An agents establishes trust with equitable information revelation
- Publisher:
- IEEE
- Publication Type:
- Conference Proceeding
- Citation:
- Proceedings of 2005 IEEE 2Nd Symposium On Multi-Agent Security And Survivability, 2005, pp. 66 - 74
- Issue Date:
- 2005-01
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| Filename | Description | Size | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2005001002.pdf | 372.75 kB |
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Negotiation is an information exchange process as well as an offer exchange process. Theories of competitive negotiation are typically founded on game theory where the agent's utility function is the focus. If an agent is uncertain of the integrity of its information then it may not know its utility with certainty. Here what an agent knows and how certain it is of what it knows are modelled using tools from information theory that are applied to value information. An agent attempts to instil a sense trust in its opponent by revealing information of comparable 'value' in its responses to that which it has received. Each proposal and claim exchanged reveals valuable information about the sender's position. A negotiation may break down if an agent believes that its opponent is not playing fairly. The agent aims to give the impression of fair play by responding with comparable information revelation whilst playing strategically to influence its opponent's preferences with claims. The agent makes no assumptions about the internals of its opponent, including her motivations, logic, and whether she is conscious of a utility function
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