Too big to prevail: The paradox of power in coalition formation

Ke, C; Morath, F; Newell, A; Page, L

Too big to prevail: The paradox of power in coalition formation

Ke, C Morath, F Newell, A Page, L

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Publisher:: Elsevier
Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Games and Economic Behavior, 2022, 135, pp. 394-410
Issue Date:: 2022-09-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Ke, C
dc.contributor.author	Morath, F
dc.contributor.author	Newell, A
dc.contributor.author	Page, L https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6020-9733
dc.date.accessioned	2022-11-29T04:27:41Z
dc.date.available	2022-11-29T04:27:41Z
dc.date.issued	2022-09-01
dc.identifier.citation	Games and Economic Behavior, 2022, 135, pp. 394-410
dc.identifier.issn	0899-8256
dc.identifier.issn	1090-2473
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/163814
dc.description.abstract	In standard coalition games, players try to form a coalition to secure a prize and a coalition agreement specifies how the prize is to be split among its members. However, in practical situations where coalitions are formed, the actual split of the prize often takes place after the coalition formation stage. This creates the possibility for some players to ask for a renegotiation of the initial split. We predict that, in such situations, a player can suffer from being “too strong”. Our experimental results confirm that, when the actual split of the prize is delayed, a player's strength can turn into a strategic disadvantage: a greater voting power in forming a winning coalition is undermined by the threat of being overly powerful when a split is determined. This result is relevant to many real world situations where “too strong” players find it paradoxically hard to form coalitions with weaker players.
dc.language	en
dc.publisher	Elsevier
dc.relation.ispartof	Games and Economic Behavior
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1016/j.geb.2022.04.006
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
dc.subject	1401 Economic Theory, 1402 Applied Economics
dc.subject.classification	Economic Theory
dc.title	Too big to prevail: The paradox of power in coalition formation
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	135
utslib.for	1401 Economic Theory
utslib.for	1402 Applied Economics
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business/Economics Discipline
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access	*
pubs.consider-herdc	false
dc.date.updated	2022-11-29T04:27:40Z
pubs.publication-status	Published
pubs.volume	135

Abstract:

In standard coalition games, players try to form a coalition to secure a prize and a coalition agreement specifies how the prize is to be split among its members. However, in practical situations where coalitions are formed, the actual split of the prize often takes place after the coalition formation stage. This creates the possibility for some players to ask for a renegotiation of the initial split. We predict that, in such situations, a player can suffer from being “too strong”. Our experimental results confirm that, when the actual split of the prize is delayed, a player's strength can turn into a strategic disadvantage: a greater voting power in forming a winning coalition is undermined by the threat of being overly powerful when a split is determined. This result is relevant to many real world situations where “too strong” players find it paradoxically hard to form coalitions with weaker players.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/163814