Persuading to participate: Coordination on a standard

Balzer, B; Schneider, J

Persuading to participate: Coordination on a standard

Balzer, B

Schneider, J

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Publisher:: Elsevier BV
Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2021, 78, pp. 102764-102764
Issue Date:: 2021-09-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Balzer, B https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9508-8487
dc.contributor.author	Schneider, J
dc.date.accessioned	2021-12-22T04:08:32Z
dc.date.available	2021-12-22T04:08:32Z
dc.date.issued	2021-09-01
dc.identifier.citation	International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2021, 78, pp. 102764-102764
dc.identifier.issn	0167-7187
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/152463
dc.description.abstract	We study coordination among competitors in the shadow of a market mechanism. Our main example is standard setting: either firms coordinate through a standard-setting organization (SSO), or a market solution—a standards war—emerges. A firms veto to participate in the SSO triggers a standards war. Participation constraints are demanding, and the optimal SSO can involve on-path vetoes. We show that vetoes are effectively deterred if firms can (partially) release their private information to the public. We discuss several business practices that can serve as a signaling device to provide that information and to effectively ensure coordination.
dc.language	en
dc.publisher	Elsevier BV
dc.relation.ispartof	International Journal of Industrial Organization
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1016/j.ijindorg.2021.102764
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
dc.subject	1401 Economic Theory, 1402 Applied Economics, 1403 Econometrics
dc.subject.classification	Economics
dc.title	Persuading to participate: Coordination on a standard
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	78
utslib.for	1401 Economic Theory
utslib.for	1402 Applied Economics
utslib.for	1403 Econometrics
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business/Economics Discipline
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access	*
dc.date.updated	2021-12-22T04:08:31Z
pubs.publication-status	Published
pubs.volume	78

Abstract:

We study coordination among competitors in the shadow of a market mechanism. Our main example is standard setting: either firms coordinate through a standard-setting organization (SSO), or a market solution—a standards war—emerges. A firms veto to participate in the SSO triggers a standards war. Participation constraints are demanding, and the optimal SSO can involve on-path vetoes. We show that vetoes are effectively deterred if firms can (partially) release their private information to the public. We discuss several business practices that can serve as a signaling device to provide that information and to effectively ensure coordination.

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10453/152463