A ‘Weak(ened)’ Quad in the Indo-Pacific: What Do Its Strategic Narratives Tell Us?

Chan, L-H; Lee, PK

A ‘Weak(ened)’ Quad in the Indo-Pacific: What Do Its Strategic Narratives Tell Us?

Chan, L-H Lee, PK

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Publisher:: Routledge
Publication Type:: Chapter
Citation:: China-US Great-Power Rivalry: The Competitive Dynamics of Order-Building in the Indo-Pacific, 2024, 1st, pp. 195-214
Issue Date:: 2024-05-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Chan, L-H
dc.contributor.author	Lee, PK
dc.contributor.editor	Chan, L-H
dc.contributor.editor	Lee, PK
dc.date.accessioned	2024-06-03T04:43:31Z
dc.date.available	2024-06-03T04:43:31Z
dc.date.issued	2024-05-01
dc.identifier.citation	China-US Great-Power Rivalry: The Competitive Dynamics of Order-Building in the Indo-Pacific, 2024, 1st, pp. 195-214
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/179372
dc.description.abstract	By looking at the Quad’s strategic narratives, this chapter examines whether the Quad is a ‘weakened’ grouping as a result of the war in Ukraine which started in February 2022 and of the assumption of power by centre-left the Australian Labor Party (ALP) in the following May or it has been a ‘weak’ grouping since its rebirth in 2017. We argue that the Quad is not efficacious because although it gives itself an identity as ‘a force of good’ for regional peace and security by both opposing any unilateral move to change the regional status quo and by vowing to bring ‘concrete results’ to regional states, it is reticent about what policy measures the four states are going to take collectively to preserve the status quo. Instead, to highlight their goal to deliver tangible and concrete results, they primarily focus on addressing non-traditional security issues in the region. The strategic narratives tell us that the Quad is not weakened by the policy of the Australian left-leaning federal government nor India’s pro-Russia stance with regard to the war in Ukraine, but, rather, by their lack of consensus or a ‘united front’ on counterbalancing China militarily throughout the Indo-Pacific. India is averse to all forms of hierarchical order. The ‘liberal’ order, for Indians, is only the lesser of two evils, namely Pax Sinica and Pax Americana. India is willing to cooperate with other three states only when its immediate interests in the Himalayas and the Indian Ocean region are under threats from China. The strategic narrative projected by the US that would bind India to the Quad project is inherently limited in ambitions and achievements.
dc.format.extent	10
dc.language	en
dc.publisher	Routledge
dc.relation.ispartof	China-US Great-Power Rivalry: The Competitive Dynamics of Order-Building in the Indo-Pacific
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Politics in Asia
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
dc.title	A ‘Weak(ened)’ Quad in the Indo-Pacific: What Do Its Strategic Narratives Tell Us?
dc.type	Chapter
utslib.citation.edition	1st
pubs.organisational-group	University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
pubs.organisational-group	University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences/Social and Political Sciences Program
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access	*
pubs.consider-herdc	true
dc.date.updated	2024-06-03T04:43:29Z
pubs.edition	1st
pubs.place-of-publication	Oxon & New York
pubs.publication-status	Published
dc.location	Oxon & New York

Abstract:

By looking at the Quad’s strategic narratives, this chapter examines whether the Quad is a ‘weakened’ grouping as a result of the war in Ukraine which started in February 2022 and of the assumption of power by centre-left the Australian Labor Party (ALP) in the following May or it has been a ‘weak’ grouping since its rebirth in 2017. We argue that the Quad is not efficacious because although it gives itself an identity as ‘a force of good’ for regional peace and security by both opposing any unilateral move to change the regional status quo and by vowing to bring ‘concrete results’ to regional states, it is reticent about what policy measures the four states are going to take collectively to preserve the status quo. Instead, to highlight their goal to deliver tangible and concrete results, they primarily focus on addressing non-traditional security issues in the region. The strategic narratives tell us that the Quad is not weakened by the policy of the Australian left-leaning federal government nor India’s pro-Russia stance with regard to the war in Ukraine, but, rather, by their lack of consensus or a ‘united front’ on counterbalancing China militarily throughout the Indo-Pacific. India is averse to all forms of hierarchical order. The ‘liberal’ order, for Indians, is only the lesser of two evils, namely Pax Sinica and Pax Americana. India is willing to cooperate with other three states only when its immediate interests in the Himalayas and the Indian Ocean region are under threats from China. The strategic narrative projected by the US that would bind India to the Quad project is inherently limited in ambitions and achievements.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/179372