Common Agency-Based Economic Model for Energy Contract in Electric Vehicle Networks

Saputra, YM; Nguyen, DN; Hoang, DT; Dutkiewicz, E; Mueck, MD

Common Agency-Based Economic Model for Energy Contract in Electric Vehicle Networks

Saputra, YM Nguyen, DN Hoang, DT Dutkiewicz, E

Mueck, MD

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Publisher:: IEEE
Publication Type:: Conference Proceeding
Citation:: 2020 IEEE Global Communications Conference, GLOBECOM 2020 - Proceedings, 2021, 00, pp. 1-6
Issue Date:: 2021

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Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Saputra, YM
dc.contributor.author	Nguyen, DN
dc.contributor.author	Hoang, DT
dc.contributor.author	Dutkiewicz, E https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4268-9286
dc.contributor.author	Mueck, MD
dc.date	2020-12-07
dc.date.accessioned	2021-04-26T01:06:47Z
dc.date.available	2021-04-26T01:06:47Z
dc.date.issued	2021
dc.identifier.citation	2020 IEEE Global Communications Conference, GLOBECOM 2020 - Proceedings, 2021, 00, pp. 1-6
dc.identifier.isbn	9781728182988
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10453/148350
dc.description.abstract	The rapid adoption of electric or hybrid vehicles (EVs) has called for wide deployment of charging stations. These stations can be launched/owned by different owners, referred to as charging station providers (CSPs), which make energy contracts with a smart grid provider (SGP). However, there exists a shortage of mutual economic strategy between the SGP and CSPs in an energy request/transfer competition due to the selfish nature among them. In this paper, we propose an economic model leveraging a multi-principal single-agent (referred to as common agency) contract policy, aiming at maximizing the utilities of multiple CSPs while optimizing the utility of the SGP in an EV network. In particular, we first develop the common agency-based contract problem as a non-cooperative energy contract optimization problem, in which each CSP can maximize its utility given the common constraints from the SGP and the contracts of other CSPs. To deal with this problem, we develop an iterative energy contract algorithm to find an equilibrium contract solution where the contracts from the CSPs can produce maximum utilities of the CSPs and satisfy the constraints of the SGP. Through numerical results, we show that our proposed model can improve the social welfare of the EV network up to 54% and the utilities of CSPs up to 60% compared with the baseline method in which each CSP obtains the amount of energy that is proportional to its energy request.
dc.language	en
dc.publisher	IEEE
dc.relation	Intel Corporation
dc.relation.ispartof	2020 IEEE Global Communications Conference, GLOBECOM 2020 - Proceedings
dc.relation.ispartof	IEEE Global Communications Conference
dc.relation.isbasedon	10.1109/GLOBECOM42002.2020.9322376
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccess
dc.title	Common Agency-Based Economic Model for Energy Contract in Electric Vehicle Networks
dc.type	Conference Proceeding
utslib.citation.volume	00
utslib.location.activity	Taipei, Taiwan
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Strength - GBDTC - Global Big Data Technologies
pubs.organisational-group	/University of Technology Sydney/Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology/School of Electrical and Data Engineering
utslib.copyright.status	open_access	*
pubs.consider-herdc	false
utslib.copyright.embargo	2023-01-25T00:00:00+1000Z
dc.date.updated	2021-04-26T01:06:46Z
pubs.finish-date	2020-12-11
pubs.place-of-publication	Piscataway, USA
pubs.publication-status	Published
pubs.start-date	2020-12-07
pubs.volume	00
dc.location	Piscataway, USA

Abstract:

The rapid adoption of electric or hybrid vehicles (EVs) has called for wide deployment of charging stations. These stations can be launched/owned by different owners, referred to as charging station providers (CSPs), which make energy contracts with a smart grid provider (SGP). However, there exists a shortage of mutual economic strategy between the SGP and CSPs in an energy request/transfer competition due to the selfish nature among them. In this paper, we propose an economic model leveraging a multi-principal single-agent (referred to as common agency) contract policy, aiming at maximizing the utilities of multiple CSPs while optimizing the utility of the SGP in an EV network. In particular, we first develop the common agency-based contract problem as a non-cooperative energy contract optimization problem, in which each CSP can maximize its utility given the common constraints from the SGP and the contracts of other CSPs. To deal with this problem, we develop an iterative energy contract algorithm to find an equilibrium contract solution where the contracts from the CSPs can produce maximum utilities of the CSPs and satisfy the constraints of the SGP. Through numerical results, we show that our proposed model can improve the social welfare of the EV network up to 54% and the utilities of CSPs up to 60% compared with the baseline method in which each CSP obtains the amount of energy that is proportional to its energy request.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10453/148350