On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation

Gershkov, A; Goeree, JK; Kushnir, A; Moldovanu, B; Shi, X

On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation

Gershkov, A Goeree, JK

Kushnir, A Moldovanu, B Shi, X

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Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Econometrica, 2013, 81 (1), pp. 197 - 220
Issue Date:: 2013-01-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Gershkov, A	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Goeree, JK https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9876-3425	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Kushnir, A	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Moldovanu, B	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Shi, X	en_US
dc.date.issued	2013-01-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Econometrica, 2013, 81 (1), pp. 197 - 220	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	0012-9682	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/27834
dc.description.abstract	© 2013 The Econometric Society. We consider a standard social choice environment with linear utilities and independent, one-dimensional, private types. We prove that for any Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism there exists an equivalent dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism that delivers the same interim expected utilities for all agents and the same ex ante expected social surplus. The short proof is based on an extension of an elegant result due to Gutmann, Kemperman, Reeds, and Shepp (1991). We also show that the equivalence between Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation generally breaks down when the main assumptions underlying the social choice model are relaxed or when the equivalence concept is strengthened to apply to interim expected allocations.	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	Econometrica	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.3982/ECTA10592	en_US
dc.subject.classification	Econometrics	en_US
dc.title	On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	1	en_US
utslib.citation.volume	81	en_US
utslib.for	1401 Economic Theory	en_US
utslib.for	1402 Applied Economics	en_US
utslib.for	1403 Econometrics	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
utslib.copyright.status	open_access
pubs.issue	1	en_US
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US
pubs.volume	81	en_US

Abstract:

© 2013 The Econometric Society. We consider a standard social choice environment with linear utilities and independent, one-dimensional, private types. We prove that for any Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism there exists an equivalent dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism that delivers the same interim expected utilities for all agents and the same ex ante expected social surplus. The short proof is based on an extension of an elegant result due to Gutmann, Kemperman, Reeds, and Shepp (1991). We also show that the equivalence between Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation generally breaks down when the main assumptions underlying the social choice model are relaxed or when the equivalence concept is strengthened to apply to interim expected allocations.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/27834