Game theoretic analysis of sublicensing for PAL and GAA bands in spectrum access system

Wang, H; Dutkiewicz, E; Nguyen, D; Mueck, MD

Game theoretic analysis of sublicensing for PAL and GAA bands in spectrum access system

Wang, H Dutkiewicz, E

Nguyen, D

Mueck, MD

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Publication Type:: Conference Proceeding
Citation:: IEEE International Symposium on Personal, Indoor and Mobile Radio Communications, PIMRC, 2018, 2017-October pp. 1 - 5
Issue Date:: 2018-02-14

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Wang, H	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Dutkiewicz, E https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4268-9286	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Nguyen, D https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2659-8648	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Mueck, MD	en_US
dc.date.issued	2018-02-14	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	IEEE International Symposium on Personal, Indoor and Mobile Radio Communications, PIMRC, 2018, 2017-October pp. 1 - 5	en_US
dc.identifier.isbn	9781538635315	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/127135
dc.description.abstract	© 2017 IEEE. Motivated by recent efforts in enabling economic models for spectrum sharing systems, in particular, for the Spectrum Access System in the US, we propose a game theoretic analysis of sublicensing between two types of access methods in such system - PAL and GAA. The aim of this paper is to illustrate how the operators' strategies affect their own payoffs and the overall utility in the Sublicenseing Game in a spectrum sharing system. We consider the problem of spectrum sharing among multiple operators who have to pay for a temporary PAL sublicense with the exclusive right to the PAL band or stay in the GAA band and share the spectrum for free with other GAA users. We first formulate this scenario as a non-cooperative game, and then study the existence of a Nash equilibrium. Finally, to reduce the overall utility loss we let the spectrum sharing platform to coordinate individual operators by forming pair coalitions for them. According to our findings, when an operator has a large number of subscribers GAA band is the best response and a high PAL sublicense price holds back operators to access the PAL band. Additionally, making equal coalitions among operators can avoid overall utility loss.	en_US
dc.relation	http://purl.org/au-research/grants/arc/DE150101092
dc.relation.ispartof	IEEE International Symposium on Personal, Indoor and Mobile Radio Communications, PIMRC	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1109/PIMRC.2017.8292427	en_US
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
dc.title	Game theoretic analysis of sublicensing for PAL and GAA bands in spectrum access system	en_US
dc.type	Conference Proceeding
utslib.citation.volume	2017-October	en_US
utslib.for	0805 Distributed Computing	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology/School of Electrical and Data Engineering
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Strength - GBDTC - Global Big Data Technologies
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access	*
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US
pubs.volume	2017-October	en_US

Abstract:

© 2017 IEEE. Motivated by recent efforts in enabling economic models for spectrum sharing systems, in particular, for the Spectrum Access System in the US, we propose a game theoretic analysis of sublicensing between two types of access methods in such system - PAL and GAA. The aim of this paper is to illustrate how the operators' strategies affect their own payoffs and the overall utility in the Sublicenseing Game in a spectrum sharing system. We consider the problem of spectrum sharing among multiple operators who have to pay for a temporary PAL sublicense with the exclusive right to the PAL band or stay in the GAA band and share the spectrum for free with other GAA users. We first formulate this scenario as a non-cooperative game, and then study the existence of a Nash equilibrium. Finally, to reduce the overall utility loss we let the spectrum sharing platform to coordinate individual operators by forming pair coalitions for them. According to our findings, when an operator has a large number of subscribers GAA band is the best response and a high PAL sublicense price holds back operators to access the PAL band. Additionally, making equal coalitions among operators can avoid overall utility loss.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/127135