Shareholder say on pay and CEO compensation: three strikes and the board is out

Grosse, M; Kean, S; Scott, T

Shareholder say on pay and CEO compensation: three strikes and the board is out

Grosse, M

Kean, S Scott, T

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Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Accounting and Finance, 2017, 57 (3), pp. 701 - 725
Issue Date:: 2017-09-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Grosse, M https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9156-4351	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Kean, S	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Scott, T https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8694-6344	en_US
dc.date.available	2020-05-25T19:12:38Z
dc.date.issued	2017-09-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Accounting and Finance, 2017, 57 (3), pp. 701 - 725	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	0810-5391	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/40467
dc.description.abstract	© 2015 AFAANZ From 2011 in Australia, if over 25% of shareholders vote against a non-binding remuneration resolution, firms are awarded a ‘strike’. We examine 237 firms that receive a strike relative to matched firms, and find no association with any measure of CEO pay. However, we do find that strike firms have higher book-to-market and leverage ratios, suggesting that the remuneration vote is not used to target excessive pay. We also find that firms respond to a strike by decreasing the discretionary bonus component of CEO pay by 57.10% more than non-strike firms and increasing their remuneration disclosure by 10.95%.	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	Accounting and Finance	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1111/acfi.12176	en_US
dc.subject.classification	Accounting	en_US
dc.title	Shareholder say on pay and CEO compensation: three strikes and the board is out	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	3	en_US
utslib.citation.volume	57	en_US
utslib.for	1501 Accounting, Auditing and Accountability	en_US
utslib.for	1502 Banking, Finance and Investment	en_US
utslib.for	1402 Applied Economics	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business/Accounting Discipline
utslib.copyright.status	open_access
pubs.issue	3	en_US
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US
pubs.volume	57	en_US

Abstract:

© 2015 AFAANZ From 2011 in Australia, if over 25% of shareholders vote against a non-binding remuneration resolution, firms are awarded a ‘strike’. We examine 237 firms that receive a strike relative to matched firms, and find no association with any measure of CEO pay. However, we do find that strike firms have higher book-to-market and leverage ratios, suggesting that the remuneration vote is not used to target excessive pay. We also find that firms respond to a strike by decreasing the discretionary bonus component of CEO pay by 57.10% more than non-strike firms and increasing their remuneration disclosure by 10.95%.

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10453/40467