Quantum information-flow security: Noninterference and access control

Ying, M; Feng, Y; Yu, N

Quantum information-flow security: Noninterference and access control

Ying, M

Feng, Y

Yu, N

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Publication Type:: Conference Proceeding
Citation:: Proceedings of the Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 2013, pp. 130 - 144
Issue Date:: 2013-10-09

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Ying, M https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4847-702X	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Feng, Y https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3097-3896	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Yu, N https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1188-3032	en_US
dc.date.issued	2013-10-09	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Proceedings of the Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 2013, pp. 130 - 144	en_US
dc.identifier.isbn	9780769550312	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	1063-6900	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/28332
dc.description.abstract	Quantum cryptography has been extensively studied in the last twenty years, but information-flow security of quantum computing and communication systems has been almost untouched in the previous research. Due to the essential difference between classical and quantum systems, formal methods developed for classical systems, including probabilistic systems, cannot be directly applied to quantum systems. This paper defines an automata model in which we can rigorously reason about information-flow security of quantum systems. The model is a quantum generalisation of Goguen and Meseguer's noninterference. The unwinding proof technique for quantum noninterference is developed, and a certain compositionality of security for quantum systems is established. The proposed formalism is then used to prove security of access control in quantum systems. © 2013 Authors, as per new IEEE copyright agreement.	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	Proceedings of the Computer Security Foundations Workshop	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1109/CSF.2013.16	en_US
dc.title	Quantum information-flow security: Noninterference and access control	en_US
dc.type	Conference Proceeding
utslib.for	0801 Artificial Intelligence and Image Processing	en_US
dc.location.activity	Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana, USA	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Strength - QSI - Centre for Quantum Software and Information
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US

Abstract:

Quantum cryptography has been extensively studied in the last twenty years, but information-flow security of quantum computing and communication systems has been almost untouched in the previous research. Due to the essential difference between classical and quantum systems, formal methods developed for classical systems, including probabilistic systems, cannot be directly applied to quantum systems. This paper defines an automata model in which we can rigorously reason about information-flow security of quantum systems. The model is a quantum generalisation of Goguen and Meseguer's noninterference. The unwinding proof technique for quantum noninterference is developed, and a certain compositionality of security for quantum systems is established. The proposed formalism is then used to prove security of access control in quantum systems. © 2013 Authors, as per new IEEE copyright agreement.

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10453/28332