$400 million film location fund,<sup>33</sup> coupled with Screen Australia's new policies designed to promote diversity in Australian productions,<sup>34</sup> present an opportune moment for Australia to collaborate with Korean film producers. Doing so provides a means to both diversify Australian screens while utilising newfound resources.

### **C) Look to Korean Model For Inspiration**

Finally, the Australian government could look to Korea's film industry as a blueprint by which to develop its own domestic industry. Traditionally, Australia has long relied on government support to make film production a reality.<sup>35</sup> However, as the case of Korea shows, building a global film industry is more complicated than simply providing funding. While Korea's efforts to develop its domestic film industry were government-led, it was the private sector actors who took the opportunity to invest in it, and these public-private partnerships proved essential to Korea's filmic success. While Korea's corporate environment is markedly different from that of Australia, namely due to Korea's complex system of chaebol conglomerates and as well as varying levels of domestic capital between the two nations, the Australian film industry can still look to Korea as an example of how to better stimulate public-private partnerships in its film industry so as to develop the industry as a whole.

## **Final thoughts**

Domestic capital aside, Australia offers a pristine location for filmmaking, providing filmmakers with a diversity of locations from which to shoot as well as stunning natural light conducive to filming.<sup>36</sup> Australia also has a highly educated workforce, with numerous graduates with qualifications in film and media who would be well-suited to work with Korean collaborators.<sup>37</sup> For these reasons, Australia is

ripe to collaborate with Korea on film. However, for this to come to fruition, it is essential that the Australian government looks to provide tax breaks and incentives for such collaboration, possibly in the form of a co-production treaty. Ultimately though, and perhaps most significantly, developing these collaborative relationships also requires a sophisticated level of Korea literacy on the part of Australia, being dependent on members of Australia's film and media industry having a deep cultural understanding of Korea as well as an understanding of how Korea perceives both Australia and the rest of the world. Without such Korea literacy, filmic collaboration will simply remain a pipe dream.

## Endnotes

- 1 Seow Ting Lee, 'Film as cultural diplomacy: South Korea's nation branding through *Parasite* (2019)', *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy* (2021). <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41254-020-00192-1>.
- 2 Joanna Elfving-Hwang, 'South Korean Cultural Diplomacy and Brokering 'K-Culture' Outside Asia', *Korean Histories* 4 no. 1 (2013): 19.
- 3 Lee, 'Film as cultural diplomacy'.
- 4 Elfving-Hwang, 'South Korean Cultural Diplomacy', 15.
- 5 Lee, 'Film as cultural diplomacy'.
- 6 Cho Hae-joang, 'Reading the 'Korean Wave' as a Sign of a Global Shift', *Korea Journal* 45 no. 4 (2005): 147-82.
- 7 Brian Yecies, 'The Chinese–Korean co-production pact: collaborative encounters and the accelerating expansion of Chinese cinema', *International Journal of Cultural Policy* 22 no. 5 (2016): 770-786.
- 8 'Box Office: Yearly', KOFIC, accessed October, 2021, [https://www.koreanfilm.or.kr/eng/news/boxOffice\\_Yearly.jsp?mode=BOXOFFICE\\_YEAR&selectDt=2020&category=ALL&country=ALL](https://www.koreanfilm.or.kr/eng/news/boxOffice_Yearly.jsp?mode=BOXOFFICE_YEAR&selectDt=2020&category=ALL&country=ALL).
- 9 'Box Office For 2020', Box Office Mojo by IMDbPro, accessed October, 2021, [https://www.boxofficemojo.com/year/2020/?area=AU&ref\\_=bo\\_yl\\_table\\_2](https://www.boxofficemojo.com/year/2020/?area=AU&ref_=bo_yl_table_2).
- 10 'Distribution of films screened in cinemas in South Korea from 2004 to 2020, by origin', Statista, accessed October, 2021, <https://www.statista.com/statistics/625516/south-korea-market-share-films-domestic-foreign/>.
- 11 'Cinema Industry Trends Box Office in Australia. 1977-2020', Screen Australia, accessed October, 2021, <https://www.screenaustralia.gov.au/fact-finders/cinema/australian-films/feature-film-releases/box-office-share>.
- 12 Patrick Frater, 'Korea Box Office: Foreign Film Revenues Collapse in 2020', *Variety*, January 3, 2021, <https://variety.com/2021/film/asia/korea-box-office-foreign-film-revenues-collapse-1234878043/>.
- 13 Ibid.
- 14 'Korean Film Industry Generated USD 18.45 Billion in 2018', MPA Asia Pacific, December 12, 2019, <https://www.mpa-apac.org/press/korean-film-industry-generated-usd-18-45-billion-in-2018/>.
- 15 Lucas Shaw and Shirley Zhao, 'Netflix Plans \$500 Million Spending in Korea to Crack Asia', *Bloomberg*, February 25, 2021, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-25/netflix-plans-500-million-korea-budget-this-year-to-crack-asia>.
- 16 Reuters Staff, 'Netflix to spend \$500 million more to line up original shows, movies in South Korea', *Reuters*, February 25, 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-netflix-south-korea-idUSKBN2AP1RJ>.
- 17 Joan Macdonald, 'Netflix Signs Long-Term Partnership with CJ ENM And Studio Dragon', *Forbes*, November 21, 2019, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/joanmacdonald/2019/11/21/netflix-signs-long-term-partnership-deal-with-cj-enm-and-studio-dragon/?sh=120736e466d1>.
- 18 Patrick Brezski, 'Netflix Expands South Korean Footprint, Leasing Two Production Facilities', *Hollywood Reporter*, January 6, 2021, <https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/business/business-news/netflix-expands-south-korean-footprint-leasing-two-production-facilities-4112863/>.
- 19 Shaw and Zhao, 'Netflix Plans \$500 Million Spending in Korea to Crack Asia'.
- 20 Elfving-Hwang, 'South Korean Cultural Diplomacy', 19.
- 21 Lee, 'Film as cultural diplomacy'.
- 22 Ibid.
- 23 Yecies, 'The Chinese–Korean co-production pact'.
- 24 Ben Goldsmith and Brian Yecies, 'Sejong Park's Birthday Boy and Korean-Australian Encounters', in *Diasporas of Australian Cinema*, ed. Catherine Simpson, Renata Murawska and Anthony Lambert, (Bristol, UK: Intellect Books, 2009) 165-166; Ben Goldsmith, 'Made in Australia/ New Zealand/ South Korea... the new landscape of international film production', in *Biennial Conference of the Korean Studies Association of Australasia: Global Korea: Old and New 6th*, Sydney, Australia: KSAA, 2009), 78-79, accessed October, 2021, [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/43527228\\_Made\\_in\\_AustraliaNew\\_ZealandSouth\\_Koreathe\\_new\\_landscape\\_of\\_international\\_film\\_production](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/43527228_Made_in_AustraliaNew_ZealandSouth_Koreathe_new_landscape_of_international_film_production); and Brian Yecies, Ae-Gyung Shim and Ben Goldsmith 'Digital Intermediary: Korean Transnational Cinema', *Media International Australia Incorporating Culture and Policy* 141 no. 141 (2011): 139-140.
- 25 Goldsmith, 'Made in Australia/ New Zealand/ South Korea', 78; and Yecies, Shim and Goldsmith, 'Digital Intermediary', 140.
- 26 Goldsmith, 'Made in Australia/ New Zealand/ South Korea', 79-80.
- 27 Ibid.
- 28 Ibid.; and Yecies, Shim and Goldsmith, 'Digital Intermediary', 140-141.
- 29 Ibid.
- 30 Ibid.
- 31 Yecies, Shim and Goldsmith, 'Digital Intermediary', 141.
- 32 Goldsmith, 'Made in Australia/ New Zealand/ South Korea', 77.
- 33 Peter de Kruijff, 'McGowan drops the act, blurring the line between election promises and governing', *WAToday*, February 22, 2021, <https://www.watoday.com.au/politics/western-australia/mcgowan-drops-the-act-blurring-the-line-between-election-promises-and-governing-20210220-p574aj.html>.
- 34 'Screen Australia Supports Screen Diversity and Inclusion Network Initiative the Everyone Project', Screen Australia, accessed October, 2021, <https://www.screenaustralia.gov.au/sa/screen-news/2020/12-09-screen-australia-supports-sdin-initiative>.
- 35 Goldsmith, 'Made in Australia/ New Zealand/ South Korea', 80.
- 36 'Why Australia', *ausfilm*, accessed November, 2021, [https://www.ausfilm.com.au/why-film-in-australia/?fbclid=IwAR1qBZp0SNhHZ\\_g-euXO5bEA-RoPq023F-61XgwlynaEZb-zUB7n0emtvKDU](https://www.ausfilm.com.au/why-film-in-australia/?fbclid=IwAR1qBZp0SNhHZ_g-euXO5bEA-RoPq023F-61XgwlynaEZb-zUB7n0emtvKDU).
- 37 Ibid.



# CHAPTER 6

## Untold stories: Australian links to South Korea's Pro-Democracy Movement (1960s-1980s)

- Strengthening diplomacy through historical research -

Younghye Seo-Whitney

### Executive Summary

- While we celebrate 60-years of Australian diplomatic ties with South Korea, our connection stems back more than 130 years.
- The seemingly incidental yet significant interaction between Australian missionaries and intellectuals and their South Korean counterparts have had a demonstrably long-term and positive influence on the trajectory of the South Korea-Australia relationship.

### Policy Recommendations

- Further historical research on the roles that Australian non-governmental and governmental actors such as missionaries, intellectuals and politicians played in supporting the social, economic and political development that drove South Korea's rapid transition to one of the world's major economies will not only help to deepen our appreciation of the multifaceted relationship between Australia and South Korea, but it will also help to highlight the importance of history as a vehicle to further transnational diplomacy.



Photograph of Youngdeungpo Urban Industrial Mission (YDP-UIM) courtesy of YDP-UIM



This year we celebrate 60-years of diplomatic ties between South Korea and Australia, but the interaction between the two nations actually goes back quite a bit further. In October 2009, Churches in Australia and South Korea celebrated 120-years of Australian missionary support to Korea.<sup>1</sup> In October 1889, more than ten years before the establishment of the Commonwealth of Australia, the Reverend Joseph Henry Davies arrived in the Joseon Dynasty, marking the beginnings of the South Korea-Australia relationship. With the leadership of Reverend Davies, other Australian missionaries soon followed and established hospitals, clinics and schools in major towns throughout Gyeongsang province. The schools that were established are recognised as being the first in the province that allowed girls to participate in education. The conditions for the missionaries were harsh, and many died before returning to Australia. Notwithstanding the challenges, which included global and regional conflict and political upheaval, the Australian missionaries continued to contribute to the development of South Korea. In recognition of this contribution, and as a part of the 120-year anniversary celebrations, in 2009, an Australian missionary cemetery was established in the southern coastal city of Masan.

In this paper, I explore examples of more recent Australian missionary, intellectual and political engagement in South Korea to highlight the significance of uncovering these hitherto little talked about histories of bilateral engagement. I show how these missionaries went beyond simply proselytising, and how they, in fact, operated within a broader transnational advocacy network that sought to support the South Korean pro-democracy movement during the turbulence of the 1960s-80s. This period was an era of significant civil unrest and political repression that unfolded in the wake of the Korean War (1950-1953). The pro-democracy struggles continued under subsequent administrations, including Syngman Rhee (1948-1960) and Park Chung Hee (1961-1979) and lasted until democratic reforms in 1987 with the election of Roh Tae Woo.<sup>2</sup>

South Korea's pro-democracy movement, which developed in response to the political vacuum that arose after the end of the Second World War and the liberation of the Korean Peninsula from 36 years of Japanese colonial rule, has been commonly considered a domestic undertaking.<sup>3</sup> What is less known about the South Korean pro-democracy movement is the role of external actors in supporting and sustaining their domestic counterparts. One such external group was a trio of Korean and Japanese actors responsible for a pro-democracy project known as the "Letters Project". This project comprised a series of influential articles entitled "Letters from South Korea", which were published in the Japanese magazine *Sekai* for approximately 16 years. The three individuals that formed the core of this project were Chi Myeong-gwan,<sup>4</sup> Oh Chae-Shik,<sup>5</sup> and Yasue Ryosuke.<sup>6</sup> The topics they chose to cover focused almost exclusively on highlighting the repression of the pro-democracy activists in South Korea. The group aimed to raise the awareness of the magazine's readership about the situation in South Korea at that time. Their hope was that by raising the awareness of the readership, the trio would be able to in some way rally broader support for the democracy movement in South Korea.

The materials that these articles were based on were

smuggled into Japan from South Korea. The project relied on many people from countries including Japan, the United States, Germany, and Canada to smuggle the information out of South Korea.<sup>7</sup> According to Chi, more than 360 missionaries were involved in this potentially risky project, many whose identities remain unknown.<sup>8</sup> The materials – including statements by underground organisations, memoirs of political prisoners, and pamphlets – were secretly handed to Chi, Oh and Yasue. Chi would translate the materials and write the articles late at night. Yasue would then get one of his trusted staff to rewrite the articles. The originals would then be burnt to prevent South Korean Intelligence Services from identifying the author through handwriting.<sup>9</sup>

The impact of these articles exceeded the expectation of the authors, gaining particular notoriety following the brazen broad daylight abduction of opposition leader Kim Dae Jung in downtown Tokyo in August 1973.<sup>10</sup> These articles came to be relied upon around the world as a trusted source of information regarding the situation in South Korea. Newspapers such as the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post* and the *Christian Monitor* regularly published stories based on the information drawn from the Letters articles. Notably, the international coverage also influenced otherwise restricted domestic news coverage in South Korea.<sup>11</sup>

While this project might not have played a central role in South Korea's transition to democracy, it certainly played an important role in raising international awareness of the often violent repression of pro-democracy activists in South Korea and attracted the attention of politicians, high court judges, and associations overseas. The external pressure these international stakeholders then applied to the South Korean regime played a significant role in making South Korea's democratic transformation possible.

Australians also contributed to the continuation of the Letter's project, albeit indirectly. In 1975, Oh Jae-Shik, who was living in exile in Japan at that time, was seeking to renew his expired passport. The South Korean Embassy in Tokyo refused to reissue Oh's passport to force his return to South Korea, where he would likely have been promptly arrested. Around that time, three Australian missionaries – Reverends Dick Wootton, Stephen Lavender and John Brown – were active in South Korea. They were all involved in the labour rights movement through activities organised by the Yeongdeungpo Urban Industrial Mission Church in Seoul. Dick Wootton, who at that time was preparing to return to Australia after living in South Korea for about ten years, received a message from Oh about the refusal of the Embassy in Tokyo to renew his passport. On his return to Melbourne, Wootton did not waste time and immediately flew to Canberra, where he began to lobby several Federal politicians to assist Oh.

Astonishingly, in the space of less than one week, the Australian government officials were ready to grant Oh Australian citizenship and to issue him an Australian passport, which he would be able to collect from the Australian Embassy in Tokyo. In Oh's biography, he remarks how this was incredibly fast, particularly considering the technical limitations and information flow in the 1970s. Indeed, even in today's highly interlinked world, such applications generally take around 14 months.<sup>12</sup> The South Korean Embassy, upon hearing this, promptly renewed Oh's passport to avoid international embarrassment. Oh was thus able to stay in

Japan, continue his activism, and garner international support for the South Korean pro-democracy movement.

While the Australian Federal politicians showed incredible foresight in their support of the South Korean democratisation movement overseas, the Australian activists in South Korea did not go unpunished for their collaboration with South Korean pro-democracy activists. In 1978 Reverend Stephen Lavender was suddenly deported from South Korea without any official reason. Circumstances strongly imply, however, that his political activism with labour workers was the cause of his expulsion.<sup>13</sup>

Yet, the work of Wootton and his missionary colleagues facilitated the continuation of localised labour and democratisation activism. The activities of these predominantly South Korean-led groups, in turn, gained the attention of significant international actors, including politicians and human rights advocates in Australia. One notable individual was the Honourable Justice Michael Kirby. He was a judge in the Australian Federal Court during the 1980s and served as Justice of the High Court of Australia during the 1990s and 2000s. Justice Kirby actively engaged in an international campaign that would ultimately save the life of Kim Dae Jung, who would later become a democratically elected President in South Korea (1998-2003).

Kim Dae Jung was a prominent opposition leader in South Korea throughout the nation's pro-democracy struggle. Following repeated arrests during the 1970s for his open activism against the repressive Park Chung Hee government, he was again arrested in May 1980. Kim was accused of agitating protestors who took part in the Gwangju Uprising of 1980, which led to thousands of deaths at the hands of the South Korean military and was sentenced to death in September the same year. It was at this point that Justice Kirby actively lobbied with international human rights groups, such as the International Commission of Jurists, on Kim Dae Jung's behalf.<sup>14</sup> Following international campaigning, his death sentence was overturned in 1981. Kim Dae Jung later openly acknowledged the efforts of Justice Kirby and the vital role that he and other like-minded individuals played in saving not only his life but also those of many other political prisoners.<sup>15</sup> The appreciation was mutual, as the Hon Justice Kirby noted during a keynote speech at the October 2000 launch of the Monash University Castan Centre for Human Rights Law in Melbourne:

"...I have had the privilege to meet and work with some of the leaders of the struggle for human rights in Asia and the Pacific. Amongst the most notable of these is President Kim Dae Jung of the Republic of Korea."<sup>16</sup>

On 18 December 1997, Kim Dae Jung was elected the eighth President of South Korea and was sworn in on 25 February 1998. Approximately 19 months later, President Kim visited Australia, where he met with Justice Kirby at his office and where they had lunch. Eyewitness accounts describe how the two warmly shook hands with tears in their eyes, and President Kim thanking Justice Kirby for his support.

These two examples of seemingly incidental yet significant interaction between Australia and South Korea have had a demonstrably long-term and positive influence on the trajectory of the South Korea-Australia relationship. However, notwithstanding the potential significance that a better

understanding of such interactions will have on furthering this important bilateral relationship, this area of research remains largely unexplored. Further historical research on the role that Australian non-governmental actors such as missionaries and intellectuals played in supporting the South Korean pro-democracy movement will not only help to deepen our appreciation of the relationship between Australia and South Korea, but it will also help to deepen our understanding of Australia's historical interactions with its regional neighbours as well as to highlight the importance of history as a vehicle to further transnational diplomacy.

## Endnotes

- 1 Nami Kwon, 'Reflections of the Australian Missionaries and Their Descendants', Sydney, Australia, Christian Review (Sydney, Australia: Christian Review, October 28, 2010).
- 2 Seo Chung-seok, *Hanguk hyeondaesa 60-nyeon* (Seoul: Yeoksa Bipyongsosa, 2007).
- 3 Namhee Lee, *The Making of Minjung: Democracy and the Politics of Representation in South Korea* (Cornell University Press, 2009); Paul Y. Chang, 'Unintended Consequences of Repression: Alliance Formation in South Korea's Democracy Movement (1970-1979)', *Social Forces* 87, no. 2 (February 11, 2009): 651-77.
- 4 Chi Myeong-gwan (1924-), an academic, journalist and pro-democracy activist.
- 5 Oh Chae Shik (1933-2013), a peace activist who served as secretary of the Council of Churches in Asia during the 1970s.
- 6 Yasue Ryōsuke (1935-1998), chief editor of the well-known Japanese intellectual magazine, *Sekai*.
- 7 The author has identified some potential links between the Letters Project and Australian missionary activities and is currently conducting further research to verify.
- 8 Interview with Chi Myeong-gwan, Tokyo August 2015
- 9 Oh Chae-sik, *Naeye kkoteuro Dagaoneun hyeonjang: Oh Chae-shik hoegorok* (Seoul: Daehan Gidokkyo Seohoe, 2012), 202-3.
- 10 Itō Narihiko, 'Kimu dejun rachi jiken to nihon'noseiji', in *Kin Daichū to Nikkan kankei : minshu shugi to heiwa no Nikkan gendaishi*, ed. Ryu Sang-yeong, Wada Haruki, and Itō Narihiko (Ensei Daigaku Kin Daichū Toshokan, 2013).
- 11 Chi Myeong-gwan, *Kyōkaisen o koeru tabi: Chi Myeong-gwan jiden* (Tōkyō: Iwanami Shoten, 2005).
- 12 'Citizenship Processing Times', Australian Government, Department of Home Affairs, Immigration and Citizenship, (September 16, 2021), <https://immi.home-affairs.gov.au>.
- 13 Tom Ballantyne, 'Expelled Missionary Wants to Go Back', *Sydney Morning Herald*, June 27, 1978.
- 14 Stephen A Oxman, Otto Triffterer, and Francisco B Cruz, *South Korea Human Rights in the Emerging Politics - Report of an ICJ Mission from March 25 to April 12, 1987*, Geneva, Switzerland (Geneva, Switzerland: International Commission of Jurists, 1987), [www.icj.org](http://www.icj.org).
- 15 Interview with Australian diplomat (now retired) responsible for organising meetings during President Kim Dae Jung's visit. (May 2021).
- 16 Michael Kirby, 'Champions of Human Rights' (Launch of the Castan Centre for Human Rights Law, October 31, 2000).

# ABOUT THE KRC

KRC aims to provide strategic leadership for the development of research and pedagogical innovation on Korea on the west coast of Australia, and it was established with the financial support of a five-year, \$1.1 million Korean Studies Core Program grant by the Academy of Korean Studies (AKS-2020-OLU-20200039).

The Centre supports education programs for Korean Studies and promotes Korea-focused research, as well as engagement with industry and government actors.

The Centre objectives are to:

- Expand research outputs through increasing capacity, and through the establishment of a strategic Korea research 'collaboratory' based on the Associate Researcher model pioneered at UWA.
- Expand outward-facing engagement with industry and government actors and seek opportunities to build research collaborations and research-led policy recommendations.
- Establish the Centre as a hub for Korean Studies teaching and research in the Perth metropolitan area and Western Australia more broadly, and a centre for training future scholars in Korean Studies through strong focus on facilitating postgraduate and postdoctoral research opportunities.
- Foster engagement and collaborations with and disseminate Korea-knowledge to media, secondary schools, the business community and the government sector in Western Australia.
- Provide leadership in pedagogy for Korean Studies through employing a dedicated teaching fellow, expanding Korean Studies-specific course offerings, and professional-targeted microcredentials in particular, and promoting employability in Korea-related careers.







KOREA AUSTRALIA  
호주 한국

Korea Research Centre  
M257, The University of Western Australia  
35 Stirling Hwy, Crawley WA 6009, Australia

For all general enquiries:  
Email: [krc@uwa.edu.au](mailto:krc@uwa.edu.au)

## WITH SPECIAL THANKS AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF SUPPORT

This event was supported by the UWA Defence and Security Program and the Core University Program for Korean Studies through the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and Korean Studies Promotion Service of the Academy of Korean Studies (AKS-2020-OLU-20200039)



Australian Embassy  
Republic of Korea



Government of Western Australia  
Department of Jobs, Tourism, Science and Innovation



Australian Government  
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade



Australian Government  
Department of Defence



Korea  
Research  
Centre



UWA  
DEFENCE  
& SECURITY



THE UNIVERSITY OF  
WESTERN  
AUSTRALIA