Judging children's best interests: Centring bodily integrity

Fox, M; Thomson, M

Judging children's best interests: Centring bodily integrity

Fox, M Thomson, M

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Publisher:: SAGE Publications
Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Clinical Ethics, 2024, 19, (4), pp. 341-348
Issue Date:: 2024-12

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Fox, M
dc.contributor.author	Thomson, M https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1570-2481
dc.date.accessioned	2025-01-07T04:42:17Z
dc.date.available	2025-01-07T04:42:17Z
dc.date.issued	2024-12
dc.identifier.citation	Clinical Ethics, 2024, 19, (4), pp. 341-348
dc.identifier.issn	1477-7509
dc.identifier.issn	1758-101X
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/183086
dc.description.abstract	<jats:p> This article addresses how bodily integrity has been mobilised in the context of genital cutting of male infants and the extent to which the concept is taken into account in legal decision-making in the United Kingdom. While bioethicists have debated whether interventions on children's bodies are more appropriately determined on the basis of hypothetical consent or in the child's best interest, it is clear that in law the relevant test is whether interventions are in the child's best interest. As the issue of nonconsensual genital cutting of infants has become more contested, courts have been asked to adjudicate on the best interests of infants in situations where their caregivers disagree about procedures. Although this body of jurisprudence remains (surprisingly) small, in this article we argue that, while there are now discernible trends in such cases (e.g. deferring decision-making until the child has the requisite capacity to decide, engaging with certain human rights norms), too often judicial reasoning about a child's best interests remains largely empty of reasoned content, and in certain respects is regressing. Using the recent case of Re P to exemplify this logic, and drawing on our previous work advocating the value of embodied integrity, we argue that judges should adopt a more substantive framework of values in judging the child's corporeal and other interests in such cases. This would move best interests assessments beyond a mere formalistic exercise and lead to better reasoned legal judgements. </jats:p>
dc.language	en
dc.publisher	SAGE Publications
dc.relation.ispartof	Clinical Ethics
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1177/14777509241291708
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights	Authors: • Fox, Marie; • Thomson, Michael Article Title: Judging children's best interests: Centring bodily integrity Journal Title: Clinical Ethics DATE: Copyright © 2024 Sage Publications https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/14777509241291708
dc.subject.classification	5001 Applied ethics
dc.title	Judging children's best interests: Centring bodily integrity
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	19
pubs.organisational-group	University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Law
utslib.copyright.status	open_access	*
dc.date.updated	2025-01-07T04:42:16Z
pubs.issue	4
pubs.publication-status	Published
pubs.volume	19
utslib.citation.issue	4

Abstract:

This article addresses how bodily integrity has been mobilised in the context of genital cutting of male infants and the extent to which the concept is taken into account in legal decision-making in the United Kingdom. While bioethicists have debated whether interventions on children's bodies are more appropriately determined on the basis of hypothetical consent or in the child's best interest, it is clear that in law the relevant test is whether interventions are in the child's best interest. As the issue of nonconsensual genital cutting of infants has become more contested, courts have been asked to adjudicate on the best interests of infants in situations where their caregivers disagree about procedures. Although this body of jurisprudence remains (surprisingly) small, in this article we argue that, while there are now discernible trends in such cases (e.g. deferring decision-making until the child has the requisite capacity to decide, engaging with certain human rights norms), too often judicial reasoning about a child's best interests remains largely empty of reasoned content, and in certain respects is regressing. Using the recent case of Re P to exemplify this logic, and drawing on our previous work advocating the value of embodied integrity, we argue that judges should adopt a more substantive framework of values in judging the child's corporeal and other interests in such cases. This would move best interests assessments beyond a mere formalistic exercise and lead to better reasoned legal judgements.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/183086