Corporate governance or globalization: What determines CEO compensation in China?

Li, D; Moshirian, F; Nguyen, P; Tan, L

Corporate governance or globalization: What determines CEO compensation in China?

Li, D Moshirian, F Nguyen, P Tan, L

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Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Research in International Business and Finance, 2007, 21 (1), pp. 32 - 49
Issue Date:: 2007-01-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Li, D	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Moshirian, F	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Nguyen, P	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Tan, L	en_US
dc.date.issued	2007-01-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Research in International Business and Finance, 2007, 21 (1), pp. 32 - 49	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	0275-5319	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/15769
dc.description.abstract	This paper examines the relationship between corporate governance and CEO compensation in China. In contrast to results derived from U.S. data, we find little evidence that Chinese CEOs take advantage of weaker board structures or less demanding shareholders to extract higher compensation packages. Instead, our results lend support to the view that the increasingly global managerial labor market and compensation standards have a greater impact on CEO pay level. Our study suggests that CEOs in developing economies like China, in our case, benefit more from their degree of exposure to these changes than from corporate governance imperfections. © 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	Research in International Business and Finance	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1016/j.ribaf.2005.12.003	en_US
dc.subject.classification	Finance	en_US
dc.title	Corporate governance or globalization: What determines CEO compensation in China?	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	1	en_US
utslib.citation.volume	21	en_US
utslib.for	1502 Banking, Finance and Investment	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Strength - CCG - Centre for Corporate Governance
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access
pubs.issue	1	en_US
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US
pubs.volume	21	en_US

Abstract:

This paper examines the relationship between corporate governance and CEO compensation in China. In contrast to results derived from U.S. data, we find little evidence that Chinese CEOs take advantage of weaker board structures or less demanding shareholders to extract higher compensation packages. Instead, our results lend support to the view that the increasingly global managerial labor market and compensation standards have a greater impact on CEO pay level. Our study suggests that CEOs in developing economies like China, in our case, benefit more from their degree of exposure to these changes than from corporate governance imperfections. © 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10453/15769