Expertise, gender, and equilibrium play

Gauriot, R; Page, L; Wooders, J

Expertise, gender, and equilibrium play

Gauriot, R Page, L Wooders, J

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Publisher:: The Econometric Society
Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Quantitative Economics, 2023, 14, (3), pp. 981-1020
Issue Date:: 2023-07-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Gauriot, R
dc.contributor.author	Page, L
dc.contributor.author	Wooders, J https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4206-7137
dc.date.accessioned	2024-03-04T21:47:08Z
dc.date.available	2024-03-04T21:47:08Z
dc.date.issued	2023-07-01
dc.identifier.citation	Quantitative Economics, 2023, 14, (3), pp. 981-1020
dc.identifier.issn	1759-7323
dc.identifier.issn	1759-7331
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/176088
dc.description.abstract	Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is the cornerstone of our understanding of strategic situations that require decision makers to be unpredictable. Using data from nearly half a million serves over 3000 tennis matches, and data on player rankings from the ATP and WTA, we examine whether the behavior of professional tennis players is consistent with equilibrium. We find that win rates conform remarkably closely to the theory for men, but conform somewhat less neatly for women. We show that the behavior in the field of more highly ranked (i.e., better) players conforms more closely to theory. We show that the statistical tests used in the prior related literature are not valid for large samples like ours; we develop a novel statistical test that is valid and show, via Monte Carlo simulations, that it is more powerful against the alternative that receivers follows a nonequilibrium mixture.
dc.language	en
dc.publisher	The Econometric Society
dc.relation	http://purl.org/au-research/grants/arc/DP140103566
dc.relation	http://purl.org/au-research/grants/arc/DP150101307
dc.relation.ispartof	Quantitative Economics
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.3982/QE1563
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subject	1403 Econometrics
dc.subject.classification	3801 Applied economics
dc.subject.classification	3802 Econometrics
dc.title	Expertise, gender, and equilibrium play
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	14
utslib.for	1403 Econometrics
pubs.organisational-group	University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
pubs.organisational-group	University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business/Economics Discipline
utslib.copyright.status	open_access	*
dc.date.updated	2024-03-04T21:47:06Z
pubs.issue	3
pubs.publication-status	Published
pubs.volume	14
utslib.citation.issue	3

Abstract:

Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is the cornerstone of our understanding of strategic situations that require decision makers to be unpredictable. Using data from nearly half a million serves over 3000 tennis matches, and data on player rankings from the ATP and WTA, we examine whether the behavior of professional tennis players is consistent with equilibrium. We find that win rates conform remarkably closely to the theory for men, but conform somewhat less neatly for women. We show that the behavior in the field of more highly ranked (i.e., better) players conforms more closely to theory. We show that the statistical tests used in the prior related literature are not valid for large samples like ours; we develop a novel statistical test that is valid and show, via Monte Carlo simulations, that it is more powerful against the alternative that receivers follows a nonequilibrium mixture.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/176088