Reconceptualizing Autonomy for Bioethics.

Dive, L; Newson, AJ

Reconceptualizing Autonomy for Bioethics.

Dive, L

Newson, AJ

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Publisher:: JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV PRESS
Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Kennedy Inst Ethics J, 2018, 28, (2), pp. 171-203
Issue Date:: 2018

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Dive, L https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6655-5138
dc.contributor.author	Newson, AJ
dc.date.accessioned	2024-12-17T01:27:45Z
dc.date.available	2024-12-17T01:27:45Z
dc.date.issued	2018
dc.identifier.citation	Kennedy Inst Ethics J, 2018, 28, (2), pp. 171-203
dc.identifier.issn	1054-6863
dc.identifier.issn	1086-3249
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/182636
dc.description.abstract	Autonomy plays a central role in bioethics, but there is no consensus as to how we should understand this concept. This paper critically considers three different conceptions of autonomy: the default conception prevalent in bioethics literature; a broader procedural account of autonomy drawing on moral philosophical approaches; and a substantive, perfectionist account. Building on Rebecca Walker's critique of the default conception of autonomy, we will argue that a substantive, perfectionist approach both fulfils Walker's criteria for a conception of autonomy in bioethics and lends itself to application in practical scenarios. In so doing, we draw on scenarios from genomic medicine to show that a substantive, perfectionist approach not only offers a more conceptually adequate understanding of autonomy in more complex cases, but also lends itself to practical application by helping health professionals identify how they can maximize people's capacity to exercise their autonomy.
dc.format	Print
dc.language	eng
dc.publisher	JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV PRESS
dc.relation.ispartof	Kennedy Inst Ethics J
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1353/ken.2018.0013
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subject	2201 Applied Ethics, 2203 Philosophy
dc.subject.classification	Applied Ethics
dc.subject.classification	5001 Applied ethics
dc.subject.classification	5003 Philosophy
dc.subject.mesh	Bioethical Issues
dc.subject.mesh	Humans
dc.subject.mesh	Personal Autonomy
dc.subject.mesh	Humans
dc.subject.mesh	Personal Autonomy
dc.subject.mesh	Bioethical Issues
dc.subject.mesh	Bioethical Issues
dc.subject.mesh	Humans
dc.subject.mesh	Personal Autonomy
dc.title	Reconceptualizing Autonomy for Bioethics.
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	28
utslib.location.activity	United States
utslib.for	2201 Applied Ethics
utslib.for	2203 Philosophy
pubs.organisational-group	University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Health
pubs.organisational-group	University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Health/Graduate School of Health
pubs.organisational-group	University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Health/Graduate School of Health/GSH.Genetic Counselling
utslib.copyright.status	open_access	*
dc.date.updated	2024-12-17T01:27:43Z
pubs.issue	2
pubs.publication-status	Published
pubs.volume	28
utslib.citation.issue	2

Abstract:

Autonomy plays a central role in bioethics, but there is no consensus as to how we should understand this concept. This paper critically considers three different conceptions of autonomy: the default conception prevalent in bioethics literature; a broader procedural account of autonomy drawing on moral philosophical approaches; and a substantive, perfectionist account. Building on Rebecca Walker's critique of the default conception of autonomy, we will argue that a substantive, perfectionist approach both fulfils Walker's criteria for a conception of autonomy in bioethics and lends itself to application in practical scenarios. In so doing, we draw on scenarios from genomic medicine to show that a substantive, perfectionist approach not only offers a more conceptually adequate understanding of autonomy in more complex cases, but also lends itself to practical application by helping health professionals identify how they can maximize people's capacity to exercise their autonomy.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/182636