Who benefits from corporate social responsibility? Reciprocity in the presence of social incentives and self-selection

Briscese, G; Feltovich, N; Slonim, RL

Who benefits from corporate social responsibility? Reciprocity in the presence of social incentives and self-selection

Briscese, G Feltovich, N Slonim, RL

Permalink

Publisher:: Elsevier BV
Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Games and Economic Behavior, 2021, 126, pp. 288-304
Issue Date:: 2021-03-01

Closed Access

	Filename	Description	Size
	1-s2.0-S0899825621000099-main.pdf	Published version	1.12 MB	Adobe PDF	View/Open

Copyright Clearance Process

Recently Added
In Progress
Closed Access

This item is closed access and not available.

Full metadata record

Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Briscese, G
dc.contributor.author	Feltovich, N
dc.contributor.author	Slonim, RL
dc.date.accessioned	2022-07-22T02:06:00Z
dc.date.available	2022-07-22T02:06:00Z
dc.date.issued	2021-03-01
dc.identifier.citation	Games and Economic Behavior, 2021, 126, pp. 288-304
dc.identifier.issn	0899-8256
dc.identifier.issn	1090-2473
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/159107
dc.description.abstract	Firms can donate a share of profits to charity as a form of corporate social responsibility (CSR). Recent experiments have found that such initiatives can induce higher effort by workers, generating benefits for both sides of the labour market. We design a novel version of the gift-exchange game to account for self-selection, and find that wages remain the most effective incentive to attract and motivate workers, with corporate donations playing a smaller role than previously suggested. We also show that firms substitute donations to charity with lower wage offers, keeping their profits constant but reducing workers' earnings. Initiatives of corporate philanthropy can thus be marginally beneficial for firms, but considerably costly for workers.
dc.language	en
dc.publisher	Elsevier BV
dc.relation.ispartof	Games and Economic Behavior
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1016/j.geb.2021.01.005
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
dc.subject	1401 Economic Theory, 1402 Applied Economics
dc.subject.classification	Economic Theory
dc.title	Who benefits from corporate social responsibility? Reciprocity in the presence of social incentives and self-selection
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	126
utslib.for	1401 Economic Theory
utslib.for	1402 Applied Economics
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business/Economics Discipline
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access	*
dc.date.updated	2022-07-22T02:05:59Z
pubs.publication-status	Published
pubs.volume	126

Abstract:

Firms can donate a share of profits to charity as a form of corporate social responsibility (CSR). Recent experiments have found that such initiatives can induce higher effort by workers, generating benefits for both sides of the labour market. We design a novel version of the gift-exchange game to account for self-selection, and find that wages remain the most effective incentive to attract and motivate workers, with corporate donations playing a smaller role than previously suggested. We also show that firms substitute donations to charity with lower wage offers, keeping their profits constant but reducing workers' earnings. Initiatives of corporate philanthropy can thus be marginally beneficial for firms, but considerably costly for workers.

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10453/159107