Group versus individual compensation schemes for senior executives and firm performance: Some evidence based on archival data

Brown, PJ; Matolcsy, Z; Wells, P

Group versus individual compensation schemes for senior executives and firm performance: Some evidence based on archival data

Brown, PJ

Matolcsy, Z

Wells, P

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Publication Type:: Journal Article
Citation:: Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, 2014, 10 (2), pp. 100 - 114
Issue Date:: 2014-01-01

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Brown, PJ https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8603-0280	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Matolcsy, Z https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6566-5079	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Wells, P https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6822-4826	en_US
dc.date.issued	2014-01-01	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, 2014, 10 (2), pp. 100 - 114	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	1815-5669	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/41406
dc.description.abstract	The objectives of this paper are (i) to provide evidence on the association between the choice of group versus individual compensation schemes for senior executives and firm characteristics, and (ii) to provide evidence on the economic consequences of adopting a particular compensation scheme. Our key findings based on 2517 firm years for the period of 2001-2010 show that on average, the choice between group or individual compensation schemes for senior executive compensation schemes are consistent with a firm's economic characteristics and on average, the choice of compensation schemes does not affect subsequent firm performance. However, we find some evidence that firms that adopt compensation schemes inconsistent with their economic characteristics have lower subsequent performance. Our findings are robust to a number of sensitivity tests. © 2014 Elsevier Ltd.	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics	en_US
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1016/j.jcae.2014.05.002	en_US
dc.title	Group versus individual compensation schemes for senior executives and firm performance: Some evidence based on archival data	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article
utslib.citation.volume	2	en_US
utslib.citation.volume	10	en_US
utslib.for	1501 Accounting, Auditing and Accountability	en_US
utslib.for	1402 Applied Economics	en_US
utslib.for	1502 Banking, Finance and Investment	en_US
pubs.embargo.period	Not known	en_US
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Business/Accounting Discipline
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Transdisciplinary Innovation
utslib.copyright.status	closed_access
pubs.issue	2	en_US
pubs.publication-status	Published	en_US
pubs.volume	10	en_US

Abstract:

The objectives of this paper are (i) to provide evidence on the association between the choice of group versus individual compensation schemes for senior executives and firm characteristics, and (ii) to provide evidence on the economic consequences of adopting a particular compensation scheme. Our key findings based on 2517 firm years for the period of 2001-2010 show that on average, the choice between group or individual compensation schemes for senior executive compensation schemes are consistent with a firm's economic characteristics and on average, the choice of compensation schemes does not affect subsequent firm performance. However, we find some evidence that firms that adopt compensation schemes inconsistent with their economic characteristics have lower subsequent performance. Our findings are robust to a number of sensitivity tests. © 2014 Elsevier Ltd.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/41406