Coercive Investigation of Corporate Crime: What investigators say

Schofield-Georgeson, E

Coercive Investigation of Corporate Crime: What investigators say

Schofield-Georgeson, E

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Publisher:: University of New South Wales
Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: University of New South Wales Law Journal, 2020, 43, (4), pp. 1405-1433
Issue Date:: 2020-03-15

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Schofield-Georgeson, E https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1022-4844
dc.date.accessioned	2020-12-18T00:51:07Z
dc.date.available	2020-12-18T00:51:07Z
dc.date.issued	2020-03-15
dc.identifier.citation	University of New South Wales Law Journal, 2020, 43, (4), pp. 1405-1433
dc.identifier.issn	0313-0096
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/144821
dc.description.abstract	This study investigates the use of coercive investigation powers in the context of corporate crime, based on a series of interviews with former Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) enforcement officials and corporate lawyers. It argues that ASIC’s powers are well equipped to investigate corporate crime but that ASIC rarely exercises these powers. In this respect, the article draws similar conclusions to the recent Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services Industry, but delves further, revealing how coercive powers are used and why they are seldom exercised in corporate criminal investigations. In accounting for this institutional failure, this study implicates a neoliberal agenda of deregulation and austerity that has permitted the regulator to be ‘captured’ by wealthy and powerful regulatees. The analysis is informed by a critical regulation approach to corporate crime that explains corporate or ‘white collar’ crime and its enforcement through a sociological lens: as a result of unequal social relationships, primarily that of social class, that create disparities in legal and political power.
dc.language	en
dc.publisher	University of New South Wales
dc.relation.ispartof	University of New South Wales Law Journal
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subject	1801 Law
dc.title	Coercive Investigation of Corporate Crime: What investigators say
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	43
utslib.for	1801 Law
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Law
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
utslib.copyright.status	open_access	*
pubs.consider-herdc	true
dc.date.updated	2020-12-18T00:50:57Z
pubs.issue	4
pubs.publication-status	Published
pubs.volume	43
utslib.citation.issue	4

Abstract:

This study investigates the use of coercive investigation powers in the context of corporate crime, based on a series of interviews with former Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) enforcement officials and corporate lawyers. It argues that ASIC’s powers are well equipped to investigate corporate crime but that ASIC rarely exercises these powers. In this respect, the article draws similar conclusions to the recent Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services Industry, but delves further, revealing how coercive powers are used and why they are seldom exercised in corporate criminal investigations. In accounting for this institutional failure, this study implicates a neoliberal agenda of deregulation and austerity that has permitted the regulator to be ‘captured’ by wealthy and powerful regulatees. The analysis is informed by a critical regulation approach to corporate crime that explains corporate or ‘white collar’ crime and its enforcement through a sociological lens: as a result of unequal social relationships, primarily that of social class, that create disparities in legal and political power.

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10453/144821